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GHSA-j3hg-9rp3-5hw9 CVE-2026-107805 GO-2026-6734

Nginx UI: Unauthenticated signed-request body staging can exhaust temporary storage

High Go
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.47%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.51% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Fix
1.9.10-0.20260901043436-8c9b9a1aff21
Upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to this version or later

Description

Summary

In Nginx UI versions 2.5.0 through 2.5.x, the node-signature authentication path staged an attacker-controlled request body in a temporary file and synchronized it to disk before validating the body digest and cryptographic signature. An unauthenticated remote client that can reach the API can provide syntactically valid signature metadata and cause storage and I/O consumption before the request is rejected.

Impact

Concurrent malicious requests can consume temporary filesystem capacity, disk I/O, and request-processing resources, potentially disrupting Nginx UI and other services that share the filesystem. The issue affects availability only; it does not bypass authentication and does not provide confidentiality or integrity impact. Deployment-specific reverse-proxy body limits, filesystem quotas, and concurrency limits may reduce practical impact.

Remediation

Upgrade to Nginx UI 2.6.0 or later. The fix authenticates signed request metadata before staging the body and enforces an application-level streaming size limit with cleanup for rejected requests.

Fix commit: https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/8c9b9a1aff218ee6c980d047b750e49da3c46796

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
>= 1.9.10-0.20260729084040-acb59fdd81db, < 1.9.10-0.20260901043436-8c9b9a1aff21
1.9.10-0.20260901043436-8c9b9a1aff21

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI Go → 1.9.10-0.20260901043436-8c9b9a1aff21

go
go get github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI@v1.9.10-0.20260901043436-8c9b9a1aff21 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GO-2026-6773
Nginx UI: Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant `state` parameter (login CSRF)
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-vc32-4gwf-77xp
Nginx UI: OTP secure-session step-up can be bypassed via MCP configuration tools
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9
Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enable
Medium Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-jrq7-xrjx-pcfw
Nginx UI: Auto backup name allows path traversal outside validated storage path
Medium Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-5r62-gj48-897x
Nginx UI: MCP configuration tools bypass restricted directive validation and allow secondary authenticated users to execute NJS in Nginx worker context
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-9jww-cxg5-rj9m
Nginx UI: MCP `nginx_config_add` Bypasses Directive Validation — Authenticated RCE
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-76pm-mq2q-9gcr
Nginx UI: MCP nginx_config_add skips config directive validation → authenticated nginx directive injection (RCE on the official image)
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-cf23-7qxj-xmhr
Nginx UI: nginx config directive denylist (ValidateConfigFile) is bypassable via same-line ";" separation → authenticated directive injection (RCE on the official image)
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
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