GHSA-mw39-9qc2-f7mg CVE-2024-58269 GO-2025-4074
Rancher exposes sensitive information through audit logs
- Severity
- 4.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.29%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 21.51% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
- Fix
0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea- Upgrade github.com/rancher/rancher to this version or later
Description
Impact
Note: The exploitation of this issue requires that the malicious user have access to Rancher’s audit log storage.
A vulnerability has been identified in Rancher Manager, where sensitive information, including secret data, cluster import URLs, and registration tokens, is exposed to any entity with access to Rancher audit logs. This happens in two different ways:
- Secret Annotation Leakage: When creating Kubernetes Secrets using the
stringDatafield, the cleartext value is embedded in thekubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configurationannotation. This annotation is included in Rancher audit logs within both the request and response bodies, exposing secret material that should be redacted. - Cluster Registration Token Leakage: During the import or creation of downstream clusters (Custom, Imported, or Harvester), Rancher audit logs record full cluster registration manifests and tokens, including:
a. Non-expiring import URLs such as
/v3/import/<token>_c-m-xxxx.yaml. b. Fullkubectl applyandcurlcommands containing registration tokens and CA checksums. c. Token values associated with cluster registration resources (clusterRegistrationToken). d. These tokens are valid until explicitly revoked and can be used to re-register nodes, granting unauthorized cluster access.
An attacker or internal user who gains access to these logs could:
- Recover plaintext secret values from annotations.
- Use cluster registration tokens or import URLs to re-enroll agents or compromise downstream clusters.
- Access clusters that rely on these tokens for authentication, enabling lateral movement.
Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Log Enumeration for further information about this category of attack.
Patches
This vulnerability is addressed by applying redaction to sensitive information that was leaking.
Patched versions of Rancher include release v2.12.3.
Workarounds
If the deployment can't be upgraded to a fixed version, users are encouraged to create AuditPolicies to redact and filter some of those requests as described in our documentation.
The following AuditPolicy can be applied to redact the secrets:
apiVersion: auditlog.cattle.io/v1
kind: AuditPolicy
metadata:
name: redactions
spec:
enabled: true
additionalRedactions:
- headers:
- "Referer"
- paths:
- "$..metadata.annotations['kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration']"
Also consider granting access to Rancher's logs only for trusted users.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in the Rancher repository.
- Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/rancher/rancher | < 0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea |
0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/rancher/rancher Go → 0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea
- go
go get github.com/rancher/rancher@v0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 4.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
The product writes sensitive information to a log file.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Consider seriously the sensitivity of the information written into log files. Do not write secrets into the log files.
- Distribution: Remove debug log files before deploying the application into production.
- Operation: Protect log files against unauthorized read/write.
- Implementation: Adjust configurations appropriately when software is transitioned from a debug state to production.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-4j6x-2764-m8gh Rancher has over-inclusive team membership expansion in GitHub App authentication provider | High | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-vx8h-4prv-g744 Rancher has Privilege Escalation from Project Owner to Host | High | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-mhc6-2gfq-xx62 Rancher vulnerable to command injection through unsanitized YAML parameter | Critical | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-5v3h-x4wf-5c35 Rancher Extensions have arbitrary file access via path traversal | High | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-gqf8-rvrh-g7w6 Rancher cloud credentials can be used through proxy API by users without access | Critical | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5 Rancher's restricted PodSecurityPolicy does not prevent containers from running as a privileged user | High | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-mc24-7m59-4q5p Rancher CLI skips TLS verification on Rancher CLI login command | Medium | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
| GHSA-j4vr-pcmw-hx59 Rancher user retains access to clusters despite Global Role removal | Medium | Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher |
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