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GHSA-95cq-p4w2-32w5 CVE-2026-32756

File Upload(RCE) Vulnerability in admidio

High Packagist
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.02%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 63.42% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Fix
5.0.7
Upgrade admidio/admidio to this version or later

Description

Summary

A critical unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in the Documents & Files module of Admidio. Due to a design flaw in how CSRF token validation and file extension verification interact within UploadHandlerFile.php, an authenticated user with upload permissions can bypass file extension restrictions by intentionally submitting an invalid CSRF token. This allows the upload of arbitrary file types, including PHP scripts, which may lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server.

Details

1. Critical - Unrestricted File Upload leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Root Cause Analysis:

The root cause lies in a design flaw in src/Infrastructure/Plugins/UploadHandlerFile.php. The UploadHandlerFile class overrides two methods from its parent UploadHandler class:

  • handle_form_data($file, $index) — Validates the CSRF token. On failure, it sets $file->error and returns. The request is not terminated.
  • handle_file_upload(...) — Calls parent::handle_file_upload() to physically write the file to disk, then checks if (!isset($file->error)) before running file extension validation (allowedFileExtension()).

The execution flow differs based on whether the CSRF token is valid:

  • Valid CSRF token: handle_form_data() does not set an error → extension check runs → invalid extension causes the uploaded file to be deleted from disk.
  • Invalid CSRF token: handle_form_data() sets $file->error → the if (!isset($file->error)) guard in handle_file_upload() causes the extension validation to be skipped entirely → the cleanup code (FileSystemUtils::deleteFileIfExists()) is never reached → the file, already written to disk by the parent class, remains on the server and is directly accessible.

In summary, the file is always saved to disk by the parent class first. The extension check and cleanup only execute when no prior error exists. A deliberate CSRF token failure bypasses the extension filter while the file remains on disk.

Affected code (src/Infrastructure/Plugins/UploadHandlerFile.php):

// File is physically saved to disk here, before any Admidio-specific checks
$file = parent::handle_file_upload($uploaded_file, $name, $size, $type, $error, $index, $content_range);

if (!isset($file->error)) {
    // Extension validation is only reached when no prior error is set.
    // If CSRF validation failed in handle_form_data(), this block is skipped
    // and the uploaded file is never cleaned up from disk.
    if (!$newFile->allowedFileExtension()) {
        throw new Exception('SYS_FILE_EXTENSION_INVALID');
    }
}

PoC

Documents & Files Create folder <img width="762" height="729" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2c927482-851b-4945-93d6-6e7a1e3bc21f" />

<img width="749" height="690" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/72443c87-e15f-4312-9659-8cd0661a4dae" />

File Upload Try 1-1 (before request) <img width="1856" height="635" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d1ffaa12-aec1-45ff-a612-885d9554fb60" />

File Upload Try 1-2 (after request) <img width="1850" height="855" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ece4aac-1255-4189-9048-45ff3df4abcf" />

File Upload Try 1-3 (After changing CSRF to a test value, request → PHP file upload succeeds) <img width="1847" height="928" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/63f9d108-5e4f-4d32-96d2-09f9ad910873" />

✅ rcepoc.php Upload Success! <img width="926" height="814" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4de99c31-dc3c-44f2-9936-19c3da0dfffb" />

Access the rcepoc upload path confirmed in the response and check the web shell. <img width="1635" height="922" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0b770caf-e737-4cbd-97b9-ae191a8b79f5" />

🆗 WebShell Success <img width="685" height="187" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e90f162b-7949-41c4-9fd1-aad3b6365adf" />

<img width="794" height="209" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f45dae74-a830-4761-af31-f2ac28eb2586" />

Steps to Reproduce:

  1. Log in to Admidio as an authenticated user with upload permissions on the Documents & Files module.
  2. Navigate to a folder in the Documents & Files module and open the file upload dialog.
  3. Intercept the upload POST request to /system/file_upload.php?module=documents_files&mode=upload_files&uuid=<folder_uuid> using a proxy tool such as Burp Suite.
  4. Replace the value of the adm_csrf_token field with an arbitrary invalid string (e.g., webshellgogo).
  5. Set the file to be uploaded to a PHP webshell (e.g., <?php system($_GET[1]); ?>).
  6. Forward the modified request.
  7. Observe that the server responds with HTTP 200 OK. The JSON body contains "error":"Invalid or missing CSRF token!", yet the file is physically present on the server at the path indicated in the url field.
  8. Access the uploaded PHP file directly via the URL provided in the response — arbitrary command execution is confirmed.

Impact

  • An authenticated attacker with upload permissions can bypass file extension validation and upload arbitrary server-side scripts such as PHP webshells.
  • This leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE), potentially resulting in full server compromise, sensitive data exfiltration, and lateral movement.
  • While authentication is required, the attack is not limited to administrators — any member granted upload rights may exploit this vulnerability, making the attack surface broader than it may initially appear.

Remediation Measures

  • The extension validation logic should be executed independently of the CSRF error state. It is recommended to move the extension check and the corresponding cleanup outside of the if (!isset($file->error)) block so that files with disallowed extensions are always removed from disk, regardless of other errors.
  • Rather than relying on a blacklist of dangerous extensions (e.g., .php, .phar, .phtml), it is strongly recommended to implement a whitelist of permitted extensions appropriate to a documents module (e.g., .pdf, .docx, .xlsx, .pptx, .txt).
  • CSRF token validation should either be performed before the file is written to disk, or a validation failure should result in immediate request termination rather than merely setting an error flag on the file object.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
admidio/admidio
< 5.0.7
5.0.7

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

admidio/admidio Packagist → 5.0.7

composer
composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.7

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Architecture and Design: Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
  • Architecture and Design: Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.
  • Implementation: Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Implementation: When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-hm42-q32m-vj4f
Admidio: CSRF on Plugin Install, Uninstall, and Update via Unprotected GET Requests
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-xw54-c3mx-9pm3
Admidio: Any logged-in user can delete inventory fields via `mode=field_delete` — incomplete fix of #2024
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-mch8-wf3h-6x88
Admidio writes session IDs and auto-login cookie values to application logs
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-4rgq-38mh-9xqg
Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-x628-457g-2pw9
Admidio has IDOR in `documents-files.php` `mode=move_save` that lets any folder-uploader exfiltrate files from private folders
High Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-q6w3-hpfv-rg36
Admidio: IDOR in documents-files.php allows cross-folder file rename and description changes by unauthorized uploaders
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-xg76-5qj2-2hhv
Admidio: CSRF in SSO client `enable` action toggles SAML/OIDC clients without token validation
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w
Admidio's CSRF in registration `send_login` mode resets arbitrary user passwords
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
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