GHSA-cmxv-58fp-fm3g CVE-2026-40490
AsyncHttpClient leaks authorization credentials to untrusted domains on cross-origin redirects
- Severity
- 6.8 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.79% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- Fix
3.0.9- Upgrade org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to this version or later
Description
Impact
When redirect following is enabled (followRedirect(true)), AsyncHttpClient forwards Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers along with Realm credentials to arbitrary redirect targets regardless of domain, scheme, or port changes. This leaks credentials on cross-domain redirects and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades.
Additionally, even when stripAuthorizationOnRedirect is set to true, the Realm object containing plaintext credentials is still propagated to the redirect request, causing credential re-generation for Basic and Digest authentication schemes via NettyRequestFactory.
An attacker who controls a redirect target (via open redirect, DNS rebinding, or MITM on HTTP) can capture Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, or any other Authorization header value.
Patches
Fixed in version 3.0.9 or 2.14.5. Users should upgrade immediately.
The fix automatically strips Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers and clears Realm credentials whenever a redirect crosses origin boundaries (different scheme, host, or port) or downgrades from HTTPS to HTTP.
Workarounds
For users unable to upgrade, set (stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true)) in the client config and avoid using Realm-based authentication with redirect following enabled. Note that (stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true)) alone is insufficient on versions prior to 3.0.9 or 2.14.5 because the Realm bypass still re-generates credentials.
Alternatively, disable redirect following (followRedirect(false)) and handle redirects manually with origin validation.
References
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client | >= 3.0.0.Beta1, < 3.0.9 |
3.0.9 |
| org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client | >= 2.0.0, < 2.14.5 |
2.14.5 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client Maven → 3.0.9
- maven
<dependency><groupId>org.asynchttpclient</groupId><artifactId>async-http-client</artifactId><version>3.0.9</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client:3.0.9")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-cmxv-58fp…
- github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/6b2fbb7f8
- github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/ae557ad35246721c09dafb29766…
- github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-pro…
- github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-pro…
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg AsyncHttpClient: Cookies received over plaintext HTTP can plant, overwrite or delete Secure cookies set over HTTPS | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-3wp9-xfwm-rjjf AsyncHttpClient: WebSocket proxy credentials sent to the origin server over a CONNECT tunnel | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-mfj3-87qq-382v AsyncHttpClient: Digest authentication cnonce generated with a non-cryptographic random source | Low | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host | Critical | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-f9m8-cv68-674w AsyncHttpClient: Cookie Domain attribute is not checked against the public suffix list, so a cookie can be set for co.uk | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4 AsyncHttpClient: Digest challenge without a usable nonce downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext | High | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r AsyncHttpClient: Pooled connections can still be shared across NTLM, Negotiate and proxy logins | High | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix) | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
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