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GHSA-7grg-jcf7-rpmx CVE-2026-85721

AsyncHttpClient's unbounded HTTP/1.1 response decompression enables a decompression-bomb denial of service

High Maven
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.63%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 50.20% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
Fix
3.0.12
Upgrade org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to this version or later

Description

Impact

With automatic response decompression enabled (the default), the HTTP/1.1 path decompresses response bodies with no limit on the total output size. A hostile or compromised server, or an attacker who can change a response in transit, can send a small compressed body that inflates without bound in memory, exhausting the client's heap and causing an OutOfMemoryError. gzip, deflate and snappy are always available as vectors; brotli and zstd apply only when those optional codecs are on the classpath.

Affected versions

  • 3.x: up to and including 3.0.11
  • 2.x: up to and including 2.16.0

The HTTP/2 path carries its own limit from 3.0.11 onward. On 3.0.8, 3.0.9 and 3.0.10 the HTTP/2 decompressor is also unbounded, so on those versions switching to HTTP/2 is not a mitigation.

Patches

Fixed in 3.0.12 on the 3.x line and in 2.16.1 on the 2.x line. The fix counts the decompressed bytes produced for each response and fails the response once the configured maximum is exceeded, so the limit applies to the whole body rather than to any single chunk.

Workarounds

On 3.x, disable automatic decompression (setEnableAutomaticDecompression(false)) and decompress manually with your own size limit. The 2.x line has no such setting; the decompressor is installed unconditionally, so the only option there is to remove the inflater handler through httpAdditionalChannelInitializer. On either line, running the client behind a proxy that caps response sizes also works.

Details

ChannelManager.newHttpContentDecompressor() created Netty's HttpContentDecompressor without any bound, and Netty's own maxAllocation parameter limits a single decode step rather than the accumulated size of a response, so it cannot bound a decompression bomb delivered as many small chunks. The fix tracks the accumulated decompressed size per response instead.

Note that 3.0.12 is itself affected by a separate issue, GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4, where a Digest challenge the client cannot read downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext. Upgrade to 3.0.13 to pick up both fixes.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.12
3.0.12
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
>= 2.0.0, < 2.16.1
2.16.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client Maven → 3.0.12

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.asynchttpclient</groupId><artifactId>async-http-client</artifactId><version>3.0.12</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client:3.0.12")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg
AsyncHttpClient: Cookies received over plaintext HTTP can plant, overwrite or delete Secure cookies set over HTTPS
Medium Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-3wp9-xfwm-rjjf
AsyncHttpClient: WebSocket proxy credentials sent to the origin server over a CONNECT tunnel
Medium Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-mfj3-87qq-382v
AsyncHttpClient: Digest authentication cnonce generated with a non-cryptographic random source
Low Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w
AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host
Critical Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-f9m8-cv68-674w
AsyncHttpClient: Cookie Domain attribute is not checked against the public suffix list, so a cookie can be set for co.uk
Medium Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4
AsyncHttpClient: Digest challenge without a usable nonce downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext
High Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-v2j5-22fr-j62r
AsyncHttpClient: Pooled connections can still be shared across NTLM, Negotiate and proxy logins
High Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf
AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix)
Medium Also affects org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
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