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CVE-2020-10181

goform/formEMR30 in Sumavision Enhanced Multimedia Router (EMR) 3.0.4.27 allows creation of arbitrary users with elevated privileges (administrator) on a…

Critical Known exploited
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
14.94%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 96.71% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
Yes
In CISA's catalog since Nov 3, 2021
Weakness
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published
Exploited in the wild. Sumavision EMR Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Vulnerability (Sumavision Enhanced Multimedia Router (EMR)). Required action: Apply updates per vendor instructions. Due for U.S. federal agencies by May 3, 2022.

Description

goform/formEMR30 in Sumavision Enhanced Multimedia Router (EMR) 3.0.4.27 allows creation of arbitrary users with elevated privileges (administrator) on a device, as demonstrated by a setString=new_user<1>administrator<1>123456 request.

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
  • Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
  • Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
  • Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
  • Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
  • Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
  • Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
  3. Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
  4. Last updated by the source
  5. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-2p8c-gr87-2676
Electron: SameSite cookie restrictions are not applied to windows opened from links
Medium Same weakness, CWE-352
GO-2026-6773
Nginx UI: Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant `state` parameter (login CSRF)
High Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq
Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions
Low Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-33rr-wq23-g6gg
Nginx-UI AuthRequired token cookie fallback enables CSRF against management APIs
High Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-pvph-5j39-v8qc
PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
High Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-xpr4-8vp6-c87j
Froxlor has CSRF Vulnerability in AJAX Endpoint — Missing Cross-Site Request Forgery Protection
Medium Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-3cc2-h3v6-rqpq
SiYuan: Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking on the admin-only network proxy endpoint (`/ws/network/proxy`) via explicit `CheckOrigin: true` bypass
High Same weakness, CWE-352
GHSA-68jx-f42c-7599
TYPO3 CMS - Broken Access Control in Backend and Install Tool
High Same weakness, CWE-352
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