praisonai-platform: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Summary

The issue create and update endpoints in praisonai-platform accept a project_id in the request body and persist it without validating that the project belongs to the URL workspace. A user who is a member of workspace W_B (and has no access to workspace W_A) can create issues that reference a project owned by W_A. Because ProjectService.get_stats() aggregates issues by project_id with no workspace constraint, those foreign issues are then counted in the victim's own legitimate view of their project statistics. This is a cross-tenant integrity violation reachable by an outsider.

This is distinct from the path-parameter IDOR family fixed in 0.1.4 (CVE-2026-47415, CVE-2026-47418, CVE-2026-47419). Those fixes scoped object references supplied in the URL path. This report concerns an object reference supplied in the request body at write time, which the 0.1.4 fixes did not cover.

Version 0.1.4 fixed a set of path-parameter IDORs by threading workspace_id into the service-layer lookups (get / update / delete) and by adding the helpers ensure_resource_in_workspace() and require_issue_in_workspace() in api/deps.py. Those helpers are applied to object references that arrive in the URL path. They are not applied to object references that arrive in the request body on create or update.

Details

api/routes/issues.py, create_issue passes the body's project_id straight through with no workspace validation:

@router.post("/", response_model=IssueResponse, status_code=201)
async def create_issue(workspace_id: str, body: IssueCreate,
                       user=Depends(require_workspace_member), session=Depends(get_db)):
    svc = IssueService(session)
    issue = await svc.create(
        workspace_id=workspace_id,
        title=body.title,
        creator_id=user.id,
        project_id=body.project_id,        # attacker-controlled, not validated against workspace_id
        ...
    )

services/issue_service.py, create persists it as-is:

issue = Issue(
    workspace_id=workspace_id,
    project_id=project_id,                 # no check that project_id belongs to workspace_id
    ...
)

services/issue_service.py, update has the identical gap on the update path:

if project_id is not None:
    issue.project_id = project_id          # re-parent to any project, no workspace check

services/project_service.py, get_stats aggregates by project_id only:

async def get_stats(self, project_id: str) -> dict:
    stmt = (
        select(Issue.status, func.count(Issue.id))
        .where(Issue.project_id == project_id)   # no workspace_id constraint
        .group_by(Issue.status)
    )
    ...

Note that the read path is not directly vulnerable. The stats route scopes the project first, so a cross-workspace stats read returns 404:

@router.get("/{project_id}/stats")
async def project_stats(workspace_id, project_id, user=Depends(require_workspace_member), ...):
    project = await svc.get(project_id, workspace_id=workspace_id)   # 404 for a foreign project
    if project is None:
        raise HTTPException(404, "Project not found")
    return await svc.get_stats(project_id)

The pollution therefore enters through the write side (issue create/update accepting a foreign project_id) and surfaces in the victim's own legitimate read of their project statistics.

Proof of concept

Two unrelated users:

• Alice, member of workspace W_A, owns project P_A.
• Bob, member of workspace W_B only. Bob has no access to W_A (every direct call to W_A resources returns 403).

Steps:

1. Alice's project P_A has one in-progress issue. GET /workspaces/W_A/projects/P_A/stats returns {"total": 1, "by_status": {"in_progress": 1}}.

2. Bob creates issues in his own workspace that reference Alice's project. Repeat 7 times:

   POST /workspaces/W_B/issues
   Authorization: Bearer <Bob's token>
   Content-Type: application/json
   
   {"title": "x", "project_id": "P_A", "status": "done"}
   

   Each returns 201. Each issue is stored with workspace_id = W_B and project_id = P_A.

3. Alice reads her own project stats: GET /workspaces/W_A/projects/P_A/stats now returns {"total": 8, "by_status": {"done": 7, "in_progress": 1}}.

Bob is not a member of W_A, yet data he wrote appears in Alice's project dashboard.

Impact

An unauthorized outsider can inflate or skew the issue counts shown in any workspace's project-statistics view, given only the target project_id (a UUID that can be harvested or guessed). The effect is limited to the statistics aggregation; it does not expose the victim's issue contents to the attacker and does not appear in the victim's workspace-scoped issue list. The same unvalidated write path also accepts cross-workspace parent_issue_id and assignee_id values, which have no aggregation read endpoint today but represent the same dangling cross-workspace reference class and should be fixed together.

Suggested fix

On both issue create and update, validate that any body-supplied object reference resolves within the URL workspace before persisting, reusing the existing pattern:

if body.project_id is not None:
    project = await ProjectService(session).get(body.project_id, workspace_id=workspace_id)
    if project is None:
        raise HTTPException(404, "Project not found")

Apply the same check to parent_issue_id (via require_issue_in_workspace) and to assignee_id. As defense in depth, scope get_stats so it only counts issues whose workspace_id matches the project's workspace.