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GHSA-592m-4533-rxq9 BIT-silverstripe-2020-9280 CVE-2020-9280

SilverStripe Folders migrated from 3.x may be unsafe to upload to

High Packagist
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.73%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 77.59% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Fix
Available
3 packages have a fixed version

Description

In SilverStripe through 4.5, files uploaded via Forms to folders migrated from Silverstripe CMS 3.x may be put to the default "/Uploads" folder instead. This affects installations which allowed upload folder protection via the optional silverstripe/secureassets module under 3.x. This module is installed and enabled by default on the Common Web Platform (CWP). The vulnerability only affects files uploaded after an upgrade to 4.x.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
silverstripe/assets
>= 1.0.0, < 1.4.7
1.4.7
silverstripe/assets
>= 1.5.0, < 1.5.2
1.5.2
silverstripe/framework
>= 4.0.0, < 4.4.6
4.4.6
silverstripe/userforms
>= 5.0.0, < 5.4.2
5.4.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

silverstripe/assets Packagist → 1.4.7

composer
composer require silverstripe/assets:^1.4.7

silverstripe/framework Packagist → 4.4.6

composer
composer require silverstripe/framework:^4.4.6

silverstripe/userforms Packagist → 5.4.2

composer
composer require silverstripe/userforms:^5.4.2

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Architecture and Design: Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
  • Architecture and Design: Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.
  • Implementation: Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Implementation: When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

References

Advisories

Packages

Other links

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-gvrw-qqp5-jgc5
Silverstripe Framework: Possible XSS attack through media embed
Medium Also affects silverstripe/framework
GHSA-256q-hx8w-xcqx
Silverstripe Framework user enumeration via timing attack on login and password reset forms
Medium Also affects silverstripe/framework
GHSA-rhx4-hvx9-j387
Silverstripe Framework has a XSS vulnerability in HTML editor
Medium Also affects silverstripe/framework
GHSA-74j9-xhqr-6qv3
Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in error message
Low Also affects silverstripe/framework
GHSA-mqf3-qpc3-g26q
Silverstripe Framework has a Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in error message
Low Also affects silverstripe/framework
GHSA-ff6q-3c9c-6cf5
Silverstripe Framework has a XSS in form messages
Medium Also affects silverstripe/framework
GHSA-7cmp-cgg8-4c82
Silverstripe Framework has a XSS via insert media remote file oembed
Medium Also affects silverstripe/framework
GHSA-52cw-pvq9-9m5v
Silverstripe uses TinyMCE which allows svg files linked in object tags
Medium Also affects silverstripe/framework
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