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GHSA-g375-5wmp-xr78 CVE-2026-32818

Admidio is Missing Authorization on Forum Topic and Post Deletion

Medium Packagist
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.24%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 14.48% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
5.0.7
Upgrade admidio/admidio to this version or later

Description

Summary

The forum module in Admidio does not verify whether the current user has permission to delete forum topics or posts. Both the topic_delete and post_delete actions in forum.php only validate the CSRF token but perform no authorization check before calling delete(). Any authenticated user with forum access can delete any topic (with all its posts) or any individual post by providing its UUID.

This is inconsistent with the save/edit operations, which properly check isAdministratorForum() and ownership before allowing modifications.

Details

Vulnerable Code Path 1: Topic Deletion

File: D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\forum.php, lines 98-108

The topic_delete handler validates CSRF but never calls $topic->isEditable():

case 'topic_delete':
    // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);

    $topic = new Topic($gDb);
    $topic->readDataByUuid($getTopicUUID);
    $topic->delete();
    echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
    break;

The Topic class has an isEditable() method (lines 144-164 of ListConfiguration.php) that properly checks isAdministratorForum() and getAllEditableCategories('FOT'), but it is never called in the delete path.

Vulnerable Code Path 2: Post Deletion

File: D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\forum.php, lines 125-134

The post_delete handler also validates CSRF but performs no authorization check:

case 'post_delete':
    // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);

    $post = new Post($gDb);
    $post->readDataByUuid($getPostUUID);
    $post->delete();
    echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
    break;

Contrast with Save Operations (Properly Authorized)

The ForumTopicService::savePost() method in D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\src\Forum\Service\ForumTopicService.php lines 117-121 correctly verifies authorization:

if ($postUUID !== '') {
    $post->readDataByUuid($postUUID);
    if (!$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorForum() && $post->getValue('fop_usr_id_create') !== $gCurrentUser->getValue('usr_id')) {
        throw new Exception('You are not allowed to edit this post.');
    }
}

The delete operations should have equivalent checks but do not.

Module-Level Access Check

File: D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\forum.php, lines 53-59

The only check before the delete operations is the module-level access check:

if ($gSettingsManager->getInt('forum_module_enabled') === 0) {
    throw new Exception('SYS_MODULE_DISABLED');
} elseif ($gSettingsManager->getInt('forum_module_enabled') === 1
    && !in_array($getMode, array('cards', 'list', 'topic')) && !$gValidLogin) {
    throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

This only ensures the user is logged in for write operations. It does not check whether the user has forum admin rights or is the author of the content being deleted.

PoC

Prerequisites: Two user accounts - a regular logged-in user (attacker) and a forum admin who has created topics and posts.

Step 1: Attacker discovers a topic UUID

The attacker visits any forum topic page. Topic UUIDs are visible in the URL and page source.

Step 2: Attacker deletes the topic (and all its posts)

curl -X POST "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/forum.php?mode=topic_delete&topic_uuid=<TOPIC_UUID>" \
  -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<attacker_session>" \
  -d "adm_csrf_token=<attacker_csrf_token>"

Expected response: {"status":"success"}

The topic and all its posts are permanently deleted from the database.

Step 3: Attacker deletes an individual post

curl -X POST "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/forum.php?mode=post_delete&post_uuid=<POST_UUID>" \
  -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<attacker_session>" \
  -d "adm_csrf_token=<attacker_csrf_token>"

Expected response: {"status":"success"}

Impact

  • Data Destruction: Any logged-in user can permanently delete any forum topic (including all associated posts) or any individual post. The Topic::delete() method cascades and removes all posts belonging to the topic.
  • Content Integrity: Forum content created by administrators or other authorized users can be destroyed by any regular member.
  • No Undo: The deletion is permanent. There is no soft-delete or trash mechanism. The only recovery would be from database backups.
  • Low Barrier: The attacker only needs a valid login and the UUID of the target content. UUIDs are visible in forum page URLs and are not secret.

Recommended Fix

Fix 1: Add authorization check to topic_delete

case 'topic_delete':
    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);

    $topic = new Topic($gDb);
    $topic->readDataByUuid($getTopicUUID);

    // Add authorization check
    if (!$topic->isEditable()) {
        throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
    }

    $topic->delete();
    echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
    break;

Fix 2: Add authorization check to post_delete

case 'post_delete':
    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);

    $post = new Post($gDb);
    $post->readDataByUuid($getPostUUID);

    // Add authorization check - only forum admins or the post author can delete
    if (!$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorForum()
        && (int)$post->getValue('fop_usr_id_create') !== $gCurrentUserId) {
        throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
    }

    $post->delete();
    echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
    break;

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
admidio/admidio
>= 5.0.0, < 5.0.7
5.0.7

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

admidio/admidio Packagist → 5.0.7

composer
composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.7

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-hm42-q32m-vj4f
Admidio: CSRF on Plugin Install, Uninstall, and Update via Unprotected GET Requests
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GHSA-xw54-c3mx-9pm3
Admidio: Any logged-in user can delete inventory fields via `mode=field_delete` — incomplete fix of #2024
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-mch8-wf3h-6x88
Admidio writes session IDs and auto-login cookie values to application logs
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-4rgq-38mh-9xqg
Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-x628-457g-2pw9
Admidio has IDOR in `documents-files.php` `mode=move_save` that lets any folder-uploader exfiltrate files from private folders
High Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-q6w3-hpfv-rg36
Admidio: IDOR in documents-files.php allows cross-folder file rename and description changes by unauthorized uploaders
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-xg76-5qj2-2hhv
Admidio: CSRF in SSO client `enable` action toggles SAML/OIDC clients without token validation
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w
Admidio's CSRF in registration `send_login` mode resets arbitrary user passwords
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
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