Skip to content

GHSA-j8f7-rjxc-mr56 CVE-2026-112936

filelock: ReadWriteLock follows a symlink at the lock path into SQLite

Medium PyPI
Severity
6.1 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.23%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 14.14% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
CWE-668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
Fix
4.0.9
Upgrade filelock to this version or later

Description

Summary

ReadWriteLock and AsyncReadWriteLock resolve the lock path with pathlib.Path.resolve() and pass it to sqlite3.connect() without refusing a symlink. A local user who can create names in the lock's directory, such as /tmp or a shared cache, can plant a symlink at the lock path and make the victim's process create, lock, or write the file it points to, or break mutual exclusion between the victim's own processes.

Details

ReadWriteLock.__init__ stores pathlib.Path(lock_file).resolve(), which follows a final symlink, and every connection opens that path through sqlite3.connect() with no O_NOFOLLOW or regular-file check. SQLite's own VFS also resolves the final symlink in user space, so fs.protected_symlinks and the sticky bit do not help: the kernel never sees a symlink to refuse. The other lock classes do not follow a final symlink: FileLock opens with O_NOFOLLOW, and SoftReadWriteLock coordinates through <path>.rw/.

Proof of concept

On Linux, with the victim and attacker as different users and /shared mode 1777 with fs.protected_symlinks=1:

  1. The attacker runs ln -s /home/victim/private/pwned.flag /shared/app.rwlock.db.
  2. The victim constructs ReadWriteLock("/shared/app.rwlock.db"). A plain os.open(..., O_NOFOLLOW) on the same path fails, but the lock creates /home/victim/private/pwned.flag, owned by the victim, inside a directory the attacker cannot write.
  3. With /shared/cache.rwlock.db -> /shared/a.db, one victim process holds the write lock. The attacker repoints the link to /shared/b.db, and a second victim process acquires the write lock while the first still holds it.

The same behavior reproduces on macOS, on Windows 11, and through AsyncReadWriteLock.

Impact

A local attacker with write access to the lock directory can make the victim create empty files it owns at paths the attacker cannot write, make the victim hold a SQLite lock on another application's database so that application gets database is locked, and give two victim processes the write lock at once, letting them corrupt the resource the lock protects.

Workarounds

Keep ReadWriteLock paths in directories that only trusted users can write.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
filelock
>= 3.20.4, < 4.0.9
4.0.9

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

filelock PyPI → 4.0.9

pip
pip install --upgrade "filelock>=4.0.9"
poetry
poetry add "filelock>=4.0.9"
uv
uv add "filelock>=4.0.9"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system. Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.

CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere

The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-wfhq-q4j2-c37m
filelock: SoftReadWriteLock follows a lock tree swapped in after its first acquire and writes lock records into directories of the user running the lock
Low Also affects filelock
GHSA-6627-m3xw-93mp
filelock: StrictSoftFileLock creates its claim directories without the lock mode, so another local user with a write bit on them can end a live hold
Medium Also affects filelock
GHSA-9c4x-gm8v-wgc4
filelock: StrictSoftFileLock and SoftReadWriteLock adopt a protocol directory another user created first, losing mutual exclusion
Medium Also affects filelock
GHSA-8mx5-7m5m-r77g
filelock: WindowsFileLock ignores mode: a 0o600 lock file and the ReadWriteLock database inherit the directory ACL
Medium Also affects filelock
GHSA-cwqr-hh33-gh44
filelock ReadWriteLock: a crafted lock database makes every acquire stall or hang regardless of timeout
Medium Also affects filelock
GHSA-rfpc-qcw5-3pc4
filelock: SoftFileLock removes a live holder's marker when another user forges the PID in a writable marker
Medium Also affects filelock
GHSA-9j6q-wvj5-jgjg
filelock: Symlink swap during SoftFileLock's writability check leaks whether a path exists and is writable by the lock taker
Low Also affects filelock
GHSA-69hj-f68j-2879
filelock: UnixFileLock truncates and chmods any regular file another user renames or hard-links onto the lock path
Medium Also affects filelock
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor