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GHSA-g8p8-94f2-28gr CVE-2026-41657

Admidio Exposes Cross-Organization Member Data via Permission Check Mismatch in contacts_data.php

Medium Packagist
Severity
4.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.32%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.28% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
5.0.9
Upgrade admidio/admidio to this version or later

Description

Summary

The contacts_data.php endpoint uses a weaker permission check (isAdministratorUsers(), requiring only rol_edit_user=true) than the frontend UI (contacts.php) which correctly requires the stronger isAdministrator() (requiring rol_administrator=true) and the contacts_show_all system setting. A user manager who is not a full administrator can directly request contacts_data.php?mem_show_filter=3 to retrieve all user records across all organizations in the Admidio instance, bypassing multi-tenant organization isolation.

Details

The frontend page contacts.php and the backend data endpoint contacts_data.php have mismatched authorization checks for the "show all organizations" filter (mem_show_filter=3).

Frontend guard at modules/contacts/contacts.php:80:

if ($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() && $gSettingsManager->getBool('contacts_show_all')) {
    // Only then is filter=3 ("All Organizations") shown in the dropdown
    $selectBoxValues = array(
        ...
        '3' => array('3', $gL10n->get('SYS_ALL_CONTACTS'), $gL10n->get('SYS_ALL_ORGANIZATIONS'))
    );
}

This correctly requires both isAdministrator() (rol_administrator=true) AND the contacts_show_all setting.

Backend check at modules/contacts/contacts_data.php:235:

} elseif (($getMembersShowFilter === 3) && $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers()) {
    $mainSql = $contactsListConfig->getSql(
        array(
            'showAllMembersDatabase' => true,
            ...
        )
    );

This only requires isAdministratorUsers() which checks rol_edit_user=true — a weaker permission available to non-admin "user manager" roles. The contacts_show_all setting is never checked.

The critical difference between the two methods (from src/Users/Entity/User.php):

  • isAdministrator() (line 1507): checks the rol_administrator flag — full system administrator
  • isAdministratorUsers() (line 1625): checks rol_edit_user right — user management module access only

When showAllMembersDatabase=true reaches ListConfiguration::getSql() (at src/Roles/Entity/ListConfiguration.php:1022-1028), the generated SQL removes ALL organization filtering:

} elseif ($optionsAll['showAllMembersDatabase']) {
    $sql = 'SELECT DISTINCT ' . $sqlMemLeader . $sqlIdColumns . $sqlColumnNames . '
              FROM ' . TBL_USERS . '
                   ' . $sqlJoin . '
             WHERE usr_valid = true ' .
        $sqlWhere .
        $sqlOrderBys;
}

Compare with the default query which includes cat_org_id = $gCurrentOrgId to restrict results to the current organization.

The cross-org indicator subqueries at line 169 do correctly check isAdministrator(), so the member_other_orga columns return 0 — but this only affects display indicators, not the actual user data returned.

PoC

Prerequisites: An Admidio instance with at least two organizations sharing the same database. A user account in Organization A assigned to a role with rol_edit_user=1 but rol_administrator=0.

Step 1: Log in as the user manager account and capture the session cookie.

Step 2: Request all users across all organizations by directly calling the data endpoint:

curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_manager_session>' \
  'https://target/adm_program/modules/contacts/contacts_data.php?mem_show_filter=3&draw=1&start=0&length=100&search%5Bvalue%5D='

Expected behavior: The request should be rejected or return only current-organization users, since the user is not a full administrator and the frontend never offers filter=3 to non-administrators.

Actual behavior: The endpoint returns a JSON response containing all users from ALL organizations in the database, including:

  • User UUIDs (usr_uuid)
  • Login names (login_name)
  • Email addresses (member_email)
  • All configured profile fields (names, addresses, phone numbers, etc.)

Step 3: Verify that users from Organization B (where the attacker has no membership) appear in the results by checking the member_this_orga field — it will be 0 for cross-org users.

Impact

In multi-organization Admidio deployments (the primary use case for organization isolation), a user manager in one organization can exfiltrate the complete member directory of all other organizations sharing the same database. Exposed data includes:

  • Full names and all configured profile fields
  • Email addresses
  • Login names (useful for credential attacks)
  • User UUIDs (useful for targeting other API endpoints)

This completely bypasses the multi-tenant organization isolation boundary. The contacts_show_all admin setting (intended to control this feature) is also bypassed, meaning even instances where administrators have explicitly disabled cross-org viewing are affected.

Recommended Fix

Change line 235 in modules/contacts/contacts_data.php to match the frontend guard at contacts.php:80:

// Before (vulnerable):
} elseif (($getMembersShowFilter === 3) && $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers()) {

// After (fixed):
} elseif (($getMembersShowFilter === 3) && $gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() && $gSettingsManager->getBool('contacts_show_all')) {

Additionally, as defense-in-depth, add an early rejection at the top of the file (after line 59) to block the filter value entirely for unauthorized users:

if ($getMembersShowFilter === 3 && (!$gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || !$gSettingsManager->getBool('contacts_show_all'))) {
    $getMembersShowFilter = 0; // Fall back to default
}

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
admidio/admidio
< 5.0.9
5.0.9

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

admidio/admidio Packagist → 5.0.9

composer
composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.9

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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