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GHSA-27gv-mg7w-mm34 CVE-2025-7954

Shopware race condition bypasses voucher restrictions

High Packagist
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.39%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 33.13% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

A race condition vulnerability has been identified in Shopware's voucher system of Shopware v6.6.10.4 that allows attackers to bypass intended voucher restrictions and exceed usage limitations.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
shopware/platform
<= 6.6.10.4
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 8.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
  • Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
  • Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
  • Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
  • Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
  • Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
  • Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
  • Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
  • Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-gq96-5pfx-f4vc
Shopware: SSRF in Media External-Link Endpoint Bypasses IP Validation
Medium Also affects shopware/platform
GHSA-xvhc-gm7j-mhmc
Shopware: Stored XSS via SVG file upload — no SVG sanitization
Medium Also affects shopware/platform
GHSA-9v5m-39wh-5chq
Shopware: Unauthorized Payment Trigger for Foreign Orders via /store-api/handle-payment
Medium Also affects shopware/platform
GHSA-f8q6-3g5w-jjr6
Shopware: Admin API ACL Bypass in Order State Transition Endpoints
Medium Also affects shopware/platform
GHSA-4x3x-869w-xx3m
Shopware SSO referer trust leading to an arbitrary redirect target
Medium Also affects shopware/platform
GHSA-7w52-7jvm-m9vw
Shopware: Timing-attack on admin panel allowing enumeration of administrator usernames
Low Also affects shopware/platform
GHSA-v39m-97p8-gqg7
Shopware: Privilege escalation: non-admin user with user:create ACL can create admin accounts
Medium Also affects shopware/platform
GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f
Shopware: Admin Account Takeover via User Recovery Hash Exposure
Medium Also affects shopware/platform
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