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RUSTSEC-2026-0339 GHSA-hmxj-32vh-65vr

Unbounded growth of pending connection ID retirements in quinn-proto

Not rated yet crates.io
Severity
Not rated yet
No source has published a CVSS score yet
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
—
Not classified
Fix
0.11.17
Upgrade quinn-proto to this version or later

Description

When processing a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame, quinn-proto queues a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame for each connection ID that the peer asked it to retire. The normal path bounds this queue and closes the connection with a CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT_ERROR if the bound would be exceeded. However, the path handling a connection ID that had already been retired pushed onto the queue without applying the limit and without deduplicating.

A peer that has completed the handshake can first send a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame with a large retire_prior_to value to advance the receiver's connection ID window, and then repeatedly send NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames with sequence numbers below that window. Each such frame adds another entry to the queue. The queue is only drained by sending RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, which are subject to congestion control, so a peer that withholds acknowledgements can stall the drain while continuing to flood, growing the victim's memory use without bound.

The flaw was corrected in 0.11.17 by applying the same limit on the already-retired path.

Thanks to @scadastrangelove for reporting this issue.

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
quinn-proto
>= 0.6.0, < 0.11.17
0.11.17

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

quinn-proto crates.io → 0.11.17

cargo
cargo update -p quinn-proto --precise 0.11.17

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
RUSTSEC-2026-0343
Outgoing datagram buffer accounting can panic the sender in quinn-proto
High Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0340
Peer minimum ACK delay can panic quinn-proto when ACK_FREQUENCY transmission is enabled
High Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0338
Remote peer can panic quinn-proto with zero-length STREAM frames during unordered reads
Not rated yet Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0342
Zero-length DATAGRAM frames bypass the receive buffer limit in quinn-proto
Not rated yet Also affects quinn-proto
RUSTSEC-2026-0341
Stream reassembly memory-exhaustion guard in quinn-proto can be bypassed
High Also affects quinn-proto
GHSA-4w2j-m93h-cj5j
Quinn: Remote memory exhaustion in quinn-proto from unbounded out-of-order stream reassembly
High Also affects quinn-proto
GHSA-6xvm-j4wr-6v98
Quinn affected by unauthenticated remote DoS via panic in QUIC transport parameter parsing
Medium Also affects quinn-proto
GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8
Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`
High Also affects quinn-proto
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