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GHSA-8xjq-pr36-ccgf CVE-2026-55548

Yamcs: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in PacketsApi allows unprivileged users to dump all telemetry packets

Medium Maven
Severity
4.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.36%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 29.84% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
5.13.2
Upgrade org.yamcs:yamcs-core to this version or later

Description

Summary

The PacketsApi.exportPackets endpoint in Yamcs fails to properly enforce object-level privileges (ReadPacket) when an API request omits specific packet names. As a result, an attacker with a low-privileged account (or any authenticated user with zero privileges) can dump the entire archive of raw telemetry packets for a Yamcs instance. This leads to a massive Information Disclosure of sensitive mission telemetry, completely bypassing the intended Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model.

Vulnerability Details

In yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/PacketsApi.java, the exportPackets method processes requests to export raw packets from the tm (telemetry archive) table.

    @Override
    public void exportPackets(Context ctx, ExportPacketsRequest request, Observer<HttpBody> observer) {
        String instance = InstancesApi.verifyInstance(request.getInstance());

        Set<String> nameSet = new HashSet<>(request.getNameList());
        ctx.checkObjectPrivileges(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, nameSet);

        SqlBuilder sqlb = new SqlBuilder(XtceTmRecorder.TABLE_NAME);
        
        // ... time filters ...

        if (request.getNameCount() > 0) {
            sqlb.whereColIn("pname", nameSet);
        }
        String sql = sqlb.toString();
        // ...

The method attempts to verify privileges using ctx.checkObjectPrivileges(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, nameSet). However, if the request.getNameList() is empty (i.e., the attacker does not specify any packet names to filter by), nameSet is empty. The checkObjectPrivileges method loops over this empty set and successfully passes without throwing a ForbiddenException.

Since request.getNameCount() is 0, no WHERE pname IN (...) filter is added to the SQL query. The resulting sql query becomes a SELECT * FROM tm (with optional time filters).

Finally, the query is executed and the results are streamed back to the user:

        StreamFactory.stream(instance, sql, sqlb.getQueryArguments(), new StreamSubscriber() {

            @Override
            public void onTuple(Stream stream, Tuple tuple) {
                if (observer.isCancelled()) {
                    stream.close();
                    return;
                }

                byte[] raw = (byte[]) tuple.getColumn(StandardTupleDefinitions.TM_PACKET_COLUMN);
                HttpBody body = HttpBody.newBuilder()
                        .setData(ByteString.copyFrom(raw))
                        .build();
                observer.next(body);
            }
            // ...

Crucially, unlike the streamPackets or exportPacket methods (which explicitly check ctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege for each packet retrieved before returning them), the onTuple handler in exportPackets blindly streams all retrieved packets to the user without any per-row authorization checks.

Thus, a user who possesses no ReadPacket privileges at all can easily bypass authorization and extract all telemetry data from the archive.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Start the Yamcs server (e.g., using the simulation example) with authentication enforced.
  2. Log in as a low-privileged user (or use their credentials) who does not have the ReadPacket privilege.
  3. Send an HTTP GET request to the export packets endpoint without specifying any name parameters:
    curl -v -u low_priv_user:password "http://localhost:8090/api/archive/simulator:exportPackets" -o dumped_packets.raw
    
  4. Observe that the server responds with HTTP 200 OK and streams all raw packets to the response, saving them to dumped_packets.raw.
  5. The downloaded file contains raw CCSDS Space Packets (binary telemetry data).
  6. Contrast this with an attempt to fetch a specific packet (or calling listPackets for an unauthorized packet), which correctly enforces authorization and rejects the request.

Impact

Telemetry packets contain the core mission data, vehicle health status, and sensitive measurements (CCSDS Protocol data). This vulnerability completely breaks the access control model for telemetry data, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate all historical telemetry packets from the database. In an aerospace or mission-critical environment, this represents a severe data leak (Massive Information Disclosure) of proprietary or classified spacecraft data.

Remediation

Ensure that exportPackets enforces the same per-row privilege checks as streamPackets. Update the onTuple handler to check the user's privileges before emitting each packet:

            @Override
            public void onTuple(Stream stream, Tuple tuple) {
                if (observer.isCancelled()) {
                    stream.close();
                    return;
                }

                // FIX: Retrieve packet name and check authorization
                String pname = (String) tuple.getColumn(XtceTmRecorder.PNAME_COLUMN);
                if (ctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, pname)) {
                    byte[] raw = (byte[]) tuple.getColumn(StandardTupleDefinitions.TM_PACKET_COLUMN);
                    HttpBody body = HttpBody.newBuilder()
                            .setData(ByteString.copyFrom(raw))
                            .build();
                    observer.next(body);
                }
            }

System Information

  • Affected Versions: 5.13.0 (Latest Release), 5.12.x, and current master branch.
  • Tested Revision (master): 309218c651680f79df11a8d0f8628f7033f98a83
  • Vulnerability Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) / Logical Authorization Bypass

PoC Images:

  • Check version: <img width="1157" height="489" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/58608222-b76f-4eb4-8e57-423523062992" />

  • Check privilege of user: <img width="1439" height="953" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/aa7e55f2-2460-4f24-8b6f-d461d2499a6f" /> <img width="1214" height="224" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e9123ae3-a194-462d-a5ca-2c0b1cc9cc6f" />

  • Exploit:

<img width="1728" height="685" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0c7b3099-44d6-4392-bbaa-8e84cc151784" />

<img width="1768" height="797" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/df4016a5-d460-4611-a34a-8c0d206edd9c" />

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.yamcs:yamcs-core
>= 5.13.0, < 5.13.2
5.13.2
org.yamcs:yamcs-core
< 5.12.8
5.12.8

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.yamcs:yamcs-core Maven → 5.13.2

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.yamcs</groupId><artifactId>yamcs-core</artifactId><version>5.13.2</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.yamcs:yamcs-core:5.13.2")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-9272-wg2r-7xmx
Yamcs has DOM XSS in Extension Routing
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GHSA-c64q-hj4j-375f
Yamcs vulnerable to authenticated remote code execution via unescaped StreamSQL `LIKE` pattern compiled by Janino (`LikeExpression`)
Critical Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core
GHSA-73mf-m39p-wpm9
Yamcs vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via instance-template argument YAML injection (createInstance)
Critical Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core
GHSA-9jg3-g3wh-w9pj
Yamcs has Unauthenticated Directory Traversal
High Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core
GHSA-rxpg-wjf8-qv9c
Yamcs has Reflected XSS in the URL of the Authorize Endpoint
Medium Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core
GHSA-cvw4-55pp-3hfq
Yamcs's Missing Authorization on Role and Privilege Enumeration Endpoints Allows Any Authenticated User to Disclose Full Security Configuration
Medium Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core
GHSA-fwww-cp23-7f5g
Yamcs's WebSocket subscription handlers omit the privilege checks their REST siblings enforce
Medium Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core
GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p
Yamcs Core API has Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities
High Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core
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