Skip to content

GHSA-53fp-9jmv-227g CVE-2026-73607 GO-2026-6624

SiYuan: Outline state for any document, including documents forbidden to readers, is returned by /api/storage/getOutlineStorage with no access check

Medium Go
Severity
6.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.25%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 16.71% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2
Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to this version or later

Description

Summary

/api/storage/getOutlineStorage is registered with CheckAuth only and performs no authorization of any kind. Given a document identifier it returns that document's stored outline state, regardless of the document's publish tier.

The two write endpoints for the same data, setOutlineStorage and removeOutlineStorage, both carry CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly. Only the read path is unguarded.

Details

Routes. kernel/api/router.go:103 on master, :108 on the development branch:

ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/getOutlineStorage",    model.CheckAuth, getOutlineStorage)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/setOutlineStorage",    model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, setOutlineStorage)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/removeOutlineStorage", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, removeOutlineStorage)

Handler. kernel/api/storage.go:466 on the development branch, :469 on master, identical. It binds docID and calls model.GetOutlineStorage(docID), which iterates the stored outline documents and returns the entry whose DocID matches. There is no filter function on this path at all: no *gin.Context, no publish-access check, no password check, no visibility check. The caller supplies the identifier and receives the payload.

What is stored. type OutlineDoc { DocID string; Data map[string]any }. The client writes it from app/src/layout/dock/Outline.ts:742:

fetchPost("/api/storage/setOutlineStorage", {
    docID: this.blockId,
    val: { expandIds: this.tree.getExpandIds() }
});

So the payload is the set of heading block identifiers the administrator has expanded in the outline pane for that document. Secondarily, an empty result versus a populated one indicates whether the administrator has ever worked with that document's outline.

Not covered by the local-storage fix. Commit 4daee87d4 addressed getLocalStorage, getLocalStorageVal, getLocalStorageVals and FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess. The word "outline" does not appear in that diff. That filter was under-inclusive; this endpoint has no filter to be under-inclusive.

Proof of Concept

Kernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, Publish.Auth.Enable false, anonymous client with no auth header.

An administrator wrote outline state through the authenticated port:

POST /api/storage/setOutlineStorage
{"docID":"<doc id>","val":{"openIDs":["<heading id>","<heading id>"]}}
→ {"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}

The same value read back anonymously:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/storage/getOutlineStorage
{"docID":"<doc id>"}
→ {"code":0,"msg":"","data":{"openIDs":["<heading id>","<heading id>"]}}

With that document set to the forbidden tier, on the same anonymous session:

Endpoint Result
getDoc (control) protyle-password--forbidden placeholder, content withheld
getOutlineStorage full payload returned

The control establishes that the session is correctly denied the document itself.

Impact

An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish RoleReader, retrieves the administrator's outline state for any document whose identifier they hold, including documents in the forbidden tier that the publish filters otherwise withhold entirely. The disclosed values are heading block identifiers, usable as input to other endpoints, and the presence or absence of an entry indicates whether the administrator has worked with that document.

No document text is returned. Confidentiality only.

Suggested fix

Gate the read path as the write paths already are. Either add CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly at the route, matching setOutlineStorage and removeOutlineStorage, or pass *gin.Context into GetOutlineStorage and apply checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess against the requested docID before returning anything.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
< 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2
0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel Go → 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2

go
go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel@v0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 6.9

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
Low
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 5.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xp3q-r38w-vgqm
SiYuan: The publish filter for local storage returns the administrator's entire storage map with only three keys sanitized
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45
SiYuan: getAttributeViewSearchTarget returns database row content to anonymous readers with no publish-access check, reopening the class closed one day earlier at the adjacent route
High Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-57v5-wqx3-cgj4
SiYuan: Database view structure (all view names, layout types and per-field visibility) is returned to anonymous readers by /api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-4wwp-f6gw-6qm5
SiYuan: TLS Private Keys Readable via getFile (Incomplete Blocklist)
High Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-3cm4-ccvw-6xr6
SiYuan: /history/*path and /repo/diff/*path potentially exposing historical snapshots of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json and data/templates/*
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj
SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF)
High Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-p23f-cm6q-2qp8
SiYuan MCP asset.upload Reads Arbitrary Absolute File Paths (Workspace Boundary Bypass)
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-rpx2-p6hp-x5gj
SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor