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RUSTSEC-2026-0342 GHSA-2hv7-gw8g-gpq5

Zero-length DATAGRAM frames bypass the receive buffer limit in quinn-proto

Not rated yet crates.io
Severity
Not rated yet
No source has published a CVSS score yet
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
—
Not classified
Fix
0.11.17
Upgrade quinn-proto to this version or later

Description

quinn-proto bounds its queue of received datagrams by charging each queued frame's payload length against TransportConfig::datagram_receive_buffer_size, evicting the oldest datagrams when the limit is exceeded. A DATAGRAM frame with an empty payload was charged zero bytes, so it never triggered eviction and was appended to the queue, which has no other bound.

DATAGRAM frames are not subject to flow control. A peer that has completed the handshake can therefore send a stream of empty DATAGRAM frames and grow the receiver's heap without limit until the process is killed. An application that reads incoming datagrams but does so more slowly than the peer sends them is still affected. Receiving datagrams is enabled by default, so all endpoints that do not explicitly set datagram_receive_buffer_size(None) are affected.

The send path had the same accounting flaw: an application could enqueue an unbounded number of empty outgoing datagrams without ever receiving SendDatagramError::Blocked.

The flaw was corrected in 0.11.17 by accounting for the fixed per-datagram overhead in both directions, so that every queued datagram consumes buffer space.

Thanks to @alexpyattaev for reporting this issue.

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
quinn-proto
>= 0.5.0, < 0.11.17
0.11.17

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

quinn-proto crates.io → 0.11.17

cargo
cargo update -p quinn-proto --precise 0.11.17

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
RUSTSEC-2026-0343
Outgoing datagram buffer accounting can panic the sender in quinn-proto
High Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0340
Peer minimum ACK delay can panic quinn-proto when ACK_FREQUENCY transmission is enabled
High Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0338
Remote peer can panic quinn-proto with zero-length STREAM frames during unordered reads
Not rated yet Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0341
Stream reassembly memory-exhaustion guard in quinn-proto can be bypassed
High Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0339
Unbounded growth of pending connection ID retirements in quinn-proto
Not rated yet Also affects quinn-proto
GHSA-4w2j-m93h-cj5j
Quinn: Remote memory exhaustion in quinn-proto from unbounded out-of-order stream reassembly
High Also affects quinn-proto
GHSA-6xvm-j4wr-6v98
Quinn affected by unauthenticated remote DoS via panic in QUIC transport parameter parsing
Medium Also affects quinn-proto
GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8
Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`
High Also affects quinn-proto
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