Skip to content
Log inStart free trial

GHSA-wqq4-5wpv-mx2g CVE-2023-45143

Undici's cookie header not cleared on cross-origin redirect in fetch

Low npm
Severity
3.9 / 10
Low · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.37%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 71.88% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Fix
5.26.2
Upgrade undici to this version or later

Description

Impact

Undici clears Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but does not clear Cookie headers. By design, cookie headers are forbidden request headers, disallowing them to be set in RequestInit.headers in browser environments. Since Undici handles headers more liberally than the specification, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and Undici's implementation of fetch.

As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site.

Patches

This was patched in e041de359221ebeae04c469e8aff4145764e6d76, which is included in version 5.26.2.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
undici
< 5.26.2
5.26.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

undici npm → 5.26.2

npm
npm install undici@5.26.2
yarn
yarn add undici@5.26.2
pnpm
pnpm add undici@5.26.2

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 3.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
High
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Advisories

Packages

Other links

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-55wc-3pg8-jfw6
undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via unhandled exception in the decompress interceptor
High Also affects undici
GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm
undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via TLS 1.2 certificate-changing renegotiation
High Also affects undici
GHSA-9fm3-97px-rjf6
undici WebSocket client vulnerable to Denial of Service via unbounded automatic PONG buffering
High Also affects undici
GHSA-4qv8-2p9j-2685
undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via unbounded memory in the EventSource parser
High Also affects undici
GHSA-xjj6-f33q-929c
undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via unhandled error on excessive content-encodings
High Also affects undici
GHSA-f72v-6w45-q472
undici vulnerable to Subresource Integrity bypass via non-lowercase algorithm tokens
High Also affects undici
GHSA-4w7w-5xrc-9h26
undici vulnerable to cache poisoning and cross-user disclosure via cross-origin redirects
Critical Also affects undici
GHSA-2m5v-pch6-74hx
undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped tls options in Agent
Critical Also affects undici
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor