Skip to content

GHSA-vx9j-46rh-fqr8 CVE-2016-2097

actionview contains Path Traversal vulnerability

Medium RubyGems
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
4.42%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 91.36% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

There is a possible directory traversal and information leak vulnerability in Action View. This was meant to be fixed on CVE-2016-0752. However the 3.2 patch was not covering all possible scenarios. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2016-2097.

Versions Affected: 3.2.x, 4.0.x, 4.1.x Not affected: 4.2+ Fixed Versions: 3.2.22.2, 4.1.14.2

Impact

Applications that pass unverified user input to the render method in a controller may be vulnerable to an information leak vulnerability.

Impacted code will look something like this:

def index
  render params[:id]
end

Carefully crafted requests can cause the above code to render files from unexpected places like outside the application's view directory, and can possibly escalate this to a remote code execution attack.

All users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds immediately.

Releases

The FIXED releases are available at the normal locations.

Workarounds

A workaround to this issue is to not pass arbitrary user input to the render method. Instead, verify that data before passing it to the render method.

For example, change this:

def index
  render params[:id]
end

To this:

def index
  render verify_template(params[:id])
end

private
def verify_template(name)
  # add verification logic particular to your application here
end

Patches

To aid users who aren't able to upgrade immediately we have provided patches for it. It is in git-am format and consist of a single changeset.

  • 3-2-render_data_leak_2.patch - Patch for 3.2 series
  • 4-1-render_data_leak_2.patch - Patch for 4.1 series

Credits

Thanks to both Jyoti Singh and Tobias Kraze from makandra for reporting this and working with us in the patch!

Affected versions

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
actionpack
>= 3.0.0, < 3.2.22.2
3.2.22.2
actionpack
>= 4.0.0, < 4.1.14.2
4.1.14.2
actionview
>= 3.0.0, < 3.2.22.2
3.2.22.2
actionview
>= 4.0.0, < 4.1.14.2
4.1.14.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

actionpack RubyGems → 3.2.22.2

bundler
bundle update actionpack # Gemfile: gem "actionpack", ">= 3.2.22.2"

actionview RubyGems → 3.2.22.2

bundler
bundle update actionview # Gemfile: gem "actionview", ">= 3.2.22.2"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 5.3

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
CVE-2019-5418
Path Traversal in Action View
High Known exploited Also affects actionview
GHSA-6x85-j5j2-27jx
actionpack Path Traversal vulnerability
High Known exploited Also affects actionpack
GHSA-xrr4-p6fq-hjg7
Directory traversal vulnerability in Action View in Ruby on Rails
High Known exploited Also affects actionpack
GHSA-v55j-83pf-r9cq
Rails has a possible XSS vulnerability in its Action View tag helpers
Low Also affects actionview
GHSA-pgm4-439c-5jp6
Rails has a possible XSS vulnerability in its Action Pack debug exceptions
Medium Also affects actionpack
GHSA-vfm5-rmrh-j26v
Possible Content Security Policy bypass in Action Dispatch
Low Also affects actionpack
GHSA-vfg9-r3fq-jvx4
Possible ReDoS vulnerability in HTTP Token authentication in Action Controller
Medium Also affects actionpack
GHSA-x76w-6vjr-8xgj
Possible ReDoS vulnerability in query parameter filtering in Action Dispatch
Medium Also affects actionpack
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor