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GHSA-6fpp-rgj9-8rwc CVE-2019-14379

Deserialization of untrusted data in FasterXML jackson-databind

Critical Maven
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
8.11%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 94.83% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1321 Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Fix
2.9.9.2
Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to this version or later

Description

SubTypeValidator.java in FasterXML jackson-databind before 2.9.9.2, 2.8.11.4, and 2.7.9.6 mishandles default typing when ehcache is used (because of net.sf.ehcache.transaction.manager.DefaultTransactionManagerLookup), leading to remote code execution.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
>= 2.9.0, < 2.9.9.2
2.9.9.2
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
>= 2.8.0, < 2.8.11.4
2.8.11.4
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
< 2.7.9.6
2.7.9.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind Maven → 2.9.9.2

maven
<dependency><groupId>com.fasterxml.jackson.core</groupId><artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId><version>2.9.9.2</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.9.9.2")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: By freezing the object prototype first (for example, Object.freeze(Object.prototype)), modification of the prototype becomes impossible.
  • Architecture and Design: By blocking modifications of attributes that resolve to object prototype, such as proto or prototype, this weakness can be mitigated.
  • Implementation: When handling untrusted objects, validating using a schema can be used.
  • Implementation: By using an object without prototypes (via Object.create(null) ), adding object prototype attributes by accessing the prototype via the special attributes becomes impossible, mitigating this weakness.
  • Implementation: Map can be used instead of objects in most cases. If Map methods are used instead of object attributes, it is not possible to access the object prototype or modify it.

CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: If available, use features of the language or framework that allow specification of allowlists of attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified. If possible, prefer allowlists over denylists. For applications written with Ruby on Rails, use the attr_accessible (allowlist) or attr_protected (denylist) macros in each class that may be used in mass assignment.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: For any externally-influenced input, check the input against an allowlist of internal object attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: Refactor the code so that object attributes or fields do not need to be dynamically identified, and only expose getter/setter functionality for the intended attributes.

References

Advisories

Packages

Other links

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-cxp5-3px4-pw24
jackson-databind quadratic forward-reference completion
High Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-wv8q-qhhj-9h54
jackson-databind retains every unknown raw type ID
High Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-q4xh-88c3-wmh7
jackson-databind: Duration XMLGregorianCalendar Unbounded Number Parse DoS
High Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j
jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist)
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf
jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-vvgp-rfg2-7rr6
jackson-databind: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54514: eager DNS resolution (SSRF) still present in InetAddress deserialization
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w
jackson-databind: `@JsonView` bypass for creator properties with `@JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)`
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh
jackson-databind: @JsonView bypassed for @JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
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