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GHSA-2v6m-6xw3-6467 CVE-2026-27465 GO-2026-4560

Fleet: Sensitive Google Calendar credentials disclosed to low-privileged users

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.27%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 19.90% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-201 Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
Fix
4.80.1
Upgrade github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 to this version or later

Description

Summary

A vulnerability in Fleet’s configuration API could expose Google Calendar service account credentials to authenticated users with low-privilege roles. This may allow unauthorized access to Google Calendar resources associated with the service account.

Impact

Fleet returns configuration data through an API endpoint that is accessible to authenticated users, including those with the lowest-privilege “Observer” role. In affected versions, Google Calendar service account credentials were not properly obfuscated before being returned.

As a result, a low-privilege user could retrieve the service account’s private key material. Depending on how the Google Calendar integration is configured, this could allow unauthorized access to calendar data or other Google Workspace resources associated with the service account.

This issue does not allow escalation of privileges within Fleet or access to device management functionality.

Patches

  • v4.80.1

Workarounds

If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should remove the Google Calendar integration from Fleet and rotate the affected Google service account credentials.

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:

Email Fleet at security@fleetdm.com
Join #fleet in osquery Slack

Credits

Fleet thanks @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
< 4.80.1
4.80.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 Go → 4.80.1

go
go get github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4@v4.80.1 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Specify which data in the software should be regarded as sensitive. Consider which types of users should have access to which types of data.
  • Implementation: Ensure that any possibly sensitive data specified in the requirements is verified with designers to ensure that it is either a calculated risk or mitigated elsewhere. Any information that is not necessary to the functionality should be removed in order to lower both the overhead and the possibility of security sensitive data being sent.
  • System Configuration: Setup default error messages so that unexpected errors do not disclose sensitive information.
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rxhg-vcww-2mpw
Fleet: ORDER BY column injection on activity list endpoints
Low Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-q9c5-pp7m-fm2g
Fleet: Unauthenticated download of in-house iOS app binaries via predictable URLs
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GO-2026-6264
Fleet: SQL injection in Okta conditional access endpoint allows host-controlled compromise of the Fleet database
High Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-88p2-jj8w-j8qg
Fleet: Observer-class users can view team enroll secrets and credential-bearing configuration via target search endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g
Fleet DM Vulnerable to Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-x4qr-qw6h-wvxq
Fleet: Observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on Apple MDM commands endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-vxm7-9x8v-8gm4
Fleet has observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on labels host-listing endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-mxmp-wr3w-rvqx
Fleet: IP spoofing allows bypassing API rate limiting
High Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
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