GHSA-93jq-624g-4p9p CVE-2017-14063

Improper Input Validation in async-http-client

High Maven

Severity: 7.5 / 10; High · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS): 3.05%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 87.54% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
Fix: 2.0.35; Upgrade org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to this version or later

Description

Async Http Client (aka async-http-client) before 2.0.35 can be tricked into connecting to a host different from the one extracted by java.net.URI if a '?' character occurs in a fragment identifier. Similar bugs were previously identified in cURL (CVE-2016-8624) and Oracle Java 8 java.net.URL.

Affected versions

Maven

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client	`< 2.0.35`	`2.0.35`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client Maven → `2.0.35`

maven

<dependency><groupId>org.asynchttpclient</groupId><artifactId>async-http-client</artifactId><version>2.0.35</version></dependency>

gradle

implementation("org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client:2.0.35")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 7.5

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: None
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: High
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

References

Advisories

Packages

github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client

Timeline

Oct 19, 2018 Published
Mar 14, 2024 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg AsyncHttpClient: Cookies received over plaintext HTTP can plant, overwrite or delete Secure cookies set over HTTPS	Medium	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-3wp9-xfwm-rjjf AsyncHttpClient: WebSocket proxy credentials sent to the origin server over a CONNECT tunnel	Medium	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-mfj3-87qq-382v AsyncHttpClient: Digest authentication cnonce generated with a non-cryptographic random source	Low	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host	Critical	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-f9m8-cv68-674w AsyncHttpClient: Cookie Domain attribute is not checked against the public suffix list, so a cookie can be set for co.uk	Medium	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4 AsyncHttpClient: Digest challenge without a usable nonce downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext	High	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r AsyncHttpClient: Pooled connections can still be shared across NTLM, Negotiate and proxy logins	High	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix)	Medium	Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client

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