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GHSA-mw39-9qc2-f7mg CVE-2024-58269 GO-2025-4074

Rancher exposes sensitive information through audit logs

Medium Go
Severity
4.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.29%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 21.51% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Fix
0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea
Upgrade github.com/rancher/rancher to this version or later

Description

Impact

Note: The exploitation of this issue requires that the malicious user have access to Rancher’s audit log storage.

A vulnerability has been identified in Rancher Manager, where sensitive information, including secret data, cluster import URLs, and registration tokens, is exposed to any entity with access to Rancher audit logs. This happens in two different ways:

  1. Secret Annotation Leakage: When creating Kubernetes Secrets using the stringData field, the cleartext value is embedded in the kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration annotation. This annotation is included in Rancher audit logs within both the request and response bodies, exposing secret material that should be redacted.
  2. Cluster Registration Token Leakage: During the import or creation of downstream clusters (Custom, Imported, or Harvester), Rancher audit logs record full cluster registration manifests and tokens, including: a. Non-expiring import URLs such as /v3/import/<token>_c-m-xxxx.yaml. b. Full kubectl apply and curl commands containing registration tokens and CA checksums. c. Token values associated with cluster registration resources (clusterRegistrationToken). d. These tokens are valid until explicitly revoked and can be used to re-register nodes, granting unauthorized cluster access.

An attacker or internal user who gains access to these logs could:

  • Recover plaintext secret values from annotations.
  • Use cluster registration tokens or import URLs to re-enroll agents or compromise downstream clusters.
  • Access clusters that rely on these tokens for authentication, enabling lateral movement.

Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Log Enumeration for further information about this category of attack.

Patches

This vulnerability is addressed by applying redaction to sensitive information that was leaking.

Patched versions of Rancher include release v2.12.3.

Workarounds

If the deployment can't be upgraded to a fixed version, users are encouraged to create AuditPolicies to redact and filter some of those requests as described in our documentation.

The following AuditPolicy can be applied to redact the secrets:

apiVersion: auditlog.cattle.io/v1
kind: AuditPolicy
metadata:
  name: redactions
spec:
  enabled: true
  additionalRedactions:
    - headers:
      - "Referer"
    - paths:
      - "$..metadata.annotations['kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration']"

Also consider granting access to Rancher's logs only for trusted users.

References

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/rancher/rancher
< 0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea
0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/rancher/rancher Go → 0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea

go
go get github.com/rancher/rancher@v0.0.0-20251013203444-50dc516a19ea && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File

The product writes sensitive information to a log file.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Consider seriously the sensitivity of the information written into log files. Do not write secrets into the log files.
  • Distribution: Remove debug log files before deploying the application into production.
  • Operation: Protect log files against unauthorized read/write.
  • Implementation: Adjust configurations appropriately when software is transitioned from a debug state to production.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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GHSA-j4vr-pcmw-hx59
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Medium Also affects github.com/rancher/rancher
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