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GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h CVE-2026-67439 GO-2026-6144

OliveTin: StartActionAndWait Endpoints Bypass `logs` Permission and Return Action Output

Medium Go
Severity
4.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.43%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 37.61% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885
Upgrade github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to this version or later

Description

Summary

The synchronous execution RPCs StartActionAndWait and StartActionByGetAndWait return the full LogEntry for the just-executed action without checking whether the caller is allowed to read that action's logs.

OliveTin's ACL model separates exec from logs. A deployment can intentionally allow a user to run an action while denying access to its historical or live output. That separation is enforced in GetLogs, GetActionLogs, ExecutionStatus, and EventStream, but it is not enforced in the synchronous ...AndWait endpoints.

As a result, any user who can execute an action through these endpoints can read the action output immediately even when the action's ACL explicitly sets logs:false.

Details

OliveTin defines separate per-action permissions:

// service/internal/config/config.go
type PermissionsList struct {
    View bool `koanf:"view"`
    Exec bool `koanf:"exec"`
    Logs bool `koanf:"logs"`
    Kill bool `koanf:"kill"`
}

The normal log and streaming paths correctly enforce logs permission:

// service/internal/api/api.go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) isLogEntryAllowed(e *executor.InternalLogEntry, user *authpublic.AuthenticatedUser) bool {
    if user == nil || !isValidLogEntry(e) {
        return false
    }
    return acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, e.Binding.Action)
}

That check is used by:

  • GetLogs
  • GetActionLogs
  • ExecutionStatus
  • EventStream

However, the synchronous execution endpoints directly return the created LogEntry without any logs ACL check:

// service/internal/api/api.go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) StartActionAndWait(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionAndWaitRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse], error) {
    ...
    internalLogEntry, ok := api.startActionAndWaitRun(binding, args, user)
    if !ok {
        return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("execution not found"))
    }
    return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse{
        LogEntry: api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user),
    }), nil
}

func (api *oliveTinAPI) StartActionByGetAndWait(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitResponse], error) {
    ...
    internalLogEntry, ok := api.executor.GetLog(execReq.TrackingID)
    if ok {
        return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitResponse{
            LogEntry: api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user),
        }), nil
    }
    return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("execution not found"))
}

And internalLogEntryToPb() includes the full output:

// service/internal/api/api.go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) internalLogEntryToPb(logEntry *executor.InternalLogEntry, authenticatedUser *authpublic.AuthenticatedUser) *apiv1.LogEntry {
    pble := &apiv1.LogEntry{
        ActionTitle:         logEntry.ActionTitle,
        Output:              logEntry.Output,
        ExitCode:            logEntry.ExitCode,
        ExecutionTrackingId: logEntry.ExecutionTrackingID,
        ...
    }
    ...
    return pble
}

The executor separately enforces exec permission, but there is no subsequent check that the response should omit or deny Output when logs:false.

Local Reproduction

I verified this locally with a one-off test against the real StartActionAndWait handler.

Configuration used:

  • action secret_action with shell echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION
  • user low matched by ACL:
    • exec: true
    • logs: false
    • view: false
    • kill: false

Then I invoked StartActionAndWait as low through the real handler path using header-based auth.

Observed output from the test run:

=== RUN   TestTempStartActionAndWaitLeaksOutputWithoutLogsPermission
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action requested" actionTitle=secret-action tags="[]"
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - Before" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION"
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - After" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION"
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action started" actionTitle=secret-action timeout=5
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action finished" actionTitle=secret-action exit=0 outputLength=40 timedOut=false
    temp_acl_bypass_test.go:56: output="S\x00E\x00C\x00R\x00E\x00T\x00_\x00F\x00R\x00O\x00M\x00_\x00A\x00C\x00T\x00I\x00O\x00N\x00\r\x00\n\x00" blocked=false action="secret-action"
--- PASS: TestTempStartActionAndWaitLeaksOutputWithoutLogsPermission (0.03s)

The UTF-16LE formatting is from Windows echo, but the key result is that the response returned the real command output even though the caller's ACL explicitly denied log access.

Impact

  • Bypass of log confidentiality controls: Operators may configure actions to be executable but not log-readable. The ...AndWait endpoints break that separation.
  • Disclosure of secrets printed by actions: Many OliveTin actions wrap administrative scripts and commands whose stdout/stderr may contain credentials, internal paths, hostnames, tokens, or sensitive operational data.
  • Adjacent to previous output-leak bugs: OliveTin already had an EventStream output disclosure bug. This is a separate response-path authorization gap on the synchronous execution APIs.

Recommended Fix

Enforce logs permission before returning LogEntry content from synchronous execution endpoints.

Two reasonable fixes:

  1. Deny the endpoint response when logs:false
if !acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, binding.Action) {
    return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied, fmt.Errorf("permission denied to view action output"))
}
  1. Or redact log-bearing fields when logs:false
pb := api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user)
if !acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, binding.Action) {
    pb.Output = ""
    pb.ExitCode = 0
}
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse{LogEntry: pb}), nil

The same fix should be applied to both:

  • StartActionAndWait
  • StartActionByGetAndWait

References

  • service/internal/api/api.go
  • service/internal/config/config.go
  • service/internal/acl/acl.go

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
< 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885
0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin Go → 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885

go
go get github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin@v0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65
OliveTin OS Command Injection via Custom regex: Argument Type Bypassing Shell Safety Check
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OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth)
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GHSA-prj9-97mp-mwh2
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GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx
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GHSA-7fq5-7wr8-rjwj
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High Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g
OliveTin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection
Medium Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-228v-wc5r-j8m7
OliveTin Vulnerable to Unauthorized Action Output Disclosure via EventStream
Medium Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
GHSA-364q-w7vh-vhpc
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High Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
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