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GHSA-fmj9-77q8-g6c4 CVE-2024-43414

Apollo Query Planner and Apollo Gateway may infinitely loop on sufficiently complex queries

High crates.ionpm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.99%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 62.48% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-673 External Influence of Sphere Definition
CWE-674 Uncontrolled Recursion
Fix
Available
3 packages have a fixed version

Description

Impact

Instances of @apollo/query-planner >=2.0.0 and <2.8.5 are impacted by a denial-of-service vulnerability. @apollo/gateway versions >=2.0.0 and < 2.8.5 and Apollo Router <1.52.1 are also impacted through their use of @apollo/query-planner.

If @apollo/query-planner is asked to plan a sufficiently complex query, it may loop infinitely and never complete. This results in unbounded memory consumption and either a crash or out-of-memory (OOM) termination.

This issue can be triggered if you have at least one non-@key field that can be resolved by multiple subgraphs. To identify these shared fields, the schema for each subgraph must be reviewed. The mechanism to identify shared fields varies based on the version of Federation your subgraphs are using.

You can check if your subgraphs are using Federation 1 or Federation 2 by reviewing their schemas. Federation 2 subgraph schemas will contain a @link directive referencing the version of Federation being used while Federation 1 subgraphs will not. For example, in a Federation 2 subgraph, you will find a line like @link(url: "https://specs.apollo.dev/federation/v2.0"). If a similar @link directive is not present in your subgraph schema, it is using Federation 1. Note that a supergraph can contain a mix of Federation 1 and Federation 2 subgraphs.

To review Federation 1 subgraphs for impact:

In Federation 1 subgraphs, fields are implicitly shareable across subgraphs. To review for impact, you will need to review for cases where multiple subgraphs can resolve the same field. For example:

# Subgraph 1
type Query {
  field: Int
}

# Subgraph 2
type Query {
  field: Int
}

To review Federation 2 subgraphs for impact:

In Federation 2 subgraphs, fields must be explicitly defined as shareable across subgraphs. This is done via the @shareable directive. For example:

# Subgraph 1
@link(url: "https://specs.apollo.dev/federation/v2.0")
type Query {
  field: Int @shareable
}

# Subgraph 2
@link(url: "https://specs.apollo.dev/federation/v2.0")
type Query {
  field: Int @shareable
}

Impact Detail

This issue results from the Apollo query planner attempting to use a Number exceeding Javascript’s Number.MAX_VALUE in some cases. In Javascript, Number.MAX_VALUE is (2^1024 - 2^971).

When the query planner receives an inbound graphql request, it breaks the query into pieces and for each piece, generates a list of potential execution steps to solve the piece. These candidates represent the steps that the query planner will take to satisfy the pieces of the larger query. As part of normal operations, the query planner requires and calculates the number of possible query plans for the total query. That is, it needs the product of the number of query plan candidates for each piece of the query. Under normal circumstances, after generating all query plan candidates and calculating the number of all permutations, the query planner moves on to stack rank candidates and prune less-than-optimal options.

In particularly complex queries, especially those where fields can be solved through multiple subgraphs, this can cause the number of all query plan permutations to balloon. In worst-case scenarios, this can end up being a number larger than Number.MAX_VALUE. In Javascript, if Number.MAX_VALUE is exceeded, Javascript represents the value as “infinity”. If the count of candidates is evaluated as infinity, the component of the query planner responsible for pruning less-than-optimal query plans does not actually prune candidates, causing the query planner to evaluate many orders of magnitude more query plan candidates than necessary.

A given graph’s exposure to this issue varies based on its complexity. Consider the following Federation 2 subgraphs:

# Subgraph 1
type Query {
  field: Int @shareable
}

# Subgraph 2
type Query {
  field: Int @shareable
}

The query planner can solve requests for Query.field in one of two ways - either by querying subgraph 1 or subgraph 2.

The following query with 1024 aliased fields would trigger this issue because 2^1024 > Number.MAX_VALUE:

query {
  field_1: field
  field_2: field
  # ...
  field_1023: field
  field_1024: field
}

However, in a graph that provided 5 options to solve a given field, the bug could be encountered in a query that aliased the field approximately 440 times.

Patches

@apollo/query-planner 2.8.5 @apollo/gateway 2.8.5 Apollo Router 1.52.1

Workarounds

This issue can be avoided by ensuring there are no fields resolvable from multiple subgraphs. If all subgraphs are using Federation 2, you can confirm that you are not impacted by ensuring that none of your subgraph schemas use the @shareable directive. If you are using Federation 1 subgraphs, you will need to validate that there are no fields resolvable by multiple subgraphs.

Note that a supergraph can contain a mix of Federation 1 and Federation 2 subgraphs.

If you do have fields resolvable by multiple subgraphs, changing this behavior in response to this issue may be risky to the operation of your supergraph. We recommend that you update to a patched version of either Apollo Router or Apollo Gateway.

Apollo customers with an enterprise entitlement using the Apollo Router can also mitigate much of the risk from this issue by implementing Apollo’s Persisted Queries (PQ) feature. With PQ enabled, the Apollo Router will only execute safelisted queries. While customers would need to ensure that queries that induce this issue are not added to the safelist, PQs would mitigate the risk of clients submitting ad hoc queries that exploit this issue.

References

Additional information on Query Plans

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
apollo-router
< 1.52.1
1.52.1

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
@apollo/gateway
>= 2.0.0, < 2.8.5
2.8.5
@apollo/query-planner
>= 2.0.0, < 2.8.5
2.8.5

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

apollo-router crates.io → 1.52.1

cargo
cargo update -p apollo-router --precise 1.52.1

@apollo/gateway npm → 2.8.5

npm
npm install @apollo/gateway@2.8.5
yarn
yarn add @apollo/gateway@2.8.5
pnpm
pnpm add @apollo/gateway@2.8.5

@apollo/query-planner npm → 2.8.5

npm
npm install @apollo/query-planner@2.8.5
yarn
yarn add @apollo/query-planner@2.8.5
pnpm
pnpm add @apollo/query-planner@2.8.5

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-673: External Influence of Sphere Definition

The product does not prevent the definition of control spheres from external actors.

CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion

The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Ensure that an end condition will be reached under all logic conditions. The end condition may include checking against the depth of recursion and exiting with an error if the recursion goes too deep. The complexity of the end condition contributes to the effectiveness of this action.
  • Implementation: Increase the stack size.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-hff2-gcpx-8f4p
Apollo Router Core: Browser Bug Enables Bypass of XS-Search Prevention via Read-Only Cross-Site Request Forgery
Medium Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-x33c-7c2v-mrj9
Apollo Router Affected by an Access Control Bypass on Polymorphic Types
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-g8jh-vg5j-4h3f
Apollo Router Improperly Enforces Renamed Access Control Directives
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-3j43-9v8v-cp3f
Apollo Router Query Validation Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Processing
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-84m6-5m72-45fp
Apollo Router Operation Limits Vulnerable to Bypass via Integer Overflow
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-75m2-jhh5-j5g2
Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Expansion
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-94hh-jmq8-2fgp
Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Optimization Bypass
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32
Apollo Router Coprocessors may cause Denial-of-Service when handling request bodies
High Also affects apollo-router
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