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GHSA-228v-wc5r-j8m7 CVE-2026-32102 GO-2026-4683

OliveTin Vulnerable to Unauthorized Action Output Disclosure via EventStream

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.46%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 39.71% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
3000.10.2
Upgrade github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to this version or later

Description

Summary

OliveTin’s live EventStream broadcasts execution events and action output to authenticated dashboard subscribers without enforcing per-action authorization. A low-privileged authenticated user can receive output from actions they are not allowed to view, resulting in broken access control and sensitive information disclosure. I validated this on OliveTin 3000.10.2.

Details

The issue is in the live event streaming path.

EventStream() only checks whether the caller may access the dashboard, then registers the user as a stream subscriber:

  • service/internal/api/api.go:776

After subscription, execution events are broadcast to all connected clients without checking whether each recipient is authorized to view logs for the action:

  • service/internal/api/api.go:846 OnExecutionStarted
  • service/internal/api/api.go:869 OnExecutionFinished
  • service/internal/api/api.go:1047 OnOutputChunk

The event payload includes action output through:

  • service/internal/api/api.go:295 internalLogEntryToPb
  • service/internal/api/api.go:302 Output

By contrast, the normal log APIs do apply per-action authorization checks:

  • service/internal/api/api.go:518 GetLogs
  • service/internal/api/api.go:585 GetActionLogs
  • service/internal/api/api.go:544 isLogEntryAllowed

Root cause:

  • the subscription path enforces only coarse dashboard access
  • execution callbacks broadcast to every connected client
  • no per-recipient ACL check is applied before sending action metadata or output

I validated the issue using:

  • an admin user with full ACLs
  • an alice user with no ACLs
  • a protected action that outputs TOPSECRET=alpha-bravo-charlie

Despite having no relevant ACLs, alice still receives the ExecutionFinished event for the privileged action, including the protected output.

PoC

Tested version:

  - 3000.10.2
  1. Fetch and check out 3000.10.2 in a clean worktree:
  git -C OliveTin fetch origin tag 3000.10.2
  git -C OliveTin worktree add /home/kali/CVE/OliveTin-3000.10.2 3000.10.2
  1. Copy the PoC test into the clean tree:
  cp OliveTin/service/internal/api/event_stream_leak_test.go \
    OliveTin-3000.10.2/service/internal/api/
  1. Run the targeted PoC test:
  cd OliveTin-3000.10.2/service
  go test ./internal/api -run TestEventStreamLeaksUnauthorizedExecutionOutput -count=1 -timeout 30s -v
  1. Optional: save validation output:
  go test ./internal/api -run TestEventStreamLeaksUnauthorizedExecutionOutput -count=1 -timeout 30s -v \
    2>&1 | tee /tmp/olivetin_eventstream_3000.10.2.log

Observed validation output:

  === RUN   TestEventStreamLeaksUnauthorizedExecutionOutput
  time="2026-03-01T04:44:59-05:00" level=info msg="Action requested" actionTitle=secret-action tags="[]"
  time="2026-03-01T04:44:59-05:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - Before" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo 'TOPSECRET=alpha-bravo-charlie'"
  time="2026-03-01T04:44:59-05:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - After" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo 'TOPSECRET=alpha-bravo-charlie'"
  time="2026-03-01T04:44:59-05:00" level=info msg="Action started" actionTitle=secret-action timeout=1
  time="2026-03-01T04:44:59-05:00" level=info msg="Action finished" actionTitle=secret-action exit=0 outputLength=30 timedOut=false
  --- PASS: TestEventStreamLeaksUnauthorizedExecutionOutput (0.00s)
  PASS
  ok      github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/internal/api       0.025s

What this proves:

  • admin can execute the protected action
  • alice has no ACLs
  • alice still receives the streamed completion event for the protected action
  • protected action output is exposed through the event stream

Impact

This is an authenticated broken access control / information disclosure vulnerability.

A low-privileged authenticated user can subscribe to EventStream and receive:

  • action execution metadata
  • execution tracking IDs
  • initiating username
  • live output chunks
  • final command output

Who is impacted:

  • multi-user OliveTin deployments
  • environments where privileged actions produce secrets, tokens, internal system details, or other sensitive operational output
  • deployments where lower-privileged authenticated users can access the dashboard and subscribe to live events

This bypasses intended per-action log/view restrictions for protected actions.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
< 3000.10.2
3000.10.2
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin Go → 3000.10.2

go
go get github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin@v3000.10.2 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h
OliveTin: StartActionAndWait Endpoints Bypass `logs` Permission and Return Action Output
Medium Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65
OliveTin OS Command Injection via Custom regex: Argument Type Bypassing Shell Safety Check
Medium Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-xpxj-f2fm-rqch
OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth)
High Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-prj9-97mp-mwh2
OliveTin has Unvalidated `ot_`-prefixed Arguments that Bypass Input Filtering
Medium Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx
OliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration
Low Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-7fq5-7wr8-rjwj
OliveTin has a Concurrent Template Parsing Race Condition which Leads to Cross-Request Command Contamination
High Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g
OliveTin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection
Medium Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-364q-w7vh-vhpc
OliveTin's unsafe parsing of UniqueTrackingId can be used to write files
High Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
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