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GHSA-rv63-4mwf-qqc2 CVE-2026-54288

hono: Body Limit Middleware can be bypassed on AWS Lambda by understating `Content-Length`

Medium npm
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.15%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 3.90% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Fix
4.12.25
Upgrade hono to this version or later

Description

Summary

The Body Limit Middleware trusts the request's Content-Length header to decide whether a body is within the limit. On AWS Lambda (API Gateway v1/v2, ALB, VPC Lattice, and Lambda@Edge) the body is delivered fully buffered and the adapter builds the request with the client-declared Content-Length, which need not match the actual payload. A client can declare a tiny Content-Length while sending a much larger body, slipping past the limit.

Details

When Content-Length is present and Transfer-Encoding is absent, the middleware compares the declared value against the limit and passes the request through if it is small enough. On standards-based runtimes the transport enforces that Content-Length matches the body, so this is safe. The Lambda adapters instead reconstruct the request from a buffered payload and copy the client's Content-Length verbatim, so the declared length and the real body size are decoupled.

This issue affects applications deployed on AWS Lambda that rely on the Body Limit Middleware to cap request body size.

Impact

The declared body-size limit can be bypassed: a handler reads a payload larger than the configured maximum. Processing the oversized payload (large JSON, multipart, etc.) consumes additional CPU and memory per request. The payload remains bounded by the platform's request size limits, and Lambda isolates invocations, so the impact is increased per-request resource usage rather than full denial of service. This affects applications deployed on AWS Lambda that use the Body Limit Middleware.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
hono
< 4.12.25
4.12.25

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

hono npm → 4.12.25

npm
npm install hono@4.12.25
yarn
yarn add hono@4.12.25
pnpm
pnpm add hono@4.12.25

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7
Hono: `serveStatic` decodes the request path a second time, leading to bypass of middleware on static paths
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-hxh3-vqpv-xpqv
hono/jsx renders plain strings unescaped in boundary components, leading to XSS
Low Also affects hono
GHSA-gqvv-2mrq-wpjv
Hono: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-39408: `toSSG()` still writes files outside the output directory
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-g6gw-c38x-mqfc
Hono: Unbounded dot-notation nesting in `parseBody()` can cause memory exhaustion
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx
Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-79qm-7rj5-m7r9
Hono: Proxy Helper does not remove response headers listed in the `Connection` header
Low Also affects hono
GHSA-54fx-42gc-7vw4
Hono: Algorithmic Complexity DoS in Language Middleware
Medium Also affects hono
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