SiYuan: Missing publish-access filter on the HPath/path-resolution endpoints discloses the private document tree to anonymous readers

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72799.

Summary

Five filetree endpoints resolve arbitrary document IDs and paths with no publish-access check of any kind. All are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader can map the complete private document tree every notebook, folder, and document title, and which notebook holds each document for documents marked hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden, and can resolve titles to document IDs.

Details

None of the following handlers invokes IsReadOnlyRoleContext, CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess, or CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore:

Each accepts an arbitrary ID or HPath and resolves it identically for hidden, publish-forbidden, and password-protected documents.

This enables two operations for an unauthenticated caller:

1. Map the private document tree: getFullHPathByID and getPathByID yield every notebook/folder/document title and its containing notebook.
2. Resolve titles to IDs: getIDsByHPath converts a known or guessed title path into document IDs, which are the required input for other block-read endpoints.

Document titles and HPaths are precisely the block metadata that the project's block-metadata restriction (commit ffde3b21e) set out to protect; that change gated getBlockInfo, getDocInfo, and getDocsInfo but left this entire path-resolution family open.

Guarded-sibling asymmetry. getRecentDocs (FilterRecentDocsByPublishAccess), getCriteria (FilterCriteriaByPublishAccess), and getLocalStorage (FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess) all filter document references for reader sessions. The codebase clearly publish-scopes reader-visible metadata elsewhere; these five endpoints do not.

Verified at origin/master (eef105683): all five handler bodies contain no publish-access call; the storage-family siblings contain their filters; all five routes are registered CheckAuth without CheckAdminRole.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. A document exists in a notebook marked publish-forbidden or password-protected.

Resolve a private document's full title path:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getFullHPathByID
{"id":"<DOC_ID>"}
→ /MySecretNotebook/Confidential/Q3 Layoffs Plan

Identify its notebook and storage path:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getPathByID
{"id":"<DOC_ID>"}
→ {"path":"/....sy","notebook":"<BOX_ID>"}

Enumerate IDs from a title path:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getIDsByHPath
{"path":"/Confidential","notebook":"<BOX_ID>"}
→ document IDs under a folder the reader cannot otherwise access

Each returns data for documents excluded from publishing; no password or membership is required.

Impact

An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can enumerate the complete private document structure: notebook names, folder hierarchy, and document titles for content the administrator marked hidden, password-protected, or excluded from publishing. Document titles alone are frequently sensitive (project names, personnel actions, client identifiers). The ID-resolution direction additionally supplies valid document IDs, removing the "attacker must know an ID" precondition for other block-read endpoints. Confidentiality-only.

Suggested fix

For IsReadOnlyRoleContext sessions, gate each of the five handlers with CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess (or restrict resolution to publish-visible documents), mirroring the treatment already applied in getRecentDocs, getCriteria, and getLocalStorage.