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GHSA-hff2-gcpx-8f4p

Apollo Router Core: Browser Bug Enables Bypass of XS-Search Prevention via Read-Only Cross-Site Request Forgery

Medium crates.io
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Fix
2.12.1
Upgrade apollo-router to this version or later

Description

Impact

In a Cross-Site Request Forgery attack, untrusted web content causes browsers to send authenticated requests to web servers which use cookies for authentication. While the web content is prevented from reading the request's response due to the Cross-Origin Request Sharing (CORS) protocol, the attacker may be able to cause side effects in the server ("CSRF" attack), or learn something about the response via timing analysis ("XS-Search" attack).

Apollo Router has a built-in feature which prevents CSRF and XS-Search attacks: it refuses to process GraphQL requests that could possibly have been sent by a spec-compliant web browser without a protective "preflight" step. See Apollo Router's docs for more details on CORS, CSRF attacks, and Apollo Router's CSRF prevention feature.

This feature is fully effective against attacks carried out against users of spec-compliant browsers. Unfortunately, a major browser introduced a bug in 2025 which meant in certain cases, it failed to follow the CORS spec. The browser's maintainers have already committed to fixing the bug and making the browser spec-compliant again.

Even with this bug, Apollo Router's CSRF prevention feature blocks "side effect" CSRF attacks: Apollo Router will still correctly refuse to execute mutations in requests that were not preflighted. However, some specially crafted authenticated GraphQL queries can be issued across origins without preflight in buggy versions of this browser, allowing for XS-Search attacks: an attacker can analyze response times to learn facts about the responses to requests such as whether fields return null or approximately how many list entries are returned from fields.

Apollo Router installations are only vulnerable if they rely on cookies (or HTTP Basic Auth) for authentication.

Patches

The vulnerability is patched in the following versions of Apollo Router:

These releases contain a single change: GraphQL requests sent in HTTP GET requests which contain a Content-Type header naming a type other than application/json are rejected. (GET requests with no Content-Type are allowed.) This change prevents XS-Search attacks even in browsers which are non-compliant in ways similar to this browser.

There are no known cases where GraphQL apps depend on the ability of clients to send non-empty Content-Type headers with GET requests other than application/json, so this change has not been made configurable; if this change breaks a specific use case, contact support and more configurability can be added.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not possible, this particular browser's bug can be mitigated by preventing any HTTP request with a Content-Type header containing message/ from reaching the Apollo Router (e.g. in a load balancer/proxy).

If the load balancer cannot easily be updated to block these requests, it can also be done with a Rhai script within Router:

# config.yaml
rhai:
  scripts: "/directory/with/rhai/script"
  main: "main.rhai"

# main.rhai
fn router_service(service) {
    const request_callback = Fn("process_request");
    service.map_request(request_callback);
}

fn process_request(request) {
    if "content-type" in request.headers {
        if request.headers["content-type"].contains("message/") {
            throw "Error: invalid content type"
        }
    }
}

While the patch prevents a broader class of similar issues, the only known way to exploit this vulnerability is against a particular browser which currently plans to ship a fix in May 2026. If it is already past June 2026 and this vulnerability has not been addressed yet, it is likely that the installation is not currently vulnerable. Upgrading to the latest version of Apollo Router is still recommended for the broader protection.

Resources

The browser bug causes a similar vulnerability in Apollo Server; see https://github.com/apollographql/apollo-server/security/advisories/GHSA-9q82-xgwf-vj

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
apollo-router
>= 2.11.0, < 2.12.1
2.12.1
apollo-router
>= 2.0.0, < 2.10.2
2.10.2
apollo-router
< 1.61.13
1.61.13

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

apollo-router crates.io → 2.12.1

cargo
cargo update -p apollo-router --precise 2.12.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
Low
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-x33c-7c2v-mrj9
Apollo Router Affected by an Access Control Bypass on Polymorphic Types
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-g8jh-vg5j-4h3f
Apollo Router Improperly Enforces Renamed Access Control Directives
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-3j43-9v8v-cp3f
Apollo Router Query Validation Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Processing
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-84m6-5m72-45fp
Apollo Router Operation Limits Vulnerable to Bypass via Integer Overflow
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-75m2-jhh5-j5g2
Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Expansion
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-94hh-jmq8-2fgp
Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Optimization Bypass
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32
Apollo Router Coprocessors may cause Denial-of-Service when handling request bodies
High Also affects apollo-router
GHSA-fmj9-77q8-g6c4
Apollo Query Planner and Apollo Gateway may infinitely loop on sufficiently complex queries
High Also affects apollo-router
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