Skip to content

GHSA-89xv-2j6f-qhc8 CVE-2026-33252 GO-2026-4773

Cross-Site Tool Execution for HTTP Servers without Authorizatrion in github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk

Medium Go
Severity
7.1 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.18%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 7.67% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Fix
1.4.1
Upgrade github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk to this version or later

Description

The Go SDK's Streamable HTTP transport accepted browser-generated cross-site POST requests without validating the Origin header and without requiring Content-Type: application/json. In deployments without Authorization, especially stateless or sessionless configurations, this allows an arbitrary website to send MCP requests to a local server and potentially trigger tool execution.

Impact:

A malicious website may have been able to send cross-site POST requests with Content-Type: text/plain, which due to CORS-safelisted properties would reach the MCP message handling without any CORS preflight barrier.

Fix:

The SDK was modified to perform Content-Type header validation for POST requests and introduced a configurable protection for verifying the origin of the request in commit a433a83. Users are advised to update to v1.4.1 to use this additional protection.

Note: v1.4.1 requires Go 1.25 or later.

Credits:

Thank you to Lê Minh Quân for reporting the issue.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
<= 1.4.0
No fix yet
github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
< 1.4.1
1.4.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk Go → 1.4.1

go
go get github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk@v1.4.1 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
  • Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
  • Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
  • Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xw59-hvm2-8pj6
DNS Rebinding Protection Disabled by Default in Model Context Protocol Go SDK for Servers Running on Localhost
High Also affects github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
GHSA-q382-vc8q-7jhj
Improper handling of null Unicode character when parsing JSON in github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
High Also affects github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
GHSA-wvj2-96wp-fq3f
MCP Go SDK Vulnerable to Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity
High Also affects github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
GHSA-2p8c-gr87-2676
Electron: SameSite cookie restrictions are not applied to windows opened from links
Medium Same weakness, CWE-352
GO-2026-6773
Nginx UI: Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant `state` parameter (login CSRF)
High Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq
Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions
Low Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-33rr-wq23-g6gg
Nginx-UI AuthRequired token cookie fallback enables CSRF against management APIs
High Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-pvph-5j39-v8qc
PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
High Same weakness, CWE-352

Credits: aleister1102

Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor