GHSA-vx8h-4prv-g744 CVE-2026-41052 GO-2026-5876
Rancher has Privilege Escalation from Project Owner to Host
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.42%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 36.68% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-305 Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
- Fix
2.14.2- Upgrade github.com/rancher/rancher to this version or later
Description
Impact
A vulnerability has been identified in Rancher Manager that allows users assigned the Project Owner role to modify Pod Security Admission (PSA) labels on namespaces within their projects. Under the default role configuration, an attacker with the following access pattern can exploit this issue:
- Cluster Access: The user is granted Cluster Member access.
- Project Ownership: The user creates or is assigned ownership of a project.
- Namespace Creation: The user creates a namespace within that project.
- PSA Modification: The user modifies the namespace PSA configuration to use the privileged profile.
- Privilege Escalation: The user deploys privileged workloads within the namespace.
As outlined in the Kubernetes Pod Security Standards documentation, privileged containers disable core Kubernetes security protections, allowing workloads to bypass standard container isolation boundaries. This can result in privilege escalation within the cluster environment.
Potential impacts include:
- Deployment of privileged containers
- Access to host-level resources
- Container breakout
- Cluster privilege escalation
- Compromise of workloads running on affected nodes
Please refer to the associated MITRE ATT&CK techniques for further information about this category of attack:
Reference: Kubernetes Pod Security Standards — Privileged Profile
Patches
This vulnerability is resolved by modifying the project-owner role to explicitly define the allowed verbs for projects resources instead of using the wildcard (*) permission.
The updated role configuration removes access to the updatepsa verb. This prevents project owners from modifying PSA settings in a manner that could enable privilege escalation.
Patched versions of Rancher include releases v2.12.10, v2.13.6, and v2.14.2.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should create a custom project role based on the existing Project Owner role, while removing unrestricted wildcard permissions for project resources.
The allowed verbs for projects should be restricted to: “get, update, delete, patch, create, list, watch, deletecollection” instead of “*”.
This prevents access to the updatepsa capability that enables the privilege escalation path.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in the Rancher repository.
- Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/rancher/rancher | >= 2.14.0, < 2.14.2 |
2.14.2 |
| github.com/rancher/rancher | >= 2.13.0, < 2.13.6 |
2.13.6 |
| github.com/rancher/rancher | >= 2.12.0, < 2.12.10 |
2.12.10 |
| github.com/rancher/rancher | < 0.0.0-20260513182521-2800aaac25b5 |
0.0.0-20260513182521-2800aaac25b5 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/rancher/rancher Go → 2.14.2
- go
go get github.com/rancher/rancher@v2.14.2 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- High
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- High
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- High
CVSS 3.1 8.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-305: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
The authentication algorithm is sound, but the implemented mechanism can be bypassed as the result of a separate weakness that is primary to the authentication error.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-4j6x-2764-m8gh Rancher has over-inclusive team membership expansion in GitHub App authentication provider | High | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-mhc6-2gfq-xx62 Rancher vulnerable to command injection through unsanitized YAML parameter | Critical | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-5v3h-x4wf-5c35 Rancher Extensions have arbitrary file access via path traversal | High | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-gqf8-rvrh-g7w6 Rancher cloud credentials can be used through proxy API by users without access | Critical | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5 Rancher's restricted PodSecurityPolicy does not prevent containers from running as a privileged user | High | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-mc24-7m59-4q5p Rancher CLI skips TLS verification on Rancher CLI login command | Medium | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-mw39-9qc2-f7mg Rancher exposes sensitive information through audit logs | Medium | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-j4vr-pcmw-hx59 Rancher user retains access to clusters despite Global Role removal | Medium | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
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