GHSA-4m8q-55qv-9pwp CVE-2026-52819
Kimai: Teamlead authorization bypass in GET /api/timesheets allows reading other users' timesheet records without being teamlead of the target
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.50%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 42.58% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
2.57.0- Upgrade kimai/kimai to this version or later
Description
Summary
GET /api/timesheets?user=<id> (and users[]=<id>) returns the targeted user's timesheet records to any caller that has the view_other_timesheet permission, without verifying that the caller is teamlead of any team containing the target user. The per-record endpoint GET /api/timesheets/{id} correctly enforces this check via TimesheetVoter/RolePermissionManager::checkTeamAccessTimesheet → checkTeamLeadAccess, but the list endpoint only filters projects/customers by team membership and never validates t.user. A ROLE_TEAMLEAD user can therefore enumerate any user's records — including the rate field — as long as those records are on a project with no team scoping (Kimai's default) or on any project that shares any team (membership, not lead) with the requester.
Details
Root cause: authorization mismatch between the per-record voter and the list endpoint.
Per-record path (correct)
src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php:138:
if (!$this->permissionManager->checkTeamAccessTimesheet($subject, $user)) {
return false;
}
return $this->permissionManager->hasRolePermission($user, $permission . '_other_timesheet');
checkTeamLeadAccess (RolePermissionManager.php:143-160) requires isTeamleadOf (not just member) one of the target user's teams. The unit test testTeamleadDeniedWhenOnlyPlainMemberOfOwnerTeam (tests/Voter/TimesheetVoterTest.php:253-269) codifies this:
"a TEAMLEAD role with
view_other_timesheetmust not access another user's timesheet by being a plain team member — they must be the team's teamlead."
List path (vulnerable)
src/API/TimesheetController.php:97-119:
public function cgetAction(ParamFetcherInterface $paramFetcher, ..., UserRepository $userRepository): Response
{
$query = new TimesheetQuery(false);
$this->prepareQuery($query, $paramFetcher);
$seeAll = false;
if ($this->isGranted('view_other_timesheet')) {
/** @var array<int> $users */
$users = $paramFetcher->get('users');
$userId = $paramFetcher->get('user');
if ('all' === $userId) {
$seeAll = true;
} elseif (\is_string($userId) && $userId !== '') {
$users[] = (int) $userId;
}
if (!$seeAll) {
foreach ($userRepository->findByIds($users) as $user) {
$query->addUser($user); // <-- no teamlead-of-target check
}
}
}
...
config/packages/kimai.yaml:96,115 grants TIMESHEET_OTHER (which contains view_other_timesheet) to ROLE_TEAMLEAD, so the gate at line 103 passes for any teamlead. The user= / users[]= IDs are pushed straight into the query.
Net effect
For any victim bob who:
- has at least one team that the requester
aliceis not teamlead of (so the voter denies per-record access), AND - has timesheets either on a project with no team (Kimai's default), or on a project that shares any team with
alice(membership, not lead)
alice is denied via GET /api/timesheets/{id} but receives bob's records via GET /api/timesheets?user=<bob_id>.
Disclosed fields in the collection response include description, begin, end, duration, billable, exported, tags, rate, internalRate, plus project/activity/user IDs (Default/Collection serializer groups, Timesheet.php:164-173). rate is financial data that the per-record voter is supposed to gate via the separate view_rate_other_timesheet permission.
Why other proposed mitigations don't apply
- The
view_other_timesheetIsGrantedon the route is the only authorization layer in the list path; ROLE_TEAMLEAD has it globally. prepareQueryonly setscurrentUser, not authorization (BaseApiController.php:68-71).- The serializer does not filter
rateper caller — it is a staticDefault-group property. - Recent commit 20c7b03 "Re-usable ACL checks on teams" hardened the voter side but left the list endpoint unchanged.
A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.
Impact
- Authorization bypass: a
ROLE_TEAMLEAD(a non-admin role typically granted to multiple users in a Kimai instance) can read any other user's timesheet records - Financial data disclosure: the
rateandinternalRatefields are returned in the collection serializer group, leaking what gets billed/costed against any user's records. - PII / activity disclosure: per-entry
description,begin,end,duration,billable,exported, project/activity/customer IDs, and tags are leaked, allowing reconstruction of any user's activity timeline.
Solution
The list of requested user TimesheetController::cgetAction() is now guarded with the access_user permission.
The access_user permission verifies that the requesting user is allowed to see each of the requested user.
If any of the requested users may not be seen, the entire call will fail.
Find out more at https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-4m8q-55qv-9pwp
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| kimai/kimai | < 2.57.0 |
2.57.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
kimai/kimai Packagist → 2.57.0
- composer
composer require kimai/kimai:^2.57.0
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rw46-qg69-vg6h Kimai: ExportTemplate CRUD Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized TEAMLEAD Access | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 Kimai: Pre-2FA KIMAI_SESSION cookie grants full authenticated REST API access, bypassing TOTP | High | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-2xgg-2x8h-8xw4 Kimai: Improper Authorization in Project, Customer, and Activity Rate Edit Endpoints Allows Cross-Scope Rate Manipulation | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-xv4r-4885-gwpg Kimai has Improper Authorization in Team Member and Team Activity Assignment APIs Which Allows Expansion of Team Scope Beyond Authorized Visibility | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-jr9p-4h4j-6c58 Kimai: Default APP_SECRET in Docker Image Enables Cookie Forgery and Account Takeover | Critical | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-r8vr-m544-qh4h Kimai: Login CSRF in the Timesheet Stop and Restart API Endpoints Allows Unauthorized State Changes | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-c6w6-57jj-62vh Improper Authorization in Kimai Timesheet Restart and Duplicate Allows New Timesheets After Project Access Revocation | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-3q6q-26vg-v97x Kimai: Improper Authorization Through Activity Creation with Preset Project Allows Creation Under Unauthorized Projects | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
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