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GHSA-27p4-pjqv-whgj CVE-2026-47408 PYSEC-2026-2927

praisonai-platform: list_issue_activity returns activity log for any issue regardless of workspace ownership

Medium PyPI
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.29%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 21.95% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Fix
0.1.4
Upgrade praisonai-platform to this version or later

Description

Summary

Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity endpoint is gated by require_workspace_member(workspace_id) and dispatches to ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id), which executes SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py, lines 32-43; services/activity_service.py's list_for_issue method.

Root cause: the route extracts workspace_id from the URL path, uses it solely for the membership gate, then passes the URL-supplied issue_id directly to ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id) without verifying which workspace the issue belongs to. The companion list_workspace_activity endpoint at line 19-29 is implemented correctly (it passes workspace_id to svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id)) — the asymmetry is the smoking gun.

Affected Code

File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py, lines 19-43.

@router.get("/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
async def list_workspace_activity(
    workspace_id: str,
    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    svc = ActivityService(session)
    logs = await svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)  # correct: passes workspace_id
    return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]


@router.get("/issues/{issue_id}/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
async def list_issue_activity(
    workspace_id: str,
    issue_id: str,
    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    svc = ActivityService(session)
    logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)  # <-- BUG: no workspace_id
    return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]

Why it's wrong: activity logs are typically the most sensitive operational record — they include actor identity, action type, entity references, and a free-form details JSON blob that may contain pre-/post-change values for any tracked field. Reading the foreign workspace's activity log gives the attacker a high-fidelity view into who did what when, which is gold for further reconnaissance (cross-workspace member enumeration, foreign issue title disclosure, knowing which projects exist). The same author got list_workspace_activity right by passing workspace_id — the issue-scoped variant is the gap.

Exploit Chain

  1. Attacker is a member of workspace W_attacker and harvests a target issue UUID I_T from any side channel. State: attacker holds I_T.
  2. Attacker sends GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/activity?limit=200 with Authorization: Bearer <attacker_jwt>. State: control flow enters list_issue_activity.
  3. require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker) passes. ActivityService.list_for_issue(I_T) runs SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = 'I_T' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200. State: response body is the full activity log for the foreign issue.
  4. The activity entries reveal: every actor (member or agent) who touched the issue, every action (created, updated, commented, status_changed, assignee_changed, project_changed, label_added, dependency_added), and the details JSON blob containing the before/after values of every change. State: the attacker fingerprints the foreign workspace's triage workflow, identifies who works on what, and sees the issue's complete history including any embedded secrets that ever passed through the description or comments.
  5. Final state: with one workspace-member token plus one GET, the attacker reads the full activity timeline of any issue in the multi-tenant deployment given the issue UUIDs.

Security Impact

Severity: sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, high confidentiality (full activity log including before/after details), no integrity claim (read-only), no availability claim.

Attacker capability: read the activity log of any issue in the deployment given its UUID. Combined with the companion issue-IDOR (which already gives full issue content), this is recon for the foreign workspace's operational tempo, member identity, and triage workflow.

Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any workspace-membership token; foreign issue UUIDs are reachable.

Differential: source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between list_workspace_activity (correctly workspace-scoped) and list_issue_activity (no workspace check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the route first resolves the issue via IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id), returns 404 for foreign issues, and only then proceeds.

Suggested Fix

--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py
@@ -32,9 +32,12 @@
 @router.get("/issues/{issue_id}/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
 async def list_issue_activity(
     workspace_id: str,
     issue_id: str,
     limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
     offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
     user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
+    issue_svc = IssueService(session)
+    if await issue_svc.get(workspace_id, issue_id) is None:    # workspace-scoped get from issue-IDOR companion
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
     svc = ActivityService(session)
     logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)
     return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]

The same single-key issue lookup pattern is filed separately as the IssueService IDOR; once that is fixed, the helper used here is just IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id).

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
praisonai-platform
< 0.1.4
0.1.4

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

praisonai-platform PyPI → 0.1.4

pip
pip install --upgrade "praisonai-platform>=0.1.4"
poetry
poetry add "praisonai-platform>=0.1.4"
uv
uv add "praisonai-platform>=0.1.4"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
  • Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xxgv-vgvj-qvxh
PraisonAI: Platform members can rewrite shared labels and owner issue labels without owner/admin authorization
High Also affects praisonai-platform
GHSA-c78w-2q4r-68r7
PraisonAI: Platform member PATCH routes allow owner resource rewrites and project lead reassignment delete bypass
High Also affects praisonai-platform
GHSA-mxmx-rh57-jx58
PraisonAI: Platform members can delete owner issue dependencies through member-owned related issues
High Also affects praisonai-platform
GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x
praisonai-platform: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Medium Also affects praisonai-platform
GHSA-cwj8-7gp2-ggcw
praisonai-platform: default JWT signing secret 'dev-secret-change-me' enables token forgery
Critical Also affects praisonai-platform
GHSA-f38v-77qj-h4jq
praisonai-platform 0.1.4 still boots on the hardcoded JWT secret dev-secret-change-me (default-open production guard)
Critical Also affects praisonai-platform
GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh
PraisonAI: Missing ownership check on DELETE endpoints allows members to delete others' content in Platform API
High Also affects praisonai-platform
GHSA-7p8g-6c6g-h9w7
praisonai-platform: Agent endpoints accept any agent_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
High Also affects praisonai-platform
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