Skip to content

GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf CVE-2026-107228

AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix)

Medium Maven
Severity
6.8 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.30%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 22.87% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-287 Improper Authentication
Fix
3.0.14
Upgrade org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to this version or later

Description

Impact

With the cookie store enabled, which is the default, a Cookie header that the caller sets on a request with setHeader or addHeader is thrown away whenever the store holds any cookie for the request's origin: the request's cookie list is written into that header afterwards and replaces it. CVE-2024-53990 fixed the same problem for cookies added with addCookie, but that fix works on the cookie list, and a header set directly never reaches it.

This is not limited to a cookie of the same name. A store cookie of any name erases the caller's header, so a request meant to carry the caller's session cookie goes out with only the store's cookies, and where the store has a cookie of the caller's name, the store's value is sent instead.

It matters most where one client acts for several users. An application that puts each user's session on the request itself, and shares one client and its default cookie store, sends one user's request with a session cookie the store took from a response to another user. The request runs as that other user, so a user of such an application can have their request served under someone else's session, or someone else's under theirs.

Affected versions

  • 3.x: up to and including 3.0.13
  • 2.x: from 2.1.0 up to and including 2.16.1

Patches

Fixed in 3.0.14. The store's cookies are added to a caller's Cookie header instead of replacing it, and where both name the same cookie the caller's is kept. The caller's text is kept as written, and several Cookie headers are folded into one, as RFC 6265 Section 5.4 requires.

The 2.x line is end of life and will not receive a fix. Upgrade to 3.0.14.

Workarounds

Where requests carry per-user cookies, use a separate client per user, or disable the cookie store with setCookieStore(null).

References

Incomplete fix of CVE-2024-53990 (GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv). Reported by @1diot9.

Attribution

AI-assisted tools were used to support discovery and analysis.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.14
3.0.14
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
>= 2.1.0, <= 2.16.1
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client Maven → 3.0.14

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.asynchttpclient</groupId><artifactId>async-http-client</artifactId><version>3.0.14</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client:3.0.14")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-287: Improper Authentication

When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use an authentication framework or library such as the OWASP ESAPI Authentication feature.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg
AsyncHttpClient: Cookies received over plaintext HTTP can plant, overwrite or delete Secure cookies set over HTTPS
Medium Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-3wp9-xfwm-rjjf
AsyncHttpClient: WebSocket proxy credentials sent to the origin server over a CONNECT tunnel
Medium Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-mfj3-87qq-382v
AsyncHttpClient: Digest authentication cnonce generated with a non-cryptographic random source
Low Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w
AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host
Critical Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-f9m8-cv68-674w
AsyncHttpClient: Cookie Domain attribute is not checked against the public suffix list, so a cookie can be set for co.uk
Medium Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4
AsyncHttpClient: Digest challenge without a usable nonce downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext
High Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r
AsyncHttpClient: Pooled connections can still be shared across NTLM, Negotiate and proxy logins
High Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-x8v2-478q-2hvg
AsyncHttpClient: Unbounded WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression enables a decompression-bomb denial of service when compression is enabled
High Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor