GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3 CVE-2026-55987 GO-2026-6078
Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
- Severity
- 8.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.54% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Description
Gitea's OAuth2 sign-in callback reactivates a deactivated user account (IsActive=false) when the user signs in through an authentication source that does not issue refresh tokens (notably GitHub, and any OIDC/OAuth2 source configured without offline_access). PR #38009 added a gate intended to reactivate users only when the OAuth2 auto-sync cron had disabled them, using "the stored refresh token is empty" as the signal. That signal is wrong: for sources that never issue refresh tokens, an empty refresh token is the normal state of every user, so the gate cannot distinguish a cron-disabled account from one an administrator deliberately deactivated. The next time the administrator-deactivated user signs in through the provider, Gitea sets IsActive=true and grants a full session, silently undoing the administrator's action. This is the exact behavior #38009 was written to prevent. (ProhibitLogin, the hard ban, is enforced separately and is not affected.)
No special privileges are required beyond being the deactivated user and being able to sign in through the source.
Root Cause
routers/web/auth/oauth.go (the handleOAuth2SignIn reactivation gate):
if !u.IsActive {
extLogin, hasExt, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID)
if err != nil { ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err); return }
isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.RefreshToken == "" // wrong signal
if isDisabledByAutoSync {
opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true) // reactivates the account
}
}
The assumption that RefreshToken == "" is produced only by the auto-sync cron is false:
- The cron's disable path is unreachable for sources without refresh tokens.
services/auth/source/oauth2/source_sync.goreturns early:if !provider.RefreshTokenAvailable() { return ... }, so it never disables (or touches the tokens of) such users. - The stored token is exactly what the provider returned, with no synthesizing:
services/externalaccount/user.gostoresRefreshToken: gothUser.RefreshToken. When the provider issues none, this is""from the first login. - GitHub never issues a refresh token:
gothhardcodesfunc (p *Provider) RefreshTokenAvailable() bool { return false }(providers/github/github.go). OIDC/OAuth2 withoutoffline_accesslikewise store"".
So for a GitHub (or no-refresh-token) source, RefreshToken == "" is the state of every user, including one an administrator deactivated, and the gate reactivates them.
Proof of Concept
Setup:
- A Gitea instance with a GitHub authentication source (Admin Panel -> Authentication Sources -> OAuth2 -> GitHub), or any OAuth2/OIDC source configured without
offline_access. - Account V: a normal user who has signed in at least once through that source (an
external_login_userrow exists with emptyrefresh_token).
Steps:
- As an administrator, open Admin Panel -> Users -> V and uncheck "Activated" (
is_active=false). Confirm V's requests now bounce to the activation page. - As V, sign in again via "Sign in with GitHub" and complete the provider flow.
- V lands in the application with a working session.
SELECT is_active FROM "user" WHERE lower_name='v';now returnstrue.
Expected (intended by #38009): V stays is_active=false and is routed to the activation page.
Actual: V is is_active=true with a full session — the administrator's deactivation is undone.
- GitHub user, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED + session granted <<< admin action undone
- OIDC user w/ refresh token, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="..." -> stays disabled (control)
- OIDC user, AUTO-SYNC cron disabled refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED (intended)
RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED.
Gitea's own regression test TestOAuth2CallbackReactivationGating ("auto-sync-disabled user is reactivated") sets RefreshToken="" and asserts reactivation after a full OIDC callback — that state is identical to a GitHub-source user an administrator deactivated.
Impact
Any Gitea instance using a GitHub authentication source (one of the most common) or an OIDC/OAuth2 source without refresh tokens, that relies on the "Activated" toggle to disable accounts, is affected. A deactivated user restores their own account to active and obtains a session, regaining whatever access the account had. Deactivation does not clear IsAdmin, so a deactivated administrator regains admin access. Bound: accounts disabled with "Prohibit Login" stay blocked; this defeats the IsActive=false deactivation only.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| code.gitea.io/gitea | < 1.27.0 |
1.27.0 |
| gitea.dev | < 1.27.0 |
1.27.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.27.0
- go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy
gitea.dev Go → 1.27.0
- go
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 8.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation | Critical Known exploited | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872 Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API | Low | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6 Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes | Medium | Also affects gitea.dev |
| GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2 Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 | High | Also affects gitea.dev |
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