GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r CVE-2026-107230
AsyncHttpClient: Pooled connections can still be shared across NTLM, Negotiate and proxy logins
- Severity
- 7.4 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.19%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 8.49% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
3.0.14- Upgrade org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to this version or later
Description
Impact
The fix for GHSA-vvp4-63h8-v5pm in 3.0.13 folded the authenticated principal into the HTTP/1.1 connection pool key, so that a connection one principal authenticated with NTLM, Kerberos or SPNEGO is not handed to another. It left three cases out. In each, a socket that one identity authenticated can still be drawn by a request belonging to a different identity, and the server serves that request as the first one.
- A login with no configured principal. Kerberos and SPNEGO against the ticket cache or the default JAAS login, which is the usual deployment, leave the realm's principal unset, and the key stayed unscoped in that case. A request to the same host that carries no credentials at all draws the authenticated socket and is served as the service identity.
- The proxy realm. Only the origin realm went into the key. A connection authenticated to a proxy with NTLM or Negotiate is handed to requests of another proxy identity, or of none, and the proxy acts for them as the first identity.
- Identities that share a user name. Only the principal string went into the key, so
CORP\aliceandOTHER\aliceshared connections, as did two realms differing only in password, login context, keytab or service principal. The Kerberos login cache inSpnegoEnginehad the same collision, and it was an unsynchronised map, so concurrent first use could hand one caller's login to another.
Who is Impacted
Applications that authenticate with NTLM, Kerberos or SPNEGO, to an origin or to a proxy, and send requests under different identities, or both with and without credentials, to the same host through one client. The sharpest case is a service that calls an internal host under its own Kerberos identity and also fetches user-supplied URLs: a URL on that host is fetched as the service. Basic and Digest are not affected.
Affected versions
- 3.x: 3.0.13
- 2.x: 2.16.1
Earlier versions are covered by GHSA-vvp4-63h8-v5pm.
Patches
Fixed in 3.0.14. The pool key now carries a digest of every field of the realm that decides which identity the connection ends up as, for the origin and the proxy separately, and a realm that authenticates the connection is scoped whether or not it names a principal. SpnegoEngine caches logins in a concurrent map keyed by every other field of that identity, and replaces a cached login when the password changes.
The 2.x line is end of life and will not receive a fix. Upgrade to 3.0.14.
Workarounds
Use a separate AsyncHttpClient instance per identity, and do not share one between authenticated and unauthenticated requests to a host that uses NTLM or Negotiate. Disabling connection pooling also removes the reuse.
Incomplete fix of GHSA-vvp4-63h8-v5pm.
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client | >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.14 |
3.0.14 |
| org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client | >= 2.0.0, <= 2.16.1 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client Maven → 3.0.14
- maven
<dependency><groupId>org.asynchttpclient</groupId><artifactId>async-http-client</artifactId><version>3.0.14</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client:3.0.14")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-346: Origin Validation Error
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg AsyncHttpClient: Cookies received over plaintext HTTP can plant, overwrite or delete Secure cookies set over HTTPS | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-3wp9-xfwm-rjjf AsyncHttpClient: WebSocket proxy credentials sent to the origin server over a CONNECT tunnel | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-mfj3-87qq-382v AsyncHttpClient: Digest authentication cnonce generated with a non-cryptographic random source | Low | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host | Critical | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-f9m8-cv68-674w AsyncHttpClient: Cookie Domain attribute is not checked against the public suffix list, so a cookie can be set for co.uk | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4 AsyncHttpClient: Digest challenge without a usable nonce downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext | High | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix) | Medium | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
| GHSA-x8v2-478q-2hvg AsyncHttpClient: Unbounded WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression enables a decompression-bomb denial of service when compression is enabled | High | Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client |
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