GHSA-3wrr-7qpf-2prh CVE-2026-50193
jackson-databind: Deeply nested JsonNode throws StackOverflowError for toString()
High
Maven
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.62%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 49.54% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
- Fix
2.14.0- Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to this version or later
Description
Impact
Potential Denial-of-Service when attacker sends deeply nested JSON if (and only if) service:
- Reads deeply nested (1000s of levels) JSON as
JsonNode(ObjectMapper.readTree()) - Writes out same (or modifided) node using
JsonNode.toString()
which can consume significant amount of resources with concurrent relatively small requests (1000 nested arrays is 2kB).
Patches
Fixed in 2.14.0 via https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/3447.
Workarounds
Avoid serializing JsonNode using toString(): use ObjectMapper.writeValueAsString(node)
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 2.10.0, < 2.14.0 |
2.14.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind Maven → 2.14.0
- maven
<dependency><groupId>com.fasterxml.jackson.core</groupId><artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId><version>2.14.0</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.14.0")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-cxp5-3px4-pw24 jackson-databind quadratic forward-reference completion | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-wv8q-qhhj-9h54 jackson-databind retains every unknown raw type ID | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-q4xh-88c3-wmh7 jackson-databind: Duration XMLGregorianCalendar Unbounded Number Parse DoS | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist) | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-vvgp-rfg2-7rr6 jackson-databind: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54514: eager DNS resolution (SSRF) still present in InetAddress deserialization | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w jackson-databind: `@JsonView` bypass for creator properties with `@JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)` | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh jackson-databind: @JsonView bypassed for @JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
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